[XZ1c/XZ1/XZp] temp root exploit to backup drm keys implemented

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j4nn

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Jan 4, 2012
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Tested also build without parallel make (removed the -j7 option). It did not help (stock ramdisk, not modified sony source).
Patched final linking of kernel with dtb images in order to produce dtb variants in the same order as it was present in the stock kernel, to have the dtb blob binary identical - no luck:
moofesr said:
Having tried both the NoJ7 and DTB kernel images, neither has worked whatsoever. They both result in the same issue as before: frozen on the sony screen before rebooting automatically. Once again, I tried to connect via ADB but in both cases, it was simply too early to hook up via ADB

--- edit ---
Tried with ramdisk rebuilt (unpacked stock ramdisk and re-packed it again) - to avoid possible garbage that could have been there from stock boot image split process.
According to @moofesr, it still failed to boot the same as the trials before.

@janjan, could you please let me know which toolchain and which mkbootimg do you use for build of your kernel?
Do you use some different option with mkbootimg?
I am already out of ideas what can be wrong with this:(
 
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nailyk

Senior Member
Oct 3, 2015
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Hi all,

just got my xz1c. Still locked for now (am reading xda threads about it, but almost really don't care of keeping it locked)
How can I help you on this?
(right now am on .179)

BTW hi @munjeni ! Funny to see you here, with the same device this time :highfive:
 
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j4nn

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@golden-guy, please check the the opening post, the CVE-2017-7308 had been already checked. You need to find userspace exploit to get NET_RAW capability first in order to be able to exploit via that CVE. Only very few processes have the needed capability. The oreo selinux setup is not nice with that regard.
 

golden-guy

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Oct 6, 2013
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@golden-guy, please check the the opening post, the CVE-2017-7308 had been already checked. You need to find userspace exploit to get NET_RAW capability first in order to be able to exploit via that CVE. Only very few processes have the needed capability. The oreo selinux setup is not nice with that regard.

I read it, but wasn't sure about the progress on this one. So something like a ping is not supported on the shell? Since these cmds are normally symlinked with the shell binary (toybox/busybox) I would have assumed this cap is given when the exploit is executed via shell.

Either way, please let me know how to best support this effort. I will continue to do some research for now.
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
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@golden-guy, I am afraid that even though ping might have that cap, it does not mean the shell has it nor commands started from it.
If inotify/rename vulnerability would not go well, I see blueborne followed by CVE-2017-1000112 (memory corruption in UDP fragmentation offload) exploit as the next target.
You may check post#54 from @4rz0 that seems very interesting with regard to blueborne.
There is a problem to compile a kernel that would boot stock firmware on an unlocked phone - that would be useful in general for any kernel exploit debugging/testing.
Still waiting if @janjan has some idea what is wrong as he knows the right way. Or anybody else?
 

janjan

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Tested also build without parallel make (removed the -j7 option). It did not help (stock ramdisk, not modified sony source).
Patched final linking of kernel with dtb images in order to produce dtb variants in the same order as it was present in the stock kernel, to have the dtb blob binary identical - no luck:


--- edit ---
Tried with ramdisk rebuilt (unpacked stock ramdisk and re-packed it again) - to avoid possible garbage that could have been there from stock boot image split process.
According to @moofesr, it still failed to boot the same as the trials before.

@janjan, could you please let me know which toolchain and which mkbootimg do you use for build of your kernel?
Do you use some different option with mkbootimg?
I am already out of ideas what can be wrong with this:(


@golden-guy, please check the the opening post, the CVE-2017-7308 had been already checked. You need to find userspace exploit to get NET_RAW capability first in order to be able to exploit via that CVE. Only very few processes have the needed capability. The oreo selinux setup is not nice with that regard.


Unfortunately I am away from home and my PC..( summer holidays) I can't remember which one I used. But i use to compile my own. I will post my script, steps etc when I get home.
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,286
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just got my xz1c. Still locked for now (am reading xda threads about it, but almost really don't care of keeping it locked)
How can I help you on this?
(right now am on .179)
Just unlocked mine. Feels free to send me some kernels to test on stock (with the according version to flash please)
@nailyk, could you please test following kernel?
boot-12.179-osvs.img
It is a build of not modified sony kernel source released for 47.1.A.12.179 fw with ramdisk extracted from that fw's kernel.sin.
It is another attempt to test kernel build procedure.
This time I've added os version info and signed it with a test key.
Thanks.
 
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j4nn

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Anybody here with unlocked xz1c can test a kernel to boot for me please?
It seems that everybody previously willing to test is on summer vacation.
I can build a kernel for your stock (or stock based) fw version (to avoid need of reflash/downgrade) if that makes it easier for you.
I believe the test could be done even without flashing of the kernel - using 'fastboot boot boot.img' command - to just boot the image from usb.
Let me know please. Thanks.
 
