[DISCUSSION] Play Integrity API

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V0latyle

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Play Integrity API

What is Play Integrity?
Play Integrity has replaced SafetyNet for the most part, with a deadline of June 2024, when Google's SafetyNet servers will go offline. Apps that continue to exclusively depend on SafetyNet will no longer work once this happens. Most developers have already migrated to Play Integrity.

Is Play Integrity the same as Play Protect?
No. Play Integrity provides users with the ability to verify device compatibility and security, much like SafetyNet did. Play Protect is a part of the Play Store that ensures that your device is certified, and helps to protect against malware. In this context, "certified" refers to whether or not your device has passed Android compatibility testing. This is also used for part of the Play Integrity checks. More information here


My device passes SafetyNet but I can't use Google Pay/other apps.
Don't rely on SafetyNet as a good assessment of your device's compatibility and security. It is possible to pass SafetyNet, but fail Play Integrity.
Rooted Pixel 5 on stock firmware: USNF 2.3.1 shows SafetyNet Pass using YASNAC, but device fails Play Integrity DEVICE_INTEGRITY check.

How do I know if my device is passing Play Integrity checks?
To check Play Integrity status, you can use this app:
Github

If you're a nerd and you want to check key attestation, use this:
Github

What causes a device to fail Play Integrity checks?
It depends on your Android version and device state. If you're on an old version of Android prior to 8.0, even an unmodified device will only pass BASIC_INTEGRITY and DEVICE_INTEGRITY, because they are not capable of hardware backed attestation methods. Android 8.0+ devices that are not modified or unlocked should pass all 3; Android 8.0+ devices with unlocked bootloaders will fail all 3, because the unlocked bootloader state means hardware backed attestation is not possible.

What do I do if my device is failing all 3 checks?
You can use the Universal SafetyNet Fix Magisk module 2.4.0 or higher, which forces basic attestation similar to pre Android 8. If you're on rooted OEM firmware, this should be sufficient for most apps including Google Pay. Custom ROMs and Chinese OEMs may have to use fingerprint altering methods to pass. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked bootloader...unless it's"broken", like an ASUS ROG. Fortunately, this isn't a big deal, as no app developers are known to require that verdict.

Now, details on what Play Integrity is and how it works...


SafetyNet has been discontinued in favor of the new Play Integrity, which uses stronger methods to verify the security of a device. This is why many rooted users have been unable to use security sensitive apps, such as banking and DRM.

The three elements in Play Integrity are:
  • MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet ctsProfileMatch. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. (Device profile matches that of a device that has passed Compatibility Test Suite) A device that fails this will appear as Uncertified in Play Store.
  • MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet basicIntegrity. The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer. Most devices should pass this, even if they're rooted.
  • MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet HARDWARE_BACKED evaluationType. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. An unlocked bootloader will ALWAYS fail this label because boot integrity cannot be verified, meaning that hardware backed attestation methods cannot be used.
This table shows the relationship between SafetyNet and Play Integrity responses:
1665499433643.png


The most fundamental change is this: Play Integrity, by default, uses hardware methods to verify BASIC and DEVICE integrity, but also uses the same hardware methods as proof of boot and system integrity. What this means is that Play Integrity uses stronger (and unbreakable!) methods as "proof" of the BASIC and DEVICE verdicts, and uses the availability of these hardware backed methods to determine the STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict.

These hardware methods include hardware-backed key attestation as well as Verified Boot to verify that a device has not been tampered with. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked and/or modified device, or a pre Android 8 device. (Notable exception being devices with broken keystores such as ASUS ROG)

It is worth noting that SafetyNet always provided the means for developers to force hardware backed evaluation types; none did, including Google. The same seems to still be true; most app developers require DEVICE verdict, "secure" apps require BASIC and DEVICE, but none are known to require STRONG.

So if Play Integrity defaults to unbreakable hardware backed attestation, what can we do if this is broken or unavailable on our devices?
Fortunately, we have the ability to force a basic attestation method that prevents the use of hardware checks, meaning it is possible to partially pass. Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.4.0 does this:
(Response from Play Integrity Checker on my rooted Pixel 5 with Universal SafetyNet Fix MOD by Displax)
1667488774837.png

You can find that module here:


As far as how this is going to affect us in the future, it's up to the app developers to decide what results they want. In most cases, all they care about is BASIC and DEVICE. But if they really want to ensure that they're running on a trusted platform, they can require STRONG attestation, which cannot be spoofed or bypassed. BASIC and DEVICE can, because they use the same mechanisms that SafetyNet did. The million dollar question is whether they ever will.


