Subject:
Race condition in Sprite Software's backup software, installed by OEM on LG Android devices.
Author:
Justin Case - [email protected]
CVE ID:
CVE-2013-3685
Effect:
Locally exploited vulnerability with minimal device user interaction which results in executing code as the root user. Under specific circumstances, it is possible to exploit this vulnerability without the device user's knowledge
Products:
"Backup"
"spritebud"
Vendors:
Sprite Software
LG Electronics
Potentially other vendors
Affected Versions:
spritebud 1.3.24
backup 2.5.4105
Likely others versions as well
Affected Devices (Subject to firmware configuration):
LG-E971 LG Optimus G
LG-E973 LG Optimus G
LG-E975 LG Optimus G
LG-E975K LG Optimus G
LG-E975T LG Optimus G
LG-E976 LG Optimus G
LG-E977 LG Optimus G
LG-F100K LG Optimus Vu
LG-F100L LG Optimus Vu
LG-F100S LG Optimus Vu
LG-F120K LG Optimus Vu
LG-F120L LG Optimus LTE Tag
LG-F120S LG Optimus LTE Tag
LG-F160K LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160L LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160LV LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160S LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F180K LG Optimus G
LG-F180L LG Optimus G
LG-F180S LG Optimus G
LG-F200K LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F200L LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F200S LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F240K LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F240L LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F240S LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F260K LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-F260L LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-F260S LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-L21 LG Optimus G
LG-LG870 LG (Unknown)
LG-LS860 LG Mach
LG-LS970 LG Optimus G
LG-P760 LG Optimus L9
LG-P769 LG Optimus L9
LG-P780 LG Optimus L7
LG-P875 LG Optimus F5
LG-P875h LG Optimus F5
LG-P880 LG Optimus 4X HD
LG-P940 LG Prada
LG-SU540 LG Prada 3.0
LG-SU870 LG Optimus 3D Cube
LG-US780 LG Lollipop
Potentially other devices as well.
Product Information:
"Backup" and "spritebud" are a setting and application backup/restore system written by Sprite Software and deployed on LG Android smartphones. "Backup" is the end user front end app, and "spritebud" is the service that preforms the backup and restore functions.
Details:
The "spritebud" daemon is started by the init scripts and runs as the root user. Listening on a unix socket, the daemon accepts instructions from the "Backup" app. Using a crafted backup, we can write to, change permission and change ownership of any file, being that "spritebud" is running under the root user.
The crafted backup contains restore data for our exploiting application, "com.cunninglogic.lgpwn". The data includes a 50mb dummy file (a) used to increase our exploit window, su binary (b), a script (c) to install su, and a text file (d) containing the path to our script. All files are owned by the application, and are world write/read/execute. All files are restored in alphabetical order. The entire backup, after compress, is approximately 2mb. The structure of this backup is as follows:
drwxrwxrwx u0_a114 u0_a114 2013-05-28 20:13 files
./files:
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 52428800 2013-05-22 20:06 a
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 91992 2013-05-22 20:07 b
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 251 2013-05-22 20:12 c
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 42 2013-05-22 20:07 d
Prior to restoration, our exploit app runs, watches the process and waits. During restoration, the spritebud daemon first creates the files directory, then sets it's permission and owner. Next it decompresses and restores the "a" file, our 50mb dummy files. During the restoration of "a", our exploit application has time to symlink "d", our text file containing the full path to our script (c), to /sys/kernel/uevent_helper. Upon restoration of file "d", our path is written to uevent_helper. When a hotplug even occurs (which occur every few seconds), the path contained in uevent_helper is execute by the kernel and our script (c) is executed and installs the su binary (b).
Subject:
Race condition in Sprite Software's backup software, installed by OEM on LG Android devices.