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blue-spiderfire

Senior Member
Feb 19, 2012
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Muenster
Anybody here with unlocked xz1c can test a kernel to boot for me please?
It seems that everybody previously willing to test is on summer vacation.
I can build a kernel for your stock (or stock based) fw version (to avoid need of reflash/downgrade) if that makes it easier for you.
I believe the test could be done even without flashing of the kernel - using 'fastboot boot boot.img' command - to just boot the image from usb.
Let me know please. Thanks.
I'm still on 47.1.A.2.2.324 and I would like to test, if your kernel wouldn't hurt my daily driver.
 

j4nn

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Jan 4, 2012
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Let me show you something:
Code:
    /data/local/tmp # ./mytest-linux -p 1000 -l
    detected overwrite (event#561, count=1):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#829, count=2):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1015, count=3):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1441, count=4):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1481, count=5):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1627, count=6):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1697, count=7):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1793, count=8):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1889, count=9):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
    detected overwrite (event#1943, count=10):
        len=208 name="p+ppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp"
This is my implementation of inotify/rename exploit run in qemu - I have found a way how to overcome the problem with delayed kfree from kfree_rcu described in post#33, post#44 and post#48.

And I've even managed to tune half of it for real locked xz1c - it triggers short filenames overwrite, but using the same method as with long filenames (or the first half of it as the second part with kfree_rcu is not needed in short file name case):
Code:
130|G8441:/data/local/tmp $ ./mytest-android                                   
detected overwrite (event#728, count=1):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#802, count=2):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#1418, count=3):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#1778, count=4):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#1834, count=5):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#1982, count=6):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#2038, count=7):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#2066, count=8):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#2102, count=9):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
detected overwrite (event#2116, count=10):
    len=16 name="g+ggggggggggggg"
G8441:/data/local/tmp $
Guys, is here really nobody (with _unlocked_ xz1c) willing to at least test with me?
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,286
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It is another attempt to test kernel build procedure.
This time I've added os version info and signed it with a test key.
Thanks.
I would help you. I have an unlocked bootloader and I'm on build .235 so my test will fail?
So we have a working build procedure now (reinvented the wheel after all; -)
With Raz0Rfail we could finally boot a kernel built from 12.235 source.
The cause of bootloop with all previous build attempts (that were tested by @moofesr) was missing os version setting in kernel boot image (what a shame that sony did not include that option in their kernel's readme).
So big thanks go to both, @moofesr and @Raz0Rfail for help with the testing.

Working build procedure allowed to get first insight into inotify/rename vulnerability time relations - I've reverted the fix for the vulnerability and built a kernel patched with important points timing recording:
boot-12.235-timing.img
It can boot the 47.1.A.12.235 stock firmware.
That allowed to finally proceed with post#53 to get some timing measurements (test result from Raz0Rfail):
Code:
...
status = 0x03 (#1) [0]
rename_start = 8614972865
inotify_start +      -4
fsnot_start   +     214
fsnot_strlen  +     249
copy_name     +    5349
kfrcu_start   +    5355
rename_end    +    5688
kfrcu_kfree   +  690549
addk_wake     +    5775
fsnot_strcpy  +     273
inotify_end   +    1332
...
This shows that there is only 273 - 249 = 24 timer cycles long the racy/vulnerable part of the inotify handler code, the part between the strlen and strcpy there.
While the actual kfree (marked as kfrcu_kfree) was invoked many orders later (690549 - 5355 = 685194) after the kfree_rcu call, confirming the problem with delayed kfree from kfree_rcu described in post#33, post#44 and post#48. The max delay of kfree in the results from one test attempt was even 1 316 601 timer cycles, while the min delay was 182 715, so that is quite a big range (done 10 trials).
The log from qemu showed in post#73 indicates that it may eventually work, still it will be very difficult (in case of qemu test I've put artificial delay of 20000 timer cycles in between the strlen and strcpy in order to increase probability to trigger the bug) - and try to "fix" the delay/timing problem of the kfree-add_key to fill the slub entry in time (i.e. to achieve the use after free exploit). That is we need to fit the delayed kfree followed by add_key spray into the 24 cycles long vulnerable part - seems impossible right?
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,286
2,505
Could someone with unlocked and rooted XZ1c post a kernel boot log here please?
I assume you could do it with something like this:
Code:
adb shell
su
cd /data/local/tmp
dmesg > dmesg.txt
chmod 644 dmesg.txt
exit
exit
adb pull /data/local/tmp/dmesg.txt
Stock based fw/kernel would be preferred, but possibly any would do.
Thanks.
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,286
2,505
@moofesr or @Raz0Rfail or anybody else with _unlocked_ bootloader on XZ1c, could you please do a test with following kernel:
boot-12.270-mvuaf.img - sources patched for another timing test, ramdisk extracted from 47.1.A.12.270 (so it needs to be used with this stock fw)
You may either flash it with fastboot, or possibly just boot it with fastboot without flashing (in such case you may verify the kernel build date in "about phone -> kernel" that it was built today to be sure the kernel actually booted via fastboot from usb instead of the stock one in flash) - see post#53 for details.
After the kernel boots, copy the attached utility to the phone via adb and start the test as bellow:
View attachment mvuaf.zip
Code:
adb push mvuaf /data/local/tmp
adb shell
cd /data/local/tmp
chmod 755 mvuaf
./mvuaf
If this gets tested by multiple persons it would be great so we have timing from multiple devices.
Thanks.
 