For those interested in the timeline:
1665497085076.png


For more information, please read the discussion in this thread.
 
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pndwal

Senior Member
But new devices have originally been released with A11 (or A12).
Hence, it's not possible to spoof A10 on those devices just by 'downgrading' the Android version

Then we come to the 'suggestions' to spoof fingerprints from a 'close device' (where A10 or earlier stock ROM was available) - but that just opens a Pandora box with who knows what kind of problems, because the same fingerprints are also used by system apps and services to drive various components:
- go to MHPC thread and find people who experimented with the same and lost fingerprint or the whole touch
- on another phone it could be camera or who knows what
- not to mention that spoofed CTS fingerprints may screw OTA and therefore brick the system
Yup... But this is what the @Displax mod solution is doing however, but targeting GMS... Also his USNF PR...

Also interesting:
This kills two rabbits:
• fix old SN CTS profile check on some weird Custom ROMs
• bypass Integrity (MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY) for now.
https://github.com/kdrag0n/safetynet-fix/pull/207#issue-1317290126

@kdragon is taking interest... He's concerned about fingerprint mismatch issues too:
Have you noticed any features acting up with the old fingerprint?

Ideally, I think this should be scoped to Play Integrity code by identifying methods it calls near the beginning and end of integrity checks, and adding hooks to set and restore the fingerprint. I feel like setting a fingerprint that doesn't match the system in so many ways is bound to cause an issue somewhere.

So @Displax says it's "for now" / and is "just quick example (and core resolve) with temp fix for impatient people))... But need more testing with various devices." He agreed:
We need separate target hook for this (if feasible) - will be more polite solution...

Target process (one of?) "com.android.vending/com.google.android.finsky.integrityservice.IntegrityService"
https://github.com/kdrag0n/safetynet-fix/pull/207#issuecomment-1195951660

👀 PW
 

zgfg

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Yup... But this is what the @Displax mod solution is doing however, but targeting GMS...
Yeah, that's the point - he uses Zygisk to limit CTS prints only to GMS - therefore if you use getprop you won't see the CTS prints being changed (like if you would use MHCP for changing the prints)

See that USNF is Zygisk type module, MHCP is not - hence MHCP cannot filter the props changes only to particular app/process

Therefore, other apps (like camera, Samsung store, etc) are not troubled - they still see the proper props values
 
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pndwal

Senior Member
Some Insight on the New Cat and Mouse Game...

Since many are asking:
Is there a fix for this? ... Can't pass MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY.
I'm posting this WOT. 🤪

I predict some will like it, some won't... You've been warned! 😜

FWIW, Play Integrity MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY is akin to SafetyNet Evaluation type HARDWARE with CTS Profile match...

Banks could have used this before (w/ S/N API) but haven't as it would have excluded too many users/devices/customers... Nothing has actually changed with new PI API; MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY will exclude the same group, so it's doubtful they'll rush to require this verdict...

Basically, the means to enforce Hardware key-backed Attestation has already been here w/ either of these attestations, but banks don't want to exclude all those w/Android 7 and below, or many w/ broken keymaster 3+ implementations in Android 8+ devices (CTS Profile match with HARDWARE Evaluation type / MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY won't pass with locked bootloader), eg most OnePlus devices (nb. Keymaster may have been fixed in OnePlus devices launched with Android 12+)...

I'm guessing the banks may well leverage this at some point if the time arrives when they feel there is a sufficient critical mass of devices w/ working hardware-backed keymaster (ie w/ hardware keystore, A8+) to trade against the number of modded (bootloader unlocked) devices in use especially if they deem Google slow to close the fallback-to-basic-attestation loophole that has allowed modders to bypass hardware based attestation to CTS Profile match enforcement (by triggering fallback to BASIC Evaluation type as well as bypassing enforcement) and also to allow its counterpart, MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict. (Nb. This verdict should not properly be obtained on modded devices, and it requires the same attestations as S/N as well as the same tricks to trigger fallback to BASIC attestation and bypass enforcement) The incentive to use this foolproof means is also certainly being weighed constantly against the cost / need to use their own custom means of sophisticated 'root' detection...

Google also, as other authorities have commented, appears to be waiting for some 'acceptable' percentile / critical mass of such devices in use to be reached also, before they swing the 'big hammer' that is Hardware-backed Key Attestation enforcement and that will definitely spell the endgame for modders' use of bank apps, and possibly for OnePlus users and others whose devices have broken keymaster*

*Nb. There are exceptions, eg Asus ROG Phone 3, where broken keymaster actually results in PI MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY and S/N CTS Profile match with Evaluation type HARDWARE regardless of bootloader status instead of the converse...

