- Status
Major News!!
A Norwegian newspaper have discovered a network of IMSI-catchers
in and around the Parliament, and various other governmental and
military installations, including around their members offices and homes.
Read all about it HERE.
(Translated with Google Translate)
A Norwegian newspaper have discovered a network of IMSI-catchers
in and around the Parliament, and various other governmental and
military installations, including around their members offices and homes.
Read all about it HERE.
(Translated with Google Translate)
Attachments
Major News!!
A Norwegian newspaper have discovered a network of IMSI-catchers
in and around the Parliament, and various other governmental and
military installations, including around their members offices and homes.
Read all about it HERE.
(Translated with Google Translate)
Thank you, shared it on Pags.to
What about a feafure (checkbox in settings) to force flight mode on catcher detect- interval check if leaved and mode leave if normal network found?
Sent from my GT-I9505 using XDA Free mobile app
Major News!!
A Norwegian newspaper have discovered a network of IMSI-catchers
in and around the Parliament, and various other governmental and
military installations, including around their members offices and homes.
Read all about it HERE.
(Translated with Google Translate)
Great article. Tks. Good to get confirmation of our suspicions of govt buildings! (If anyone is near a major protest area will be good to get confirmation of mobile IMSI catchers also.)
Hey guys!
I work within the affected area in Oslo where the suspicious traffic has been detected. I just installed this app and will take a walk around tomorrow and see what happens. I suspect that the catchers has already been removed but it but i might get "lucky".
I only got a Nexus 5 but hopefully it will do the job.
PS: The newspaper has been in contact with Norwegian government agencies, these devices are not placed out by them (they are the only onces that are allowed), so the theory is either foreign intelligence or some entity spying on politicians in the area..
I work within the affected area in Oslo where the suspicious traffic has been detected. I just installed this app and will take a walk around tomorrow and see what happens. I suspect that the catchers has already been removed but it but i might get "lucky".
I only got a Nexus 5 but hopefully it will do the job.
PS: The newspaper has been in contact with Norwegian government agencies, these devices are not placed out by them (they are the only onces that are allowed), so the theory is either foreign intelligence or some entity spying on politicians in the area..
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Hi Uelandir,
Thanks for having a look at our project. I just want to warn you (and others) that this app is still in alpha stage of development. This basically means that most core functions are working, but the app is very buggy and that only ~2/15 detection mechanisms have been implemented. If those devices out there on the streets are doing anything at all right, it is unlikely that you will see anything with this app at this point. However, we're working hard to try to get this in a fit-for-fight shape so that people can start using it. Our main problem, is that we're missing developers.
So the best way you can help us out, right now, is by trying to hit us up with some app developers, so we can get this project a real kick in the rear!
This would be a perfect student project, for example, where we could offer both technical guidance and academic advice.
Best Wishes,
Team AIMSICD
http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/loc...e-hacking-cell-phones-text-messages/20214047/
Erin Van der Bellen, WUSA 12:42 p.m. EST December 12, 2014
Spy Drone
(Photo: WUSA9)
1241 CONNECT 330 TWEET 116 LINKEDIN 9 COMMENTEMAILMORE
WASHINGTON (WUSA9) -- It's small. It's bright yellow, and it's capable of cracking Wi-Fi passwords, eavesdropping on your cell phone calls and reading your text messages. It's an unmanned spy drone and it just landed in Washington, D.C.
Long-time friends and former Air Force buddies, Mike Tassey and Rich Perkins, describe their state-of-the-art cyber drone as hard to take down, hard to see and virtually hard to detect.
They built it in a garage, using off the shelf electronics to prove a drone can be used to launch cyber-attacks.
It needs a human for take-off and landing but once airborne, it can fly any pre-programmed route posing as a cell phone tower and tricking wireless cell phones.
While it's flying those points, the spy drone has a number of antennas for picking up your cell phone conversation, for picking up blue tooth, and for picking up and monitoring Wi Fi signals.
Tassey and Perkins tested the drone in isolated conditions to avoid breaking laws or recording conversations other than their own.