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j4nn

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Thanks to both @moofesr and @Raz0Rfail for testing.
Guys, could you please do one more test with following updated mvuaf?
Unfortunately the offset did not advance as expected.

It would be great if you could get results where ts_range at the beginning is bigger than 100 000. Please skip those when "ts_range 0 (count=10)" is present.
 

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    Tools to backup TA partition (drm keys) of Xperia XZ1 Compact
    renotrap-xda-icon.png
    by j4nn
    https://j4nn.github.io/

    As everyone knows, bootloader unlock via code from sony removes drm keys. That disables certain functions, the most critical one being the camera (outputting only solid green pictures in case of oreo fw).
    I've implemented tools that allow to backup the whole TA partition, which contains device master key needed to access sony drm keys and restore the TA after bootloader unlock in order to make the camera (among other things) working again on any sony stock firmware.
    In order to be able to use the tools, you need to flash one of the supported firmwares (or be lucky to have the phone already running it).
    In case you need to downgrade, please check this thread first.

    Anybody who is about to unlock your phone, could you please do so with additional test included?
    See post#500 and post#502 for more details.
    Additional details in post#515, post#516, post#517 and post#527.
    Instructions for the test that I kindly ask anybody who is about to unlock to do are described in the post#520 -- tested already.
    Thank you.


    ABOUT THE TOOLS
    • renosploit - rename/notify exploit to get kernelspace read/write, uses multiple vulnerabilities to overcome kaslr, pxn and pan mitigations of android oreo
    • renotrap - helper application (rename/notify temp root app)
    • renoshell - get temp root shell by use of kernel space read/write primitives provided by renosploit (sources available here)
    • renoroot - a shell script to be started from adb, it starts the above tools to get temp root shell
    A preview video of the tools in action can be downloaded here: renoroot-preview.zip or watched online here.

    As an alternative to renoroot you may use 'bindershell' to get a temp root shell for TA backup - it is available here /added on 2020-02-08/

    SUPPORTED TARGETS
    (with downloadable firmware links)
    • Sony Xperia XZ1 Compact (G8441)
      47.1.A.2.324_CE1 (initial tested by @tramtrist, this release tested by @tanapoom1234 post#212)
      47.1.A.8.49_CE1 (tested by @notaz post#224 and @orsonmmz post#232)
    • Sony Xperia XZ1 (G8341/G8343)
      47.1.A.2.324_CE1 (tested by @HandyMenny post#228)
    • Sony Xperia XZ1 Dual (G8342)
      47.1.A.2.281_CE1 (tested by @Vildanoff post#230)
    • Sony Xperia XZ1 (SOV36) /added on 2019-08-22/
      this Japan version can be flashed with fw for G8431 making it exploitable as standard XZ1 (the possibility to use G8431 fw is confirmed here and also here)
      /this confirms there might be a possibility of TA backup for few yoshino platform phone models that are possible to flash with one of the above firmwares (and boot ok even though designed for other phone variant)/

    • Sony Xperia XZ Premium (G8141)
      47.1.A.3.254_CE1 (tested by @DocLM post#227, by @LinFan post#242 and by @steso90 xzp forum post#45)
    • Sony Xperia XZ Premium Dual (G8142)
      47.1.A.3.254_RU (tested by @greatpatel007 xzp forum post#31 and #39)
    • Sony Xperia XZ Premium (G8188) /added on 2019-04-24/
      this Japan version can be flashed with fw for G8141 making it exploitable as standard XZp (tested by zatsune as documented here)
      /this confirms there might be a possibility of TA backup for few yoshino platform phone models that are possible to flash with one of the above firmwares (and boot ok even though designed for other phone variant)/

    An advice: before flashing anything, enable 'OEM Unlocking' in android developer menu and if flashing a fw for different phone model, skip flashing bootloader (i.e. remove boot/ subdirectory completely before using newflasher). /added on 2019-08-27/

    Please note: the temp root exploit (all renoroot tools) are designed only for the above firmware versions (binary kernels builds in them) - there is no chance it would work on other phones or other kernel builds - do not try it, it would not work.
    Concerning portability to other targets, the exploit itself needs several vulnerabilities not fixed in a kernel, the primary one is CVE-2017-7533 (race between inotify and rename).
    This was patched by google with 2017-12-05 security patch level. That means unless you can flash a firmware with older security patch level, it would not make sense to try to adapt the exploit for a new target (like it is a case with XZ2 Compact device for example).