It seems likely to me that OnePlus and other devices with broken keymaster can be spared if Google do prevent on-device triggering of fallbacks to basic attestation use simply by using device info contained in the cryptographic attestation sent to Google servers instead of userspace model props etc now used, to bypass enforcement at the server end. If they do this it would be a concession as modded OnePlus etc may then still be able to pass CTS Profile match / DEVICE_INTEGRITY while other modern modded devices won't...

This would, however, be a way to swing the hammer a bit sooner, and either way, as can be seen from the above, they may be forced to do this once banks do indicate a willingness to enforce
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY in order to stop a landslide that would prevent all stock locked Android 7 and lower devices using bank apps etc... Or maybe they'll just let the landslide go and force bank app users to upgrade devices...

Hopefully this gives some insight regarding what pressures may finally force Google to properly deploy (ie. strictly enforce) Hardware-based Key Attestation on devices that support it...

Personally, I think Google has exercised great restraint, possibly out of some regard for the modding community since I can't see any other compelling reason not to have properly enforced CTS Profile match with HARDWARE Evaluation type where supported or Hardware attested MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY sooner, unless the matter of ensuring that the API properly sees hardware identifiers (ie. these cannot be spoofed, which I believe would again require cryptographic server-side attestation that the device doesn't indicate the presence of hardware keystore) for bypassing hardware attestation enforcement in devices launched with Android 7 and earlier is proving difficult (but I'm fairly sure this mechanism will be a simple matter for Google and probably already in place)... 😛

It may well be that Google is benevolently holding off but is using/will use MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY uptake data as tha natural indicator of the banks propensity for reliable HKA... My bet is that if Google doesn't have immediate plans to move to srtict HKA enforcement for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, then they will when the banks themselves move to use the even stricter MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict...


👀 🤠
 

V0latyle

Forum Moderator
Staff member
Since many are asking:

I've posted some information about Play Integrity MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY being akin to SafetyNet Evaluation type HARDWARE with CTS Profile match, but since it became a WOT, I put it here:
https://forum.xda-developers.com/t/magisk-general-support-discussion.3432382/post-87274009

😜 PW
I've been meaning to ask....Since Google is replacing SafetyNet with Play Integrity, is it safe to assume that there will come a day when app developers (particularly Google) remove SafetyNet support from their apps, at which point those of us with root will be unable to force "legacy" attestation as with the modified USNF? Of course this will mean that all versions of Android prior to the implementation of HA/TEE will be excluded as well, but it's not uncommon for developers to stop supporting older platforms.
 

V0latyle

Forum Moderator
Staff member
Some Insight on the New Cat and Mouse Game...

Since many are asking:

I'm posting this WOT. 🤪

I predict some will like it, some won't... You've been warned! 😜

FWIW, Play Integrity MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY is akin to SafetyNet Evaluation type HARDWARE with CTS Profile match...

Banks could have used this before (w/ S/N API) but haven't as it would have excluded too many users/devices/customers... Nothing has actually changed with new PI API; MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY will exclude the same group, so it's doubtful they'll rush to require this verdict...

Basically, the means to enforce Hardware key-backed Attestation has already been here w/ either of these attestations, but banks don't want to exclude all those w/Android 7 and below, or many w/ broken keymaster 3+ implementations in Android 8+ devices (CTS Profile match with HARDWARE Evaluation type / MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY won't pass with locked bootloader), eg most OnePlus devices (nb. Keymaster may have been fixed in OnePlus devices launched with Android 12+)...

I'm guessing the banks may well leverage this at some point if the time arrives when they feel there is a sufficient critical mass of devices w/ working hardware-backed keymaster (ie w/ hardware keystore, A8+) to trade against the number of modded (bootloader unlocked) devices in use especially if they deem Google slow to close the fallback-to-basic-attestation loophole that has allowed modders to bypass hardware based attestation to CTS Profile match enforcement (by triggering fallback to BASIC Evaluation type as well as bypassing enforcement) and also to allow its counterpart, MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict. (Nb. This verdict should not properly be obtained on modded devices, and it requires the same attestations as S/N as well as the same tricks to trigger fallback to BASIC attestation and bypass enforcement) The incentive to use this foolproof means is also certainly being weighed constantly against the cost / need to use their own custom means of sophisticated 'root' detection...