Author:
Justin Case - [email protected]
CVE ID:
CVE-2013-3685
Effect:
Locally exploited vulnerability with minimal device user interaction which results in executing code as the root user. Under specific circumstances, it is possible to exploit this vulnerability without the device user's knowledge
Products:
"Backup"
"spritebud"
Vendors:
Sprite Software
LG Electronics
Potentially other vendors
Affected Versions:
spritebud 1.3.24
backup 2.5.4105
Likely others versions as well
Affected Devices (Subject to firmware configuration):
LG-E971 LG Optimus G
LG-E973 LG Optimus G
LG-E975 LG Optimus G
LG-E975K LG Optimus G
LG-E975T LG Optimus G
LG-E976 LG Optimus G
LG-E977 LG Optimus G
LG-F100K LG Optimus Vu
LG-F100L LG Optimus Vu
LG-F100S LG Optimus Vu
LG-F120K LG Optimus Vu
LG-F120L LG Optimus LTE Tag
LG-F120S LG Optimus LTE Tag
LG-F160K LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160L LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160LV LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160S LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F180K LG Optimus G
LG-F180L LG Optimus G
LG-F180S LG Optimus G
LG-F200K LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F200L LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F200S LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F240K LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F240L LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F240S LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F260K LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-F260L LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-F260S LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-L21 LG Optimus G
LG-LG870 LG (Unknown)
LG-LS860 LG Mach
LG-LS970 LG Optimus G
LG-P760 LG Optimus L9
LG-P769 LG Optimus L9
LG-P780 LG Optimus L7
LG-P875 LG Optimus F5
LG-P875h LG Optimus F5
LG-P880 LG Optimus 4X HD
LG-P940 LG Prada
LG-SU540 LG Prada 3.0
LG-SU870 LG Optimus 3D Cube
LG-US780 LG Lollipop
Potentially other devices as well.
Product Information:
"Backup" and "spritebud" are a setting and application backup/restore system written by Sprite Software and deployed on LG Android smartphones. "Backup" is the end user front end app, and "spritebud" is the service that preforms the backup and restore functions.
Details:
The "spritebud" daemon is started by the init scripts and runs as the root user. Listening on a unix socket, the daemon accepts instructions from the "Backup" app. Using a crafted backup, we can write to, change permission and change ownership of any file, being that "spritebud" is running under the root user.
The crafted backup contains restore data for our exploiting application, "com.cunninglogic.lgpwn". The data includes a 50mb dummy file (a) used to increase our exploit window, su binary (b), a script (c) to install su, and a text file (d) containing the path to our script. All files are owned by the application, and are world write/read/execute. All files are restored in alphabetical order. The entire backup, after compress, is approximately 2mb. The structure of this backup is as follows:
drwxrwxrwx u0_a114 u0_a114 2013-05-28 20:13 files
./files:
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 52428800 2013-05-22 20:06 a
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 91992 2013-05-22 20:07 b
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 251 2013-05-22 20:12 c
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 42 2013-05-22 20:07 d
Prior to restoration, our exploit app runs, watches the process and waits. During restoration, the spritebud daemon first creates the files directory, then sets it's permission and owner. Next it decompresses and restores the "a" file, our 50mb dummy files. During the restoration of "a", our exploit application has time to symlink "d", our text file containing the full path to our script (c), to /sys/kernel/uevent_helper. Upon restoration of file "d", our path is written to uevent_helper. When a hotplug even occurs (which occur every few seconds), the path contained in uevent_helper is execute by the kernel and our script (c) is executed and installs the su binary (b).
Great work jcase !! :good: I successfully rooted T-mobile USA p769 20d version.. Tried to see if I had spritebud with terminal emulator which got no file found. Downloaded the pwn apk and decided to try anyways. Followed the backup / recovery steps. Phone rebooted by itself. Downloaded root checker with successful root result .. Props !!!
if you get /system/xbin/spritebud does not exist (I don't have the file at that location)
what is the issue. (running version 4.4.2) - LG-F260S LG Optimus LTE 3
- i've installed the .apk.
- enable debugger mode
- enable debugger mode on the application
- turned phone off and back on
- did a backup
- did a restore
- ran again same error
i'm a noob, go gently with the sandpaper to the arse.
has anyone tried the Lg Spree K120 from cricket. cant seam to root it. anyhelp would be awesome.
thanks
Neither is the work, donation made, enjoy a beer or a cheap American six pack on me, ha.
Sent from my LG-P769 using Tapatalk 2
Enclosed. I grep'ed the logcat file for lgpwn, here is what came of it:
I/ActivityManager( 350): START {act=android.intent.action.MAIN cat=[android.intent.category.LAUNCHER] flg=0x10200000 cmp=com.cunninglogic.lgpwn/.MainActivity u=0} from pid 638
I/ActivityManager( 350): Start proc com.cunninglogic.lgpwn for activity com.cunninglogic.lgpwn/.MainActivity: pid=2527 uid=10120 gids={1015, 1028}
D/SurfaceFlinger( 142): createSurface for (1 x 1), name=Starting com.cunninglogic.lgpwn
W/ActivityThread( 2527): Application com.cunninglogic.lgpwn is waiting for the debugger on port 8100...