    USING THE TOOLS
    Please follow the steps bellow for a official and up to date guide. If something was not clear enough, you may also check post#382 from @munted for a pdf guide with screenshots possibly containing more details and windows specific hints.
    1. backup everything you need from your phone
    2. flash compatible firmware
      Before flashing, you may take a screenshot of service menu -> service tests -> security possibly together with current sw version screen for reference and copy them from the phone to your PC.
      You can use newflasher tool from @munjeni and use instructions there to flash the firmware.
      The tool should skip dangerous .ta files automatically. You may consider removing Just remove the persist_X-FLASH-ALL-42E5.sin file, which is discussed here to avoid flashing it - as tested by @tanapoom1234, not flashing the persist partition allows to keep the Android Attest Key - check his post#212. /Added on 2019-04-06: The key is not part of TA obviously, it is present in the persist partition, so never flash persist even after TA backup./
      /Added on 2019-04-09: When flashing a firmware, be sure to flash it's bootloader too (i.e. the whole 'boot' directory needs to be present with all files in it including the .ta there). You might skip appslog, diag, Qnovo and ssd./
      In case of downgrade it is needed to flash userdata (and possibly also cache) otherwise you get a boot loop.
      Just backup your stuff before downgrade as with downgrade comes a factory reset. In fact I would recommend to do a factory reset just before the downgrade in order to remove the binding to your google account. This way you can avoid going online after the downgrade if used without sim and skipping wifi configuration.
    3. prepare your phone
      When the phone boots up, try to avoid connecting to internet by selecting only wifi and not configuring any, skipping accounts setup for later.
      This may not always be possible - if persist is not flashed, android insists on setup of google account online, also starting downloads for upgrade.
      Cancel everything as soon as possible and disable wifi. You may be better not using a data enabled sim card - we try to avoid any updates.
      Disable auto updates of both apps and system. Change the theme from animated backgroud to a static one.
      Enable developer menu, enable adb and "Stay awake" option. An youtube video showing the initial setup to prepare for renoroot is available here.
      Take a screenshot of service menu -> service tests -> security for reference and copy it from the phone.
      Again be sure both wifi and mobile data connection are disabled to avoid any background internet access.
    4. install the tools
      Unzip renoroot.zip (download it bellow). Use following adb commands to get the tools to the phone:
      Code:
      adb push renoroot /data/local/tmp
      adb push renoshell /data/local/tmp
      adb push renosploit /data/local/tmp
      adb install -r renotrap.apk
    5. start the tools to get a temp root shell
      Use adb shell to get a command line terminal to the phone and use following commands:
      Code:
      cd /data/local/tmp
      chmod 755 reno*
      ./renoroot
      The last command above will start the exploit eventually resulting with a temp root shell (that should be indicated by # char before the cursor).
      It may get the phone to reboot in case an overwrite does not hit the wanted shaped heap object.
      You may wait few minutes after the phone boots to allow startup processes to settle down in order to avoid timing influence for next trial.
      There is a video for example of this step available here.
    6. backup your TA partition
      When renoroot is successful, you may use following commands in the root shell to backup the trim area partition:
      Code:
      cd /data/local/tmp
      dd if=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA of=TA-locked.img
      chown shell:shell TA-locked.img
      sync
      sync
      And then try to read it out from the phone to your PC - use another command prompt window, do not exit the root one:
      Code:
      adb pull /data/local/tmp/TA-locked.img
    7. unlock phone's bootloader using a code from sony
      When you have the TA-locked.img on your PC including screenshots, you may start the official Sony unlock procedure - follow instructions on sony website please.
      Added on 2019-04-16: please note, bootloader unlocking is not reversible - it is not possible to re-lock back (restore of TA-locked does not relock the bootloader).
      So be prepared to live with the boot up warning screen (can be seen for example in this video).

