[2017.10.01] suhide-lite v1.09 [EXPERIMENTAL/UNSUPPORTED]

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oOflyeyesOo

Senior Member
May 27, 2010
994
127
St louis
I seem to be having issues getting SU to install under SBIN. I have put the commands in termenal in TWRP, and doing it through command line on the pc. Both of course give no response, but every time I try to install suhide, it tells me that it was not installed under SBIN. I am running a N6 on DU, so that may be the problem. I am going to try more when I get home from work.
 
nguyentankiet

nguyentankiet

Senior Member
Aug 6, 2014
576
308
Kien Giang
Hi @Chainfire
Thank for updated suhide.
I installed supersu 2.82 sr2 with sbin mode. It working, but i had problem: my device (S7 edge - Aug security patch) not detect sim card.
If i install supersu 2.82 sr2 with normal mode then no problem. Any idea?
c36f503bc929afaa0d0925ab39f0d28f.jpg
 
S

SvEgiiVEteR

Member
Jul 21, 2017
13
2
SR2-SuperSU-v2.82-SR2-20170808115921.zip
UPDATE-suhide-v1.00-20170809130405-v1.07-20170811001532
Xiaomi Redmi 4X MUIU 8.2.1.0 A6
detected root management app.is this normal?
i.imgur.com/XnzLrVg.jpg
i.imgur.com/yqaUfxk.jpg
for example, snapchat does not see root and SafetyNet Test ok
sberbank finds.
 
Last edited:
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jcmm11

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Chainfire

Chainfire

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nguyentankiet said:
Thank for updated suhide.
I installed supersu 2.82 sr2 with sbin mode. It working, but i had problem: my device (S7 edge - Aug security patch) not detect sim card.
If i install supersu 2.82 sr2 with normal mode then no problem. Any idea?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse

Reproduced. Trying to find the cause.

liudongmiao said:
When I try to fix an issue with suhide, I found the mechanism.

...

So, It should be very easy to detect. I'm very curious about the binder proxy. Will it be opensource?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse

That's great, but why would you post the details? Android Security guys are reading this thread, and even if it is easy for them to find, if it takes them 5 minutes extra that is better.

No, the binder proxy will not be open source.
 
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Z

zenyatta80

Member
May 11, 2017
15
4
SuperSU in SBIN mode problems

oOflyeyesOo said:
I seem to be having issues getting SU to install under SBIN. I have put the commands in termenal in TWRP, and doing it through command line on the pc. Both of course give no response, but every time I try to install suhide, it tells me that it was not installed under SBIN. I am running a N6 on DU, so that may be the problem. I am going to try more when I get home from work.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse

I am having the same problem on my Pixel XL. SuperSU does not install in SBIN mode despite the ECHO command. I am unable to attached a screenshot but Rootchecker says SuperSU is installed /su/bin/su.

I am reflashing it from /tmp. Will that make a difference?

Many thanks for your help.
 
L

lpmlpm

Member
Dec 7, 2011
5
1
IMEI/telephony lost after install of SuperSu 2.82 SR2 + Suhide 1.07

EDIT: problem confirmed fixed with SuperSU-v2.82-SR2-20170812122541-SIMFIX

SO I have a SM-G930FD (Galaxy S7 Duos) flashed with firmware G930FXXU1DQD7_CL11104523_QB13263348 and rooted with SuperSU 2.79 SR3. My recovery is TWRP 3.0.2-4

Yesterday I installed SuperSU 2.82 SR2 and suhide 1.07. I had no problem installing it, I created /data/.supersu then I simply copied the zip's over to /sdcard and flashed using TWRP with SuperSu first, reboot, then suhide, then reboot.

Suhide was indeed installed and working OK but I noticed that my both my SIM's were no longer recognized. After further investigation the IMEI's were both showing as "unknown". Also, Flashfire would no longer backup (would reboot instead of launching the backup). Other connectivity (Wifi, bluetooth) were working normally.