Google also, as other authorities have commented, appears to be waiting for some 'acceptable' percentile / critical mass of such devices in use to be reached also, before they swing the 'big hammer' that is Hardware-backed Key Attestation enforcement and that will definitely spell the endgame for modders' use of bank apps, and possibly for OnePlus users and others whose devices have broken keymaster*

*Nb. There are exceptions, eg Asus ROG Phone 3, where broken keymaster actually results in PI MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY and S/N CTS Profile match with Evaluation type HARDWARE regardless of bootloader status instead of the converse...

It seems likely to me that OnePlus and other devices with broken keymaster can be spared if Google do prevent on-device triggering of fallbacks to basic attestation use simply by using device info contained in the cryptographic attestation sent to Google servers instead of userspace model props etc now used, to bypass enforcement at the server end. If they do this it would be a concession as modded OnePlus etc may then still be able to pass CTS Profile match / DEVICE_INTEGRITY while other modern modded devices won't...

This would, however, be a way to swing the hammer a bit sooner, and either way, as can be seen from the above, they may be forced to do this once banks do indicate a willingness to enforce
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY in order to stop a landslide that would prevent all stock locked Android 7 and lower devices using bank apps etc... Or maybe they'll just let the landslide go and force bank app users to upgrade devices...

Hopefully this gives some insight regarding what pressures may finally force Google to properly deploy (ie. strictly enforce) Hardware-based Key Attestation on devices that support it...

Personally, I think Google has exercised great restraint, possibly out of some regard for the modding community since I can't see any other compelling reason not to have properly enforced CTS Profile match with HARDWARE Evaluation type where supported or Hardware attested MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY sooner, unless the matter of ensuring that the API properly sees hardware identifiers (ie. these cannot be spoofed, which I believe would again require cryptographic server-side attestation that the device doesn't indicate the presence of hardware keystore) for bypassing hardware attestation enforcement in devices launched with Android 7 and earlier is proving difficult (but I'm fairly sure this mechanism will be a simple matter for Google and probably already in place)... 😛

It may well be that Google is benevolently holding off but is using/will use MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY uptake data as tha natural indicator of the banks propensity for reliable HKA... My bet is that if Google doesn't have immediate plans to move to srtict HKA enforcement for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, then they will when the banks themselves move to use the even stricter MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict...


👀 🤠
Would you consider possibly boiling this down to a fairly simpler explanation that we can sticky? It's likely this will be the topic of quite repetitive questions going forward.

I tried to explain it somewhat simply here, please let me know how far I missed the mark
 
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pndwal

Senior Member
I've been meaning to ask....Since Google is replacing SafetyNet with Play Integrity, is it safe to assume that there will come a day when app developers (particularly Google) remove SafetyNet support from their apps,
I put info about this originally here:
https://forum.xda-developers.com/t/magisk-module-universal-safetynet-fix-2-3-1.4217823/post-87188299

Google is urging Devs to do just that; S/N API was already depreciated in June with 'full turndown' slated for June 2024... banks are urged to move to PI asap, and at least before the June 2023 migration deadline. If they do, their older versions will continue to function with S/N API till June 2024. If they don't, these will cease to gat needed attestations from June 2023.
at which point those of us with root will be unable to force "legacy" attestation as with the modified USNF?
No, the new API includes all of the same device state checks and app processees use either one or the other, (although GPay seemed to use one for the app info and the other for card setup... but I'm betting it's only due to progressive changes...) so S/N turnoff won't matter...

You'll notice that if CTS Profile match fails for example, Device Integrity will fail also... The new API is a little stricter, especially for A11+ devices but @Displax's new USNF covers new enforcement bypass needed for these devices... The old bypasses are also still needed... And an official Pull Request is pending. (My Android 10 device doesn't need any change from official USNF)
Of course this will mean that all versions of Android prior to the implementation of HA/TEE will be excluded as well, but it's not uncommon for developers to stop supporting older platforms.
This is the point of what I just posted; if Google swings the enforce HKA if supported for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY hammer first, banks likely won't move to MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY sparing pre A8 stock devices... If they don't, eventually banks will implement MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY which will exclude customers using pre A8 devices... Either way it's game over for modders at that point... At least that's what my deduction says! 😛

See official dates, info, links from here:
https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/deprecation-timeline