      Again be sure you have the TA-locked.img on your PC before you start unlocking the bootloader - unlock will erase you phone, so it would get lost from /data/local/tmp if not backed up.
      In case oem unlocking is grayed out (so you cannot enable it) you need to go online at least once and the option would be accessible then - video here.
      After you unlock the bootloader, do not flash anything - just boot the same unmodified fw we used for the temp root.
    8. get temp root again to restore TA
      Use the same instructions to avoid internet access and updates as described above, configure the few above mentioned options and start renoroot as before.
      With the temp root shell, backup the unlocked TA (for future comparisons) and then restore the state from the locked one. You may need to adb push the TA-locked.img back to /data/local/tmp as the unlock erased everything.
      Code:
      cd /data/local/tmp
      dd if=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA of=TA-unlocked.img
      chown shell:shell TA-unlocked.img
      sync
      sync
      And then try to read it out from the phone to your PC (and transfer the locked TA back to the phone) - use another command prompt window, do not exit the root one:
      Code:
      adb pull /data/local/tmp/TA-unlocked.img
      adb push TA-locked.img /data/local/tmp
      And using the window with renoshell temp root shell, restore the TA:
      Code:
      cd /data/local/tmp
      dd if=TA-locked.img of=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA
      sync
      sync
    9. boot up the phone with the current fw and see about the camera if it works on not
      You may also document the security screen state by taking a screenshot. Do not forget to transfer it from the phone to PC.
    10. flash twrp recovery
      Updated on 2019-08-08: please see post#1029 for the latest workflow with the kernels hiding bootloader unlock status.
      Updated on 2019-02-10:
      Instead of flashing twrp, you may just 'fastboot boot' it if you need it.
      Instead of the steps 10. to 13., you may use patched and rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock available in following forum threads in order to be able to even install FOTA system update
      giving you back sony drm functionality that fw disables when it detects unlocked bootloader status. For more details see also post#645 of this thread.
    11. OPTIONAL step (only for XZ1c maybe XZ1)
      This step is optional and only lightly tested. The idea is that secd detects unlocked bootloader and switches to limited mode even though drm keys are available. This can be seen in the adb logcat with following message:
      Code:
      E secd    : secd_backend_credential_manager.cpp:77    the bootloader is unlocked, use limited functionality
      To workaround that, we may use a secd ripped from secd extension by modpunk - just flash attached secd-ignore-unlock.zip at bottom of this post via twrp recovery (do not flash the 'secd extension by modpunk' which is linked here only for reference).
      I've analysed, what changes were done in the secd. Also the lib which fixes the missing device key in TA is not needed from the modpunk's package as we have the real valid key there, so I've removed the lib (and the script which would preload it). Therefore it is just about making secd think that bootloader was not unlocked. Thanks to @modpunk for the patched secd and @russel5 for the flashable zip on which the secd-ignore-unlock.zip is based on.
      With this, sony updates may start to arrive.
      Please note, this would make sony think the phone runs unmodified and still locked fw. OTA updates may restore original secd or fail altogether (due to modified system/vendor/... partitions).
      You may boot the phone to see what happens (OTA updates?) - edit: OTA updates did come, but install to be done on reboot failed - tested by @Unbounded, see post#43 and #44 of the attest key thread please - this may confirm the availability of the SOMC Attest Key which may be the key needed to get sony ota updates (just a guess, not sure what exactly this key is used for).
      Again, this step is optional and very experimental, maybe better not to apply it (camera works without this step on any stock fw without any change /until sony changes that in some update/).
      Update: see post#395 for secd_ignore_unlock for XZ1c for pie from @S-trace - thank you. It works with XZ1 too (see post#396). The patch port for XZp pie is here: attest key thread post#67.
      In my opinion all these secd patch variants are hiding the unlocked state only partially. There are other components in the fw that ask about the unlock state. A proper solution for this is the unlock hiding patched kernel linked in the step 10. of this howto.
    12. flash a recent stock firmware
      In case you wanted the patched secd, flash it again over the flashed fw.
      Boot the phone, check functionality, take screenshots.
    13. install magisk if rooted phone is what you need; -)
      Follow instructions of latest magisk, it should work without any special actions.

    AUTOMATED FULL BACKUP
    These are experimental tools (and actually seem not to work in some cases getting truncated files that are useless) to extract most of the partitions from the phone after getting a temp root. It can be used for comparisons/analysis of what unlock changes (download backup-tools.zip at bottom of this post).
    You would run backup-setup.bat in windows command prompt first (you may need to adjust the PATH setting to find adb properly) to copy the tools to the phone and setup tcp forwarding for netcat based copying.
    Then using adb shell you would do:
    Code:
    cd /data/local/tmp
    ./backup-send.sh
    and in windows command prompt you would start:
    Code:
    backup-recv.bat bk-unlocked
    and partitions images would be extracted from the phone (for larger ones sparse android image format is used).
    Full depth comparison could be achieved by use of these backup tools (obviously needs to be done twice - before and after unlock, changing the target directory name argument of backup-recv.bat).

    WHAT WORKS
    Here is a quote of post#185 from @tramtrist in this thread describing the results of the initial tests - special thanks to him!
    I'd like to report in real quick on what's working.
    After following @j4nn very clear instructions and backing up/restoring my TA keys I was left with the NOT PROVISIONED messages he mentioned earlier. However this seems to be no problem as after TA-restore my camera works as it did before. I'm also able to use WIDEVINE sites which require that key as well.
    After restoring TA I went ahead and flashed the latest UK customized firmware
    I then flashed TWRP latest version 3.2.3
    I wanted to have root so I flashed Magisk 1.73 and safety net worked without me having to do anything special.
    Google Pay could be set up and seems to be using my credit cards just fine.
    I didn't flash any custom kernel as stock is just fine for me.
    Adaway is working with root without issue.
    All-in-all if you follow @j4nn instructions when he's ready to fully release them to the public then I'd say you will be in good shape.
    I'd like to thank @j4nn for giving me the chance to finally contribute something concrete to this community. If you're gonna use this you should drop him some cash.
    Update: if you follow the links added in step 10. and use "rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock", it seems you can have all functionality restored including fota system updates while having magisk root with passed safetynet cts. Verified by @notaz in post#14 of the "[XZ1c] rooted kernel hiding bootloader unlock" thread. Thanks.

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
    Many thanks to following users:
    • @moofesr - for testing initial kernel builds until proper build procedure had been found, special thanks for his patience when all tests resulted with bootloop
    • @Raz0Rfail and @moofesr - for testing timing of rename/notify vulnerability with patched kernel
    • @dosomder (aka zxz0O0) - for his iovyroot
    • @tramtrist - for initial testing of TA backup, unlock and restore, special thanks for exposing to risk of loosing drm if it did not work
    • @tonsofquestions - for a lot of testing with unlocked-ta-restored phone when I did not have an unlocked phone yet
    • ThomasKing (not a user on xda) - for his black hat ksma presentation
    • few other users in this and attest key lost thread here on xda - for some other cve possibilities, ideas and specific tests

    DONATIONS
    Please note: I had to invest enormously lot of time (as you can see throughout this thread and also summarized in progress/change log in post#2) to develop these tools, the code is extremely complex (more than 9000 lines of source code) and it was unbelievable hard to debug and get the timing usable.
    It would be kind of you if you could consider donating here please:
    https://j4nn.github.io/donate/
    I would be happy to accept any donation to me as a form of gratitude in case the software helped you to backup your TA (drm keys) before bootloader unlocking.
    Thanks.