Mike Tassey, Rich Perkins: Wireless Ariel Surveillance
Mike Tassey, Rich Perkins: Wireless Ariel Surveillance Platform(Photo: Mike Tassey, Rich Perkins)
"We passed telephone calls, hacked into networks, cracked the encryption on Wi-Fi access points all of that sort of evilness is possible," said Tassey.
And now their spy drone has landed in Washington so everyone can see it.
"I think it's fantastic to have an artifact like this in the Spy Museum," said Vincent Houghton, International Spy Museum Curator.
"It's the first of its kind, it's a piece of modern espionage equipment," said Houghton. "This is something governments should be doing and perhaps only government should be doing.
"If two guys from the Midwest can build this for six-thousand dollars in a garage, what can Iran do? What can nation states do?" said Rich Perkins.
The drone has a 50 mile range and while its creators chose a cyber-attack test, they say this technology can be used things like anti-IED missions and search and rescue operations.
---------- Post added at 11:07 PM ---------- Previous post was at 11:00 PM ----------
I was in Washington DC this weekend with a VS980 LG G2 and AIMSICD 0.124-alpha. On numerous occasions I received yellow warning signals. No orange or red. Seems like it is working.
Thank you for doing this important work.
Erin Van der Bellen, WUSA 12:42 p.m. EST December 12, 2014
Spy Drone
(Photo: WUSA9)
1241 CONNECT 330 TWEET 116 LINKEDIN 9 COMMENTEMAILMORE
WASHINGTON (WUSA9) -- It's small. It's bright yellow, and it's capable of cracking Wi-Fi passwords, eavesdropping on your cell phone calls and reading your text messages. It's an unmanned spy drone and it just landed in Washington, D.C.
Long-time friends and former Air Force buddies, Mike Tassey and Rich Perkins, describe their state-of-the-art cyber drone as hard to take down, hard to see and virtually hard to detect.
They built it in a garage, using off the shelf electronics to prove a drone can be used to launch cyber-attacks.
It needs a human for take-off and landing but once airborne, it can fly any pre-programmed route posing as a cell phone tower and tricking wireless cell phones.
While it's flying those points, the spy drone has a number of antennas for picking up your cell phone conversation, for picking up blue tooth, and for picking up and monitoring Wi Fi signals.
Tassey and Perkins tested the drone in isolated conditions to avoid breaking laws or recording conversations other than their own.
Mike Tassey, Rich Perkins: Wireless Ariel Surveillance
Mike Tassey, Rich Perkins: Wireless Ariel Surveillance Platform(Photo: Mike Tassey, Rich Perkins)
"We passed telephone calls, hacked into networks, cracked the encryption on Wi-Fi access points all of that sort of evilness is possible," said Tassey.
And now their spy drone has landed in Washington so everyone can see it.
"I think it's fantastic to have an artifact like this in the Spy Museum," said Vincent Houghton, International Spy Museum Curator.
"It's the first of its kind, it's a piece of modern espionage equipment," said Houghton. "This is something governments should be doing and perhaps only government should be doing.
"If two guys from the Midwest can build this for six-thousand dollars in a garage, what can Iran do? What can nation states do?" said Rich Perkins.
The drone has a 50 mile range and while its creators chose a cyber-attack test, they say this technology can be used things like anti-IED missions and search and rescue operations.
---------- Post added at 11:07 PM ---------- Previous post was at 11:00 PM ----------
I was in Washington DC this weekend with a VS980 LG G2 and AIMSICD 0.124-alpha. On numerous occasions I received yellow warning signals. No orange or red. Seems like it is working.
Thank you for doing this important work.
Can confirm that i did not get any alarms, but i did take some logs and shared them on Github. I will have a look into the code and see how i can contribute. Just gotta get IntelliJ up and running correctly.
Sir,
i am a startup android app developer , is there any way i could help you , I'm very much interested in your project.