W/ActivityManager( 350): Activity idle timeout for ActivityRecord{418e27f8 com.cunninglogic.lgpwn/.MainActivity}
Subject:
Race condition in Sprite Software's backup software, installed by OEM on LG Android devices.
Author:
Justin Case - [email protected]
CVE ID:
CVE-2013-3685
Effect:
Locally exploited vulnerability with minimal device user interaction which results in executing code as the root user. Under specific circumstances, it is possible to exploit this vulnerability without the device user's knowledge
Products:
"Backup"
"spritebud"
Vendors:
Sprite Software
LG Electronics
Potentially other vendors
Affected Versions:
spritebud 1.3.24
backup 2.5.4105
Likely others versions as well
Affected Devices (Subject to firmware configuration):
LG-E971 LG Optimus G
LG-E973 LG Optimus G
LG-E975 LG Optimus G
LG-E975K LG Optimus G
LG-E975T LG Optimus G
LG-E976 LG Optimus G
LG-E977 LG Optimus G
LG-F100K LG Optimus Vu
LG-F100L LG Optimus Vu
LG-F100S LG Optimus Vu
LG-F120K LG Optimus Vu
LG-F120L LG Optimus LTE Tag
LG-F120S LG Optimus LTE Tag
LG-F160K LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160L LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160LV LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F160S LG Optimus LTE 2
LG-F180K LG Optimus G
LG-F180L LG Optimus G
LG-F180S LG Optimus G
LG-F200K LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F200L LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F200S LG Optimus Vu 2
LG-F240K LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F240L LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F240S LG Optimus G Pro
LG-F260K LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-F260L LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-F260S LG Optimus LTE 3
LG-L21 LG Optimus G
LG-LG870 LG (Unknown)
LG-LS860 LG Mach
LG-LS970 LG Optimus G
LG-P760 LG Optimus L9
LG-P769 LG Optimus L9
LG-P780 LG Optimus L7
LG-P875 LG Optimus F5
LG-P875h LG Optimus F5
LG-P880 LG Optimus 4X HD
LG-P940 LG Prada
LG-SU540 LG Prada 3.0
LG-SU870 LG Optimus 3D Cube
LG-US780 LG Lollipop
Potentially other devices as well.
Product Information:
"Backup" and "spritebud" are a setting and application backup/restore system written by Sprite Software and deployed on LG Android smartphones. "Backup" is the end user front end app, and "spritebud" is the service that preforms the backup and restore functions.
Details:
The "spritebud" daemon is started by the init scripts and runs as the root user. Listening on a unix socket, the daemon accepts instructions from the "Backup" app. Using a crafted backup, we can write to, change permission and change ownership of any file, being that "spritebud" is running under the root user.
The crafted backup contains restore data for our exploiting application, "com.cunninglogic.lgpwn". The data includes a 50mb dummy file (a) used to increase our exploit window, su binary (b), a script (c) to install su, and a text file (d) containing the path to our script. All files are owned by the application, and are world write/read/execute. All files are restored in alphabetical order. The entire backup, after compress, is approximately 2mb. The structure of this backup is as follows:
drwxrwxrwx u0_a114 u0_a114 2013-05-28 20:13 files
./files:
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 52428800 2013-05-22 20:06 a
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 91992 2013-05-22 20:07 b
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 251 2013-05-22 20:12 c
- -rwxr-xr-x u0_a114 u0_a114 42 2013-05-22 20:07 d
Prior to restoration, our exploit app runs, watches the process and waits. During restoration, the spritebud daemon first creates the files directory, then sets it's permission and owner. Next it decompresses and restores the "a" file, our 50mb dummy files. During the restoration of "a", our exploit application has time to symlink "d", our text file containing the full path to our script (c), to /sys/kernel/uevent_helper. Upon restoration of file "d", our path is written to uevent_helper. When a hotplug even occurs (which occur every few seconds), the path contained in uevent_helper is execute by the kernel and our script (c) is executed and installs the su binary (b).
It initially appeared that the exploit had been patched in P769 V20h, but I was able to get it to work.
What I did was restore the backup and prior to clicking the button to restart, plugged the phone into my computer. I was prompted with a SuperSU confirmation dialog and I granted access.
This hotplug wasn't necessary with previous ROM versions, but maybe something changed. I read that was how the exploit worked, so I thought I'd give it a try.