    DOWNLOAD THE TOOLS
    See the attached renoroot.zip at bottom of this post.
    Please post your experience with using the tools, if it worked and on which phone model (and fw in case of xz1c).
    You may include info about how long it took to get a root shell, how many reboots, how many events in the last trial which succeeded with how many overwrites (just one with success is the best, more means previous overwrites did not hit wanted object in shaped heap resulting with possibly unstable system). This info is interesting for statistics, so we all know, how fast can we get a temp root on each device/firmware.
    Thanks.
    32
    permanent root with still locked xz1c preview

    Here a preview video of my current work: still locked xperia xz1c with permanent root on latest fw
    Phone since power up, no unlocked bootloader warning screen, i.e. still locked, with root / magisk right after boot, even auditor app passes the hardware attestation confirming locked state.
    fw version 47.2.A.10.107 (July 1, 2019 security patch level)
    30
    Try to flash full 47.1.A.16.20 fw with newflasher - remove *.ta, keep boot subdirectory (including the one .ta there), remove persist (and optionally Qnovo, amss*, ssd) sin files.
    Try to boot it, check camera and video enhancements. At least camera should work if TA was previously restored.
    Flash the latest twrp. Then magisk. As far as reported by other guys, these two steps were straightforward...

    Does it matter if you don't remove *.ta files or the remove persist (and optionally Qnovo, amss*, ssd) sin files??? (My Android Attest Key was NOT PROVISIONED anyway when I started.) I err just left all the files and flashed them, camera is working though and I have working root and TWRP.

    I've also attached a guide, have a look, honestly because I was fumbling around this whole process took me many hours over 3 days and I'm really glad to get responses to my questions. I hadn't done a lot of this stuff for over a year so I basically had to research from scratch on how to install TWRP etc. But I think the guide should change the degree of difficultly from, "this is quite an involved process, you need to have prior experience with installing multiple tools like TWRP, magisk etc. and know where to find the right Google and Sony drivers from as well as have some UNIX knowledge" to more like, "doable for intermediate users who can download and unzip files and can put commands into Command Prompt." It's a small contribution but I'm hoping it should make your work more accessible and more people will use it. :laugh:

    Again thanks for making this tool j4nn and thanks to tonsofquestions and j4nn for all your help and answering questions, no guarantee I won't ask more questions though! Again hopefully this guide will mean less questions from others! :D

    If anyone has tried to follow this guide and has any suggestions or found it useful let me know :)
    25
    @SXUsr, you know, my work definitely was not about making a profit.
    As mentioned in this post (my answer for a help request to exploit google pixel 2 xl locked down by verizon), just counting the time spent, I could make a better profit taking any low paid job than any bounty promised here.
    If I wanted everybody to pay, it would be a heavily protected commercial app with online license providing private keys to obtain key parts to exploit particular target.
    As already mentioned, if I did not want to get it done for myself, I would not do it, regardless possible reward.

    So thank you to all who donate.

    And so you know, there was an exceptionally generous donation recently - a person who donated even 100$ (not making any comment or any link to a nickname here).
    Thank you very much. That shows there are few who really understand how it was difficult and what value it brings.

    And so you know, your money did not get wasted - I've ordered a brand new XZ1 Compact just for testing and development work.
    This will allow me finally to use my phone for daily driver while I can develop or test anything on another one.
    I believe this phone is great, possibly one of last with such small/acceptable size, now temp-rootable to get it under full control - not sure this repeats anytime soon.
    Working on the exploit and testing downgrades and such, I did not have even a contact list in my phone for something like 9 months!
    Think about it, having such phone and instead of using it, working so long on an exploit...