👀 PW
 

zgfg

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I've been meaning to ask....Since Google is replacing SafetyNet with Play Integrity, is it safe to assume that there will come a day when app developers (particularly Google) remove SafetyNet support from their apps, at which point those of us with root will be unable to force "legacy" attestation as with the modified USNF? Of course this will mean that all versions of Android prior to the implementation of HA/TEE will be excluded as well, but it's not uncommon for developers to stop supporting older platforms.
That's something we can only speculate about.
Frankly, Google did not need Play Integrity - they could have simply forced CTS Profile checking through TEE (same thing as STRONG now) - but they didn't (yet)

Per specification, Google is not the final Judge. It only provides info how your device passes the Play Integrity API levels

If you are developer of a banking app, it is up to you would you allow DEVICE integrity, or would you require STRONG. Not even your banking app but better the banking server should make the final judgement (upon being passed the PI API test results)

Again, frankly, bankers could have already been checking do you pass CTS Profile with HARDWARE_BACKED or only BASIC, and allow only the first ones (they can also read that info with the old SafetyNet)

Btw, bankers (developers) can employ a more complex logic. Based on your phone model to require STRONG (new phones) or allow DEVICE (for older phones) - but it requires more work on their side
 
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pndwal

Senior Member
Wow.. another thread 😬... Perhaps we could condense this in @Didgeridoohan's GPay thread?

Anyway, since you asked me to critique:
The reason for this is that Google is sunsetting the SafetyNet and Play Protect certifications
I hadn't heard about Play Protect depreciation (it's still there currently, and Play Store is already using Play Integrity API!), but SafetyNet is already deprecated...
in favor of the new Play Integrity API, which uses 3 fields:

MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY
  • The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. This is replacing SafetyNet's ctsProfile. This is what USNF fixes.
MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY
  • The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer. This is replacing SafetyNet's basicIntegrity, and means that Play Services has not detected root.
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY
  • The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements.
    This is replacing SafetyNet's Hardware Attestation, and uses the Android system's Trusted Execution Environment to guarantee process security. This will not pass with an unlocked bootloader, and cannot be spoofed as it specifically relies on hardware security; unlocking the bootloader "breaks" TEE.

The workaround for this is the modded USNF module by @Displax which forces the system to use the old SafetyNet API instead of Play Integrity.
Um, no...

It simply allows PI MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict in Android 11+ (generally), by creating a fingerprint prop SDK-level (and possibly other) mismatch that triggers bypassing of Hardware keystore attestation enforcement... The original USNF fallback trigger (fake keystone registration) and enforcement bypass (altered Model prop) are also needed for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict, and these alone are enough for many devices (pre-Android 11 generally).
I imagine at some point in the future when SafetyNet is completely retired, app developers (especially large ones like Google) will eventually remove support for SafetyNet in their apps, which will mean that anyone whose device does not pass Play Integrity will not be able to use the app. This will include everyone running versions of Android older than 8.0, when TEE was implemented.
Hardware keystore and hardware TEE have been around at least since Android 6, but keymaster could not reliably verify the key pairs were in hardware... This was strengthened in Android 7 Keymaster 2 attesting to hardware backed keys, but only Android 8's Keymaster 3, with ID attestation allowing the device to provide proof of hardware identifiers, such as serial number or IMEI, was considered an attestation strong enough for HKA in android..

The other points are treated in my post above. 😛 PW
 
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zgfg

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Would you consider possibly boiling this down to a fairly simpler explanation that we can sticky? It's likely this will be the topic of quite repetitive questions going forward.

I tried to explain it somewhat simply here, please let me know how far I missed the mark
You may also see this answer (we are all talking the same things, maybe with slightly different words):
https://forum.xda-developers.com/t/...agisk-discussion-thread.3906703/post-87274309
 
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V0latyle

Forum Moderator
Staff member
I admit it's a little hard to wrap my brain around this.

My understanding of the Play Integrity API was originally that in order to meet Play Integrity as a whole, devices would have to meet the BASIC, DEVICE, and STRONG integrity. I didn't know the apps looked at those qualities directly - I thought Play Integrity checked these, and if any of them was false, Play Integrity would report that integrity is compromised.

I promise I'm not being obtuse...

So the way it REALLY works is that the API is a method by which the apps can check these properties; it doesn't rely on a Google specific process (because AOSP)
Which means I still don't quite understand...how does the modded USNF allow apps such as GPay and Wallet to ignore the MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY?

It's clear to me that almost any device should return MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY, and that we have to use workarounds such as USNF to be able to return MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, and that we will never be able to return MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY because of HKA vs unlocked bootloaders.
 
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zgfg

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I admit it's a little hard to wrap my brain around this.