On behalf of all our team members: Welcome to the AIMSICD-Project, @Rohit99! We have had many people who said they'd like to help. Therefore, I appreciate actions, instead of words. Feel invited to show us that you're really up for it by creating PULL REQUESTS to fix or enhance any of the current Issues. Please closely follow our contribution guidelines. Hack and improve what you can and we'll invite you to our secret chatrooms!
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Looks like aimsicd is the only real relevant one currently / one being updated.
Looking fwd to the next release!
Our Latest Happy New Year Release is HERE!
"2015 -- The year of Mobile Privacy"
(Your wish is our command!)
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What does the -B6 appendix stand for? Wouldn´t it be easier to offer the app in the Google Play Store as well? It would make updates for users more convenient
In recent days I read some things about great dangers from attacks against the baseband. How far can AIMSICD provide some security against such threats?
Do attackers who intend to invoke a baseband attack rely on IMSI catchers? What way do these creatures use to mount attacks on the baseband?
Great work! Where do donate?
---------- Post added at 03:05 AM ---------- Previous post was at 03:01 AM ----------
The Norwegians used a Cryptophone 500 from GSMK as far as I know.
Would AIMSICD have detected these IMSI catchers as well?
Maybe you can contact someone in Norway to test AIMSICD at these places?
Has already someone found malicious stations in the wild using AIMSCID?
In recent days I read some things about great dangers from attacks against the baseband. How far can AIMSICD provide some security against such threats?
Do attackers who intend to invoke a baseband attack rely on IMSI catchers? What way do these creatures use to mount attacks on the baseband?
Great work! Where do donate?
---------- Post added at 03:05 AM ---------- Previous post was at 03:01 AM ----------
The Norwegians used a Cryptophone 500 from GSMK as far as I know.
Would AIMSICD have detected these IMSI catchers as well?
Maybe you can contact someone in Norway to test AIMSICD at these places?
Has already someone found malicious stations in the wild using AIMSCID?
- Our app is in alpha stage and thus we publish the build numbers as "b6" for "build-6".
- No, Google Play (+ all related services) is the worst spying institution on the planet. We refuse.
- No, just download and click on the link on our GithHub, works even better than GP. No advertisments, no tracking, no waiting, no extra Google bloat updates.
As for donations, the best way you can donate to this project is by helping us solve some outstanding issues and find developers interested in helping us to do something good for the community and not only to line their own pockets with money and fame.
And is there already any documented finding of a IMSI or a silent SMS till yet?
Does the silent SMS catch work yet?
Have now a SGS4 with Qualcomm, should this work?
Does the silent SMS catch work yet?
Have now a SGS4 with Qualcomm, should this work?
Scroll some posts back, there are reports it worked.
Edit: No information for silent sms yet but you can find silent sms pingers in market to test yourself
And yes ,i have the same phone , it works
@E:V:A i totally agree with your no-google policy - actually theres an discussion at gnusocial about gitorious usage instead of github
- what about alternative markets, didnt looked yet if i can find imsi-catcher
Sent from my GT-I9505 using XDA Free mobile app
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83UPDATE: 2015-01-14IMPORTANT!
Although this thread is still open, it is no longer updated with relevant info.
Please go to our official GitHub Site for the latest developer news and join
our development efforts in our back rooms...
For all the latest changes see our CHANGELOG.---
For all the latest WIP alpha releases, see RELEASES.
The minimum supported AOS API version is 16, thus
AIMSICD will only work on Jelly Bean 4.1 or later.
Call for help to develop an IMSI catcher detector application for Android OS.
Q: What is an IMSI catcher?
A: It is a fake cell tower (aka. Base Transceiver Station, BTS) used to track and monitor specific (groups of) people in the near vicinity of that BTS.
In the light of last years highly publicized events in the many Arabic nations and the German state sponsored rootkit discovery, etc etc. It is of the highest priority to start developing anti/counter-spy applications for the people living in rogue states such as Syria, Iran etc. In addition, it may play an important role in finding (and preventing) other rogue applications that attempt to send silent SMS's to high-cost premium services.