    Thanks again to all who appreciate the effort, the value it brings and donate/donated something.
    23
    DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS / CHANGE LOG
    • 26-05-2018 started this thread listing vulnerabilities found during many weeks of research done right after buy of my XZ1c phone
    • 06-06-2018 post#7: managed to boot kernel from the 47.1.A.2.281 fw in qemu
    • 16-06-2018 post#25: simple out of bounds overwrite not useful, complex exploiting of use after free needed
    • 02-07-2018 post#33: explained how use after free exploit would work, but timing is impossible: kfree from rcu too late
    • 06-07-2018 post#44 and post#48: more details about exploiting use after free and kfree_rcu too late kfree timing problem
    • 17-07-2018 post#53: first kernel to test timing, did not boot when tried with unlocked xz1c
    • 27-07-2018 post#73: solved the problem with delayed kfree from kfree_rcu, basic inotify/rename proof of concept running in qemu for long filenames
    • 27-07-2018 post#75: found a way to build xz1c kernel from source which can be booted on unlocked xz1c, confirmed the delayed kfree from rcu timing problem
    • 11-08-2018 post#88: extensive testing of timing
    • 20-08-2018 post#104: inotify/rename exploit now works with long filenames, allowing kernel heap (256 bytes slub unit) overflow, overview of next phases of the exploit yet to be implemented
    • 31-08-2018 post#118: implemented mostly arbitrary kernel write _together_ with mostly arbitrary kernel read, first bypass of KASLR but we need to bypass PXN & PAN too
    • 15-09-2018 post#131: found that we will need ROP/JOP gadgets to overcome PXN & PAN oreo mitigations, more details in post#135
    • 22-09-2018 post#137: first arbitrary kernel space read and write proof of concept working in qemu
    • 22-09-2018 post#138: with great timing luck kernel space R/W poc worked on still locked xz1c
    • 05-10-2018 post#146: first backup of my xz1c locked TA done: asking for an unlock-and-TA-restore test volunteer
    • 07-10-2018 post#151: confirmed that BL unlock removed 66667 unit - device master key?
    • 18-10-2018 post#162: exploit not reliable enough for public use yet
    • 22-10-2018 post#165: renoroot preview video, send initial test version to @tramtrist
    • 22-10-2018 post#168: renoroot initial test results - after TA restore camera works, BL remains unlocked
    • 25-10-2018 post#185: more initial test results directly from @tramtrist
    • 28-10-2018 post#199: researched possible uses of various keys from security service menu
    • 03-11-2018 post#206: renoroot temp root including tools and howto for TA partition (drm keys) backup released, put everything on the first page
    • 05-11-2018 post#235: renoroot confirmed working with other phone models
    • 10-11-2018 post#287: ordered a new xz1c just for testing and development work
    • 18-11-2018 post#348: the new xz1c arrived
    • 22-11-2018 post#372: a persistent root from a temp root possibility - but not with selinux
    • 11-12-2018 post#428: possibly the fastest temp root - 6.03 seconds with just 53 events and 1 overwrite
    • 05-01-2019 post#493: explained about TA restore not re-locking bootloader - good for us!
    • 09-01-2019 post#515: intercept BL unlock of xz1c in the middle of the procedure
    • 10-01-2019 post#516: posted few videos to highlight key points when preparing for unlock with backup of TA via renoroot temproot
    • 10-01-2019 post#517: video showing xz1c bl unlock with twrp booted in the middle
    • 11-01-2019 post#520: howto for unlock with the twrp booted in the middle
    • 19-01-2019 post#602: info about test to write dev master key TA unit from the secd process
    • 30-01-2019 post#620: info about TA restore and various drm keys
    • 02-02-2019 post#623: preview of FOTA system update fully installed with unlocked and rooted XZ1c - it confirms all functionality of a locked phone have been restored
    • 05-02-2019 post#633: tested fota system update from oreo to pie - posted a video
    • 10-02-2019 post#645: kernels hiding bootloader unlock released for XZ1c/XZ1/XZp - with locked TA restored this brings root with all locked phone functionality of stock fw restored
    • 16-02-2019 post#652: ported BL unlock hiding patch to TAMA platform for testing with XZ2 (it worked, but cannot be booted via fastboot due to bug in bootloader according to sony /more details here/)
    • 19-02-2019 post#663: patched XZ2 kernel to make it boot via 'fastboot boot' command from usb (tested successfully by @serajr post#664) - shall be useful for twrp setup on TAMA platform (post#668 by @MartinX3)
    • 19-02-2019 post#672: fota system update with my rooted kernels verified with XZ2 phone by @serajr - so we may have fota system update with root on xz2/xz2c/xz2p/xz3 phones too (theoretically)

    ---->> moved the original opening post in here ----
    Downgrade XZ1 Compact to 47.1.A.2.281 firmware version (not sure if this downgrade is safe, see android-attest-key-lost thread here please). The 47.1.A.2.324_CE1 version might be better to try first.

    The 2.281 fw results with android security patch level 2017-08-05, kernel 4.4.74, android oreo.

    BlueBorne vulnerabilities are not patched yet with this firmware:
    CVE-2017-0785 Android information leak vulnerability PoC seems to work - tested myself.

    Not sure, but it seems that bluetooth service is not a 32bit process anymore, contrary the note in BlueBorne whitepaper /The​ ​Bluetooth​ ​service​ ​in​ ​Android​ ​runs​ ​under​ ​Zygote​ ​(Android​ ​service​ ​manager),​ ​and​ ​is surprisingly​ ​a​ ​32-bit​ ​process​ ​(even​ ​when​ ​the​ ​OS​ ​and​ ​CPU​ ​are​ ​ARM-64​ ​for​ ​instance/ - example of stack dump obtained:
    Code:
    000000b0  00 00 00 00  ff ff ff fd  ff ff ff ff  d8 69 f4 80  │····│····│····│·i··│
    000000c0  00 00 00 73  e8 60 0c 10  00 00 00 73  e8 60 01 40  │···s│·`··│···s│·`·@│
    000000d0  00 00 00 73  d8 6b 20 08  00 00 00 73  e8 69 06 d0  │···s│·k ·│···s│·i··│
    ...
    000007e0  00 00 00 73  2c 32 34 38  72 68 74 20  20 64 61 65  │···s│,248│rht │ dae│
    000007f0  65 6d 61 6e  5f 74 62 20  6b 72 6f 77  75 65 75 71  │eman│_tb │krow│ueuq│
    00000800  74 73 20 65  65 74 72 61  00 00 00 64  00 00 00 00  │ts e│etra│···d│····│
    Those '00 00 00 73' are often present, quite possibly the upper 32bit part of a 64bit pointer. The text at 7e8 may be something like 'thread name bt_workqueue started', possibly indicating the CVE-2017-078 PoC worked (modified so that 'n = 90' to receive more data).