I inspected the EFS and I noticed a freshly generated nv_data.bin with a modified date timestamp roughly equal to the installation time of suhide, give or take a few minutes. I tried restoring from the .nv_data.bak to no avail. I tried restoring the EFS manually from a backup I had, still both IMEI's were gone. I tried multiple reboots with various variations of EFS restore to no avail.

So I uninstalled suhide by deleting folder /data/adb/su/suhide , uninstalling the suhide-lite APK, then I reflashed SuperSU 2.79 SR3 by sideloading the zip to TWRP. Lo and behold, the IMEI's came back and the phone was back to normal with both SIM's active.

The whole thing was very odd. suhide working fine but no more telephony.

EDIT: problem confirmed fixed with SuperSU-v2.82-SR2-20170812122541-SIMFIX
 
Last edited:
KaMyKaSii

KaMyKaSii

Senior Member
Feb 25, 2015
1,391
686
oOflyeyesOo said:
I seem to be having issues getting SU to install under SBIN. I have put the commands in termenal in TWRP, and doing it through command line on the pc. Both of course give no response, but every time I try to install suhide, it tells me that it was not installed under SBIN. I am running a N6 on DU, so that may be the problem. I am going to try more when I get home from work.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse

zenyatta80 said:
I am having the same problem on my Pixel XL. SuperSU does not install in SBIN mode despite the ECHO command. I am unable to attached a screenshot but Rootchecker says SuperSU is installed /su/bin/su.

I am reflashing it from /tmp. Will that make a difference?

Many thanks for your help.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse

Try to move the file to /data (or /cache if data is not available in TWRP) and rename it to ".supersu", then install SuperSU normally
 

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Z

zenyatta80

Member
May 11, 2017
15
4
KaMyKaSii said:
Try to move the file to /data (or /cache if data is not available in TWRP) and rename it to ".supersu", then install SuperSU normally
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Thanks for your reply. .supersu gets created in /data as a result of the echo command. I've verified it's there and also the contents. But reflashing SuperSU still creates the binaries in /su/bin/su instead of /su/sbin.

Also must mention that I already has SuperSU 2.82 installed. Should I try to remove root completely and retry?

Sent from my Pixel XL using Tapatalk
 
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    Chainfire
    Chainfire
    suhide-lite is an experimental (and officially unsupported) mod for SuperSU that can selectively hide root (the su binary) from other applications. It can also toggle visibility of packages (such as SuperSU).

    SafetyNet verified passing on 2017.08.10.

    This is ultimately a losing game (see the next post). suhide may stop working at any time.

    Requirements
    - SuperSU v2.82 SR2 or newer (link)
    - SuperSU installed in SBIN mode (default on O+)
    - Android 6.0 or newer
    - TWRP (3.0.2 or newer with access to /data), FlashFire is not (yet) supported.

    Xposed
    Not supported.

    CyanogenMod/LineageOS
    Not currently tested or supported. Might work, might not.

    Custom kernels/ROMs
    If they changed build props, they will probably fail SafetyNet check (for now).

    Installation

    First make sure you are using SuperSU in SBIN mode on Android 6.x and 7.x
    - Boot into TWRP
    --- adb shell: echo "BINDSBIN=true">/data/.supersu
    --- OR: flash SuperSU Config and select Systemless SBIN mode
    - Reflash SuperSU v2.82 SR2 or newer
    - Reboot into Android at least once

    With SuperSU in SBIN mode
    - Flash the suhide ZIP in TWRP
    - Reboot into Android

    If your TWRP does not fully decrypt /data, reflashing the SuperSU ZIP and immediately flashing the suhide ZIP without rebooting in between may sometimes allow suhide to be installed as well where it would otherwise throw an error.

    Usage

    The suhide GUI available from your app drawer should be fairly self-explanatory. The About tab lists further instructions.