Recently there have been some publicity surrounding the Osmocom BB's, application patch known as "Catcher Catcher" which is used to detect mobile phone tracking and spying, originating from the Mobile Phone Service Provider side. (I.e. something that generally can only be provided by state sponsored government and security forces.)
Relevant links include:
http://bb.osmocom.org/trac/
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWdHSJsEOck
http://events.ccc.de/congress/2011/Fahrplan/events/4736.en.html
http://gsmmap.org/cgi-bin/gsmmap.fcgi?risk=1
http://lab.ks.uni-freiburg.de/projects/imsi-catcher-detection/wiki/Software
http://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/catcher/wiki
For a tutorial on how to compile and help populate the Gsmmap database, see here.
In the News:
http://www.h-online.com/security/ne...iles-and-security-measures-shown-1401668.html
http://www.actualtoday.com/gsm-hacking-osmocom-patch-discovered-silent-sms-and-eavesdropping
This information started 2010 and was extended to last years 28C3 event...
How can you help?
I would very much like to have contact with anyone who can provide more in-depth knowledge how this could possibly be implemented on the AOS. There are several way you can help, eventhough you may not be an expert on HW or even android.
- Help populate the Gsmmap database.
- Follow and help/develop the OsmocomBB project.
- Compile OsmocomBB for an Android phone, so that it can be used as a USB host. (Preferably for one of the more popular models like the Samsung galaxy S.)
- Help mapping out the Android baseband AT command set or the internal RIL function, so that we can obtain as many GSM radio parameters as possible.
- Reverse engineer the vendor RIL of the phone above.
- Reverse engineer the Modem firmware so that we can use the phone as a native catcher-catcher.
- Find provide documentation of the closed source modem(s) most used in androids.
- Share other relevant experience you may have in this matter.
- Find or provide links to documentation of anything baseband related, not already widely known!
- Stay legal, or this project will close really quickly!
NOTE: This is not to prevent IMSI catchers, but to inform the "victims" that they are being subject to tracking/monitoring.
A few other items:
---
- For the Software Change Log, our Github.
- For Phone Support Log, see Post #7 below.
- We have contacted EFF and The Guardian Project and hope to join their efforts and provide support to counter illegal tracking and tapping.
- Thanks to SecUpwN, we now have our own GitHub HERE.
- Have made a preliminary Developer Roadmap.
- Added some important links.
- Licensing Proposal: This will be a community project licensed under a GPLv3 license:
Glossary: (Harald Welte)
The BSS (Base Station Subsystem)
MS (Mobile Station): Your phone
BTS (Base Transceiver Station): The cell tower
BSC (Base Station Controller): Controlling up to hundreds of BTS
BP/CP (Baseband/Cellular Processor): Your phone radio/modem processor (usually an ARM 7/9)
The NSS (Network Sub System)
MSC (Mobile Switching Center): The central switch
HLR (Home Location Register): Database of subscribers
AUC (Authentication Center): Database of authentication keys
VLR (Visitor Location Register): For roaming users
EIR (Equipment Identity Register): To block stolen phones
Our Support:
We have as a goal to become a strong supporter of the EFF and The Guardian Project.
Part of all future donations will go to EFF. Intellectual and technological support will
also be given where possible.
34The GSM Ciphering Indicator
According to the 3GPP GSM standards/specifications [1] for handsets,
there should be a Ciphering Indicator (CI) showing the user when the
GSM phone/data connection is not using encryption. Unfortunately for
many people in the rest of the world, this feature have not been
properly (if at all) implemented in the Android OS, AFAIK [2]. The
second culprit is the fact that your cellular service provider have
disabled showing this CI on the vast majority of SIM cards issued
around the world.