    The first idea was to make the Android BlueBorne exploit working to obtain bluetooth service credentails and use that with some kernel exploit to switch to root in order to finally do TA partition backup (to save DRM keys).
    The bluetooth user seems to have the NET_ADMIN capability, that could be very useful.

    I've researched further possible kernel exploits and it seems to me that the kernel from 2.281 firmware seems to contain (at least) following vulnerabilities:

    CVE-2017-7308 AF_PACKET packet_set_ring
    This needs NET_RAW capability, that may be hard to obtain, bluetooth service seems not to have it.

    CVE-2017-7533 race between inotify_handle_event() and vfs_rename()
    https://exploit.kitploit.com/2017/08/linux-kernel-412-race-condition.html
    This may work as a standalone exploit - checked the kernel source - vulnerability is not fixed, not sure about SElinux limitations and other android security mitigations - please discuss this.
    Found only demo poc not getting root, but it may be possibly developed to full temp root standalone exploit.
    This currently seems to be the most promising.

    CVE-2017-1000112 memory corruption in UDP fragmentation offload
    https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com...vilege-escalation-analyzing-cve-2017-1000112/
    https://ricklarabee.blogspot.cz/2017/12/adapting-poc-for-cve-2017-1000112-to.html
    https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43418/
    This could be used after BlueBorne done, as it needs NET_ADMIN capability.

    HELP NEEDED PLEASE - let's collaborate and develop together the needed exploits!
    For example it is hard for me to develop only with a locked device, better debugging may be possible on stock firmware with unlocked bootloader as some modifications may be flashed. My free time is quite limitted, so it would be useful to split the work.
    ----<< moved the original opening post in here ----

    It seems that 'CVE-2017-7533 race between inotify_handle_event() and vfs_rename()' is not possible to trigger from adb shell - possibly some android security mitigations/selinux limitation?
    Built exploit.c from CVE-2017-7533 with attached View attachment CVE-2017-7533-android-build.tar.gz android makefiles, adb pushed to /data/local/tmp:
    Code:
    G8441:/ $ uname -a
    Linux localhost 4.4.74-perf+ #1 SMP PREEMPT Wed Aug 9 16:09:57 2017 aarch64
    G8441:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp                                                   
    G8441:/data/local/tmp $ ./exploit 2>err.log                                    
    Listening for events.
    Listening for events.
    alloc_len : 50
    longname="test_dir/bbbb32103210321032100��1����test_dir/bbbb3210321032103210"
    alloc_len : 50
    callrename done.
    G8441:/data/local/tmp $
    the notify events seem not to be received:(
    The rename function works in the exploit (tested separately), but many errors such as
    rename1: No such file or directory
    rename2: No such file or directory
    are returned from the exploit though.
    The inotify_init1 function returns valid fd, so it looks like everything is ok, but for unknown reason, inotify events are not received.

    Running the same code in linux with vulnerable kernel results with this:
    Code:
    Linux 4.8.0 #1 SMP Tue Oct 25 09:09:01 UTC 2016 x86_64 Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500K CPU @ 3.30GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux
    
    Listening for events.
    Listening for events.
    alloc_len : 50
    longname="test_dir/bbbb32103210321032100ÿÿ1ÿÿÿÿ"
    handle_events() event->name : bbbb32103210321032100ÿÿ1ÿÿÿÿ, event->len : 32
    handle_events() event->name : b, event->len : 16
    Detected overwrite!!!
    callrename done.
    alloc_len : 50
    Note the 'handle_events' log message presence - that indicates receive of inotify event. The rename errors are not returned in this case.

    That means even though the kernel is vulnerable (as verified in sony release source code - it is fixed since 47.1.A.12.34 version as can be seen with 'git log --stat -p origin/47.1.A.12.xxx -- fs/dcache.c' in sony's kernel git repository), it looks like we cannot trigger the bug simply from adb shell.
    This is what is configured in the kernel (using sony's build instructions):
    CONFIG_FSNOTIFY=y
    CONFIG_DNOTIFY=y
    CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER=y
    # CONFIG_FANOTIFY is not set
    Am I missing something? Any idea why the bug cannot be triggered?
    --previous edit-- 27-05-2018 at 22:58. Reason: added info about rename() on xz1c; added info about inotify_init1() on xz1c; added info about 1st fw version with a fix and relevant kernel config options