    Advanced usage

    You can manually add/remove/list entries to suhide's blacklist by using these commands:

    /sbin/supersu/suhide/add UID-or-processname
    /sbin/supersu/suhide/rm UID-or-processname
    /sbin/supersu/suhide/list

    App package names are usually the same as the process name, but not always. Using the UID is safer. You can find the UID by running 'ps -n' (6.x/7.x) or 'ps -An' (8.x). The UID is the first column, and is a 5-digit number starting with 10: 10xxx.

    Uninstall

    Remove /data/adb/su/suhide folder in TWRP's file manager. You can uninstall the suhide app through Android's settings.

    Download

    UPDATE-suhide-v1.09-20171001222116.zip

    In case that bootloops, try the old v1.00 version, and let me know your device and firmware:
    UPDATE-suhide-v1.00-20170809130405.zip

    Sauce @ https://github.com/Chainfire/suhide-lite
    View
    54
    Chainfire
    Chainfire
    Hiding root: a losing game - rant du jour

    Quoting myself from the OP of the old suhide thread:

    Chainfire said:
    Most apps that detect root fall into the payment, banking/investing, corporate security, or (anit cheating) gaming category.

    While a lot of apps have their custom root detection routines, with the introduction of SafetyNet the situation for power users has become worse, as developers of those apps can now use a single API to check if the device is not obviously compromised.

    SafetyNet is of course developed by Google, which means they can do some tricks that others may not be able to easily do, as they have better platform access and control. In its current incarnation, ultimately the detection routines still run as an unprivileged user and do not yet use information from expected-to-be-secure components such as the bootloader or TPM. In other words, even though they have slightly more access than a 3rd party app, they still have less access than a root app does.

    Following from this is that as long as there is someone who is willing to put in the time and effort - and this can become very complex and time consuming very quickly - and SafetyNet keeps their detection routines in the same class, there will in theory always be a way to beat these detections.

    While reading that may initially make some of you rejoice, this is in truth a bad thing. As an Android security engineer in Google's employ has stated, they need to "make sure that Android Pay is running on a device that has a well documented set of API’s and a well understood security model".

    The problem is that with a rooted device, it is ultimately not possible to guarantee said security model with the current class of SafetyNet tamper detection routines. The cat and mouse game currently being played out - SafetyNet detecting root, someone bypassing it, SafetyNet detecting it again, repeat - only serves to emphasize this point. The more we push this, the more obvious this becomes to all players involved, and the quicker SafetyNet (and similar solutions) will grow beyond their current limitations.

    Ultimately, information will be provided and verified by bootloaders/TrustZone/SecureBoot/TIMA/TEE/TPM etc. (Samsung is already doing this with their KNOX/TIMA solutions). Parts of the device we cannot easily reach or patch, and thus there will come a time when these detection bypasses may no longer viable. This will happen regardless of our efforts, as you can be sure malware authors are working on this as well. What we power-users do may well influence the time-frame, however. If a bypass attains critical mass, it will be patched quickly.

    More security requires more locking down. Ultimately these security features are about money - unbelievably large amounts of money. This while our precious unlocked bootloaders and root solutions are more of a developer and enthusiast thing. While we're all generally fond of shaking our fists at the likes of Google, Samsung, HTC, etc, it should be noted that there are people in all these companies actively lobbying to keep unlocked/unlockable devices available for us to play with, with the only limitation being that some financial/corporate stuff may not work if we play too hard.

    It would be much easier (and safer from their perspective) for all these parties to simply plug that hole and fully lock down the platform (beyond 3rd party apps using only the normal APIs). Bypassing root checks en masse is nothing less than poking the bear.

    Nevertheless, users want to hide their roots (so do malware authors...) and at least this implementation of suhide is a simple one. I still think it's a bad idea to do it. Then again, I think it's a bad idea to do anything financial related on Android smartphone that isn't completely clean, but that's just me.