The only options for circumventing these privacy problems are:
- Write an application that present the current ciphering status. (Easy)
- Write an application that hijacks the baseband processor (modem)
SIM binary-code (in the firmware) to force-enable CI and possibly
also the use of A5/3. (Hard) - Make and use a copy of your SIM card that has CI enabled. (Hard)
- Lobby your cellular service provider to always use A5/3 ciphering. (Hard)
(A5/1 was never used and A5/2 can be cracked on-the-fly!) - Force Google to fix the issue! This is hard, since the issue is
already >2 years old at "medium priority", and in addition it
does not resolve the service provider disabled CI in their SIM
cards.
anytime soon. So I lobby for (1) or (2). But to do that we need
some background knowledge. Then I will show you how to read the
CI setting from your SIM card. Then we will figure out how to
write such an application!
References:
[1] 3GPP GSM 02.07: http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/02_series/02.07/0207-710.zip
[2] Android Issue 5353: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=5353
[3] Dieter Spaar's Blog: http://www.mirider.com/weblog/2010/08/03/#20100803-ciphering_indicator
[4] 3GPP GSM 11.11: ???
Some 3GPP GSM Terminology:
Background:Code:EF - Elementary Files AD - Administrative (Data) Field BCD - Binary-Coded Decimal (compressed) CHV - Card Holder Verification (usually your SIM code) TLV - Tag, Length, Value BER-TLV - Object that conform to the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) RFU - Reserved for Future Use
[1] § B.1.26 Ciphering Indicator
The ciphering indicator feature allows the ME to detect that
ciphering is not switched on and to indicate this to the user,
as defined in GSM 02.09.
The ciphering indicator feature may be disabled by the home network
operator setting data in the "administrative data" field (EF-AD) in
the SIM, as defined in GSM 11.11.
If this feature is not disabled by the SIM, then whenever a
connection is in place, which is, or becomes unenciphered,
an indication shall be given to the user.
Ciphering itself is unaffected by this feature, and the user can
choose how to proceed.
[3] Ciphering Indicator in mobile phones
According to GSM 02.07 B.1.26, there should be a Ciphering Indicator
in the ME to allow a user to detect if ciphering is not switched on.
The Ciphering Indicator can be turned off by the network operator
clearing (what is formerly known as) the OFM (Operational Feature
Monitor) bit in the "administrative data" field of the SIM.
(See GSM 11.11, 10.3.18)
Usually the Ciphering Indicator is turned off, at least in those SIMs
I have seen so far. And you usually cannot modify the administrative
data in the SIM. But would a phone actually display something if the
Ciphering Indicator is enabled and ciphering is not on?
[4] § 10.2.18 The SIM Administrative Data field
All data on your SIM card is stored in a special filesystem hierarchy.
To not delve too far into the murky depths of SIM data storage, we
jump straight to the particular file we are interested in. It is an
elementary file (EF) called Administrative Data (AD), whose
filename/identifier is just a number, like always in the SIM-card
filesystem. In this case it is known '6FAD' (Hex for 28589).
"
This EF contains information concerning the mode of operation according
to the type of SIM, such as normal (to be used by PLMN subscribers for
GSM operations), type approval (to allow specific use of the ME during
type approval procedures of e.g. the radio equipment), cell testing
(to allow testing of a cellbefore commercial use of this cell),
manufacturer specific (to allow the ME manufacturer to perform specific
proprietary auto-test in its ME during e.g. maintenance phases).