    Note that I have intentionally left out any debate on whether SafetyNet/AndroidPay/etc need to be this perfectly secure (most people do their banking on virus ridden Windows installations after all), who should get to decide which risk is worth taking, or even if Google and cohorts would be able to design the systems more robustly so the main app processor would not need to be trusted at all. (the latter could be done for Android Pay, but wouldn't necessarily solve anything for Random Banking App). While those are very interesting discussion points, ultimately it is Google who decides how they want this system to work, regardless of our opinions on the matter - and they want to secure it.
    Click to expand...
    Click to collapse

    I still stand behind this statement I made a year ago.

    I will add to this another concern that I've posted before: on the A/B layout devices such as the Google Pixel (XL), it is possible to detect the device is rooted with a handful of lines of code, and I do not see any way to beat this detection aside from custom kernels. As soon as this detection is added to SafetyNet, it is pretty much game over. Frankly I'm surprised it hasn't been added yet.
    View
    47
    Chainfire
    Chainfire
    The new suhide-lite vs the old suhide

    The old suhide was completely different under the hood. It proxied zygote and created two different process trees for the real zygote and descendants (apps), one with root and one without, and multiplexed app instantiation calls between them. The new suhide-lite uses a completely different mechanism to achieve a similar outcome (some apps with and some apps without root).

    One thing the old suhide had and the new suhide-lite version does not, is full binder interception. It could listen to and change most API calls and responses between apps and the Android system dynamically. While this may not sound like a big deal to some, from a malware-perspective this is almost a holy-grail class hack. suhide only used it to hide application packages (such as SuperSU) from apps selectively, so for example the launcher could still find it, but to some games it was completely invisible.

    The binder interception code was the part that really interested me and the desire to get that working was the driving force behind the old suhide implementation. The security measures in Android's November 2016 security update blocked the old mechanism and with it the binder interceptor. Of course, I have actually written the code to bypass those (naive) protections in turn, but since that implementation of suhide was possible to detect in other ways, I kept that patch private. It may still prove useful in other projects, so it didn't make any sense to burn those work-arounds.

    It may be possible to port the interceptor to the new mechanism, but it would be a lot of work and I don't think I'll be doing it any time soon, if ever. The lack of this intercepter is what makes the new suhide lite. The new suhide is able to hide packages such as SuperSU from other apps and games, but it does so via a toggle mechanism (3x alternating volup/voldown) that hides and unhides them, rather than handling the whole thing transparently.
    View
    38
    Chainfire
    Chainfire
    Changelogs

    2017.10.01 - v1.09
    - Remove ODM and OEM mounts
    - Setpropex: set multiple properties
    - Cleanup: remove /boot

    2017.08.15 - v1.08
    - Fix a process freeze issue
    - Fix framework restart survival (stop && start)
    - Fix double free crash

    2017.08.11 - v1.07
    - Startup: Fix parallelism

    2017.08.10 - v1.06
    - Startup: Disable parallelism (temporary?), causes things to break sometimes

    2017.08.10 - v1.05
    - GUI: Synchronize changing items with the same UID
    - GUI: Hide system apps (UID < 10000)
    - GUI: Fix UID / package display line to ellipsize instead of wrap
    - Properties: Adjust various build, adb, debug and security properties
    - Startup: Improve performance by running operations in parallel
    - ZIP: Allow flashing directly after SuperSU switch from image to SBIN mode, without reboot in between

    2017.08.09 - v1.00
    - Initial release of new code
    - For old code, see https://xdaforums.com/apps/supersu/suhide-t3450396
    View
    26
    Chainfire
    Chainfire
    v1.08 released

    v1.08 is now available from the opening post of this thread ( https://xdaforums.com/apps/supersu/suhide-lite-t3653855 )

    This will hopefully fix the freezing issue some have been seeing. I've had a couple of devices run the boot-sequence and monkey-testing apps for a few minute in a loop, and fixed all the freezes I could find that way. Hopefully that includes the ones that have been reported here.
    View

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