"
Technical Summary:
How to read the Ciphering Indicator in your SIMCode:----------------------------------------------------------- Name: EFAD (Administrative Data) Identifier: '6FAD' (28589) File size: 3+X bytes ----------------------------------------------------------- Byte Description ----------------------------------------------------------- 1 UE operation mode 2-3 Additional information (incl. cipher indication) 4 Length of MNC of IMSI 5-X RFU ----------------------------------------------------------- UE Operation Mode: (byte 1) ----------------------------------------------------------- This is the mode of operation for the MS. Coding: (Initial value) '00' - normal operation '80' - type approval operations '01' - normal operation + specific facilities '81' - type approval operations + specific facilities '02' - maintenance (off line) '04' - cell test operation NOTE: All other values are RFU (reserved for future) use ----------------------------------------------------------- Additional Information: (byte 2-3) ----------------------------------------------------------- Coding: - Specific facilities code (if b1=1 in byte 1); - ME manufacturer specific information (if b2=1 in byte 1). Ciphering indication is enabled by enabling both the specific facilities bit (b1) in byte-1 AND the cipher indicator bit (b1) in byte-3. Thus the administrative data field has to be: Byte-1: 0x01 0000 0001 Byte-2: 0x00 0000 0000 Byte-3: 0x01 0000 0001 Byte-4: 0x02/3 0000 001x ----------------------------------------------------------- Length of MNC in the IMSI: (byte 4) ----------------------------------------------------------- The length indicator refers to the number of digits, used for extracting the MNC from the IMSI. This value codes the number of digits of the MNC in the IMSI. Only the values (b1-b2) '0010' and '0011' are currently specified, all other values are reserved for future use. ----------------------------------------------------------- Relevant Documents: TS 22.101 TS 31.102 TS 33.102 -----------------------------------------------------------
Since there is no API call (AFAIK) for directly reading the SIM data
fields, we are going to use your modems standard AT commands. You can
normally do this in two ways. (1) By connecting your phone via USB to
your PC and use a terminal application to send AT commands (ATCs)
directly to the Baseband Processor (BP), aka "modem". (b) To connect
directly to the modem "device" via some terminal program within the
Android Operating System (AOS). For all the details surrounding this,
please see this thread.
Once you've got an AT command terminal session working, you are free
to issue the relevant AT commands to read from your SIM card. The
particular command we are interested in, is the +CRSM command. This
command can read/write various data directly from SIM card files.
==================================================
If you know of any equivalent or valid AOS API call for reading
this type of SIM data, please let us know!
==================================================
The +CRSM syntax is as follows:
For example, you could also read your IMSI code from your SIM card,Code:AT+CRSM=<command>[,<fileid> [,<P1>,<P2>,<P3> [,<data> [,<pathid>]]]] <command> This is the operation to be performed: 176 READ BINARY 178 READ RECORD 192 GET RESPONSE 214 UPDATE BINARY 220 UPDATE RECORD 242 STATUS <fileid> This is an integer which is the identifier of a elementary datafile (EF) on SIM. Mandatory for every command except STATUS and may be e.g.: Hex Dec File --------------------- 6F37 28471 ACMmax 6F07 28423 IMSI 6F39 28473 ACM 6F41 28481 PUKT 6F42 28482 SMS Structure: [CLA INS P1 P2 P3 Data] The bytes have the following meaning: CLA Is the class of instruction (ISO/IEC 7816-3 [25]), 'A0' is used in the GSM application; INS Is the instruction code (ISO/IEC 7816-3 [25]) as defined in this subclause for each command; P1, P2, P3 Are parameters for the instruction. They are specified in table 9. 'FF' is a valid value for P1, P2 and P3. P3 gives the length of the data element. P3='00' introduces a 256 byte data transfer from the SIM in an outgoing data transfer command (response direction). In an ingoing data transfer command (command direction), P3='00' introduces no transfer of data. SW1 and SW2 Are the Status Words indicating the successful or unsuccessful outcome of the command. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dec. <sw1> <sw2> Description ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 144 0x90 0x00 normal entry of the command, indicating OK 103 0x67 0xXX incorrect parameter P3 0x6B 0xXX incorrect parameter P1 or P2 0x6D 0xXX unknown instruction code given in the command 0x6E 0xXX wrong instruction class given in the command 0x6F 0xXX technical problem with no diagnostic given 0x9F 0xXX length XX of the response data 0x92 0x0X update successful but after using an internal retry routine X times 0x92 0x40 memory problem 0x94 0x00 no EF selected 0x94 0x02 out of range (invalid address) 0x94 0x04 file ID not found; pattern not found 0x94 0x08 file is inconsistent with the command 0x98 0x02 no CHV initialized 0x98 0x04 Access condition not fullfiled / unsucc. CHV verify / authent.failed 0x98 0x08 in contradiction with CHV status 0x98 0x10 in contradiction with invalidation status 0x98 0x40 Unsuccessful CHV-verification. Or UNBLOCK CHF / CHV blocked /UNBL.blocked 0x98 0x50 Increase cannot be performed. Max. value reached -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
but this is a little more tricky as that operation involves a parity
bit-field in the second byte, while using a compressed BCD coding.
Reading the AD field (containing cipher indication)
Also see +CSIM and +CSCS
How to write AD and enable the Cipher Indicator in your SIMCode:[B]AT+CRSM=176,28589,0,0,3[/B] +CRSM: 144,0,"000000" ==> Bytes: 1-3 = 00,00,00 byte1: "MS operation mode" byte2: "Specific facilities" B1 byte3: "Specific facilities" B2 (+ cipher indication) ==> [COLOR=Red]Ciphering indication is disabled[/COLOR] Note: a response like this "+CRSM: 103,3" indicates that there is a problem with P3 and that the value for P3 should be 3.
Now, this is the most tricky part while being poorly documented.
The problem is that since this is an "administrative operation", it
may require something called a "facility lock password". However it
is not clear to me what this is. Is it just a CHV PIN/PUK or is it
something only known to the OEM or cellular service provider?
Anyone who could provide proper guidance here, will be offered
a beer! (Also see: +CLCK, +CPWD, +CSIM for reference.)
Going through the reading hoops above, we guess that the
proper write command should be like this:
However, we know from reading other SIM files (IMSI) that sometimesCode:AT+CRSM=214,28589,0,0,3,"010001"
the data is returned in compressed BCD format. That is, it could be
that the 1st and last pairs of 01's should be swapped to 10's.
So that we have:
Code:AT+CRSM=214,28589,0,0,3,"100010"
Any ideas?13THIS THREAD IS CLOSED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE!
Due to lack of development and no progress in resolving critical issues, combined with the low level of development-relevant posts in this thread, I have decided to close this thread until further notice. We are restructuring the maintenance and development of this App and thus it will remain closed until other developers can step up and carry on this project. We are also looking into other funding possibilities to hire professional developers.
BUT, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE PROJECT IS DEAD!
On the contrary, it means we're taking this project more seriously than ever. In addition, our development ideology has changed in the wake of recent copy/paste projects and scientific publications/articles, not even mentioning our efforts, even though it is fairly clear that most information have been directly obtained from this thread and relevant discussions on our GitHub.
From now on, all our development notes and discussions will remain closed to public, but open for any serious developer/hacker to join. When Beta release will be available, so will all the supporting documentation.
If you have any information or other ways to help directly contribute to this project, please contact me or @SecUpwN via email or PM. Any news and successful updates will be posted on our GiHub.
9Hi @SecUpwN
Now don't get too excited but I have made some updates to the base RawPhone application you have in your repo... These changes are still very early stages of bringing RawPhone to a point where it can possibly do some of things that you have been capturing within this thread.
To save me typing everything a second time I have pasted below the commit comments which I hope captures everything I have done so far, but please be mindful that this is the first tiny step
I will make a pull request but if you would prefer to test this by cherry-picking then just close the request and pull the commit directly from my Github.
There is so much more to do and some of things I have rolling around my head include being able to identify possible suitable serial devices available on the phone, a database of AT commands and of course the ability to issue custom commands. Also possibly the extension of the Android telephony manager service to access or capture data relevant to this project.
One thing I did realise I forgot about in my message was that I began to create a ATCommand class to process and interpret responses if the microcom applet was to fail but this is basically useless at the moment More to come on that once I get back to it!!
Initial Development Commit Comments
I am sure there is so much I have forgotten to mention but it is getting late and if I don't go to bed soon I shall never get up for work tomorrow, but like I said this is very rough but at least some progress although from looking at the application once launched you would not really know it. I will hopefully update some of code tomorrow to bring it more in line with Android code standards and also work on some more of UI etc.
I will check back in tomorrow at work if I get a change but if not once I get home.