My understanding of the Play Integrity API was originally that in order to meet Play Integrity as a whole, devices would have to meet the BASIC, DEVICE, and STRONG integrity. I didn't know the apps looked at those qualities directly - I thought Play Integrity checked these, and if any of them was false, Play Integrity would report that integrity is compromised.

I promise I'm not being obtuse...

So the way it REALLY works is that the API is a method by which the apps can check these properties; it doesn't rely on a Google specific process (because AOSP)
Which means I still don't quite understand...how does the modded USNF allow apps such as GPay and Wallet to ignore the MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY?

It's clear to me that almost any device should return MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY, and that we have to use workarounds such as USNF to be able to return MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, and that we will never be able to return MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY because of HKA vs unlocked bootloaders.
Here (again) link to Google's doc:

Pay attention to verdict - but better spend 15 minutes to read the whole

And in YASNAC, you can also read the JSON with eg details was the CTS Profile checked on TEE or not (= STRONG integrity for the be PI API)
 
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pndwal

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Frankly, Google did not need Play Integrity - they could have simply forced CTS Profile checking through TEE (same thing as STRONG now) - but they didn't (yet)...
FWIW, the real reason for the change was to provide an inclusive Integrity solution that
helps protect your apps and games from potentially risky and fraudulent interactions, allowing you to respond with appropriate actions to reduce attacks and abuse such as fraud, cheating, and unauthorized access.
by combining existing SafetyNet attestation in Device Integrity fields with the new Application integrity and Account details fields in a single API.

🤠 PW
 
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pndwal

Senior Member
I admit it's a little hard to wrap my brain around this.

My understanding of the Play Integrity API was originally that in order to meet Play Integrity as a whole, devices would have to meet the BASIC, DEVICE, and STRONG integrity. I didn't know the apps looked at those qualities directly - I thought Play Integrity checked these, and if any of them was false, Play Integrity would report that integrity is compromised.

I promise I'm not being obtuse...

So the way it REALLY works is that the API is a method by which the apps can check these properties; it doesn't rely on a Google specific process (because AOSP)
Which means I still don't quite understand...how does the modded USNF allow apps such as GPay and Wallet to ignore the MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY?

It's clear to me that almost any device should return MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY, and that we have to use workarounds such as USNF to be able to return MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, and that we will never be able to return MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY because of HKA vs unlocked bootloaders.
Apps can use MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY by default, using any distribution channel. Registration with Google Play allows use of MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY in addition...

Flow chart:
IMG_20220813_014920.jpg

😛 PW
 

V0latyle

Forum Moderator
Staff member
Here (again) link to Google's doc:

Pay attention to verdict - but better spend 15 minutes to read the whole

And in YASNAC, you can also read the JSON with eg details was the CTS Profile checked on TEE or not (= STRONG integrity for the be PI API)
I have read this and keep going back but I'm no developer and my general understanding of Android is less than elementary

Apps can use MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY by default, using any distribution channel. Registration with Google Play allows use of MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY in addition...
This is where it's still confusing to me. Because according to that statement, it sounds like developers can choose what guarantee of security they want...but
This makes it sound like Play Integrity is not so much a framework as it is a service, meaning at some point app developers will have no choice?

Or am I right on both accounts, but app developers can either call the Play Integrity API, or they can call the device security fields alone?
 
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V0latyle

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Staff member
@ipdev @pndwal @zgfg @TraderJack I know it's a lot of work, but could you please move your posts on Play Integrity into this thread as described above? The idea is to have one thread to discuss this topic, as well as a place to point other users to should they have questions. If someone would like to volunteer their post, I can copy/paste into the OP so we have an up front explanation of what Play Integrity is, how it works, and what it means for rooted/modded users.
 

zgfg

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Oct 10, 2016
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@ipdev @pndwal @zgfg @TraderJack I know it's a lot of work, but could you please move your posts on Play Integrity into this thread as described above? The idea is to have one thread to discuss this topic, as well as a place to point other users to should they have questions. If someone would like to volunteer their post, I can copy/paste into the OP so we have an up front explanation of what Play Integrity is, how it works, and what it means for rooted/modded users.
Is it possible to move the posts without copy-pasting them?

I mean it is if I mark it is Report and ask you to move - but then it's more work for you. Hence some other way?
 

V0latyle

Forum Moderator
Staff member
Is it possible to move the posts without copy-pasting them?

I mean it is if I mark it is Report and ask you to move - but then it's more work for you. Hence some other way?
No, only moderators can move posts (and we have forum specific moderators so it wouldn't be me lol)

Else, you can copy/paste and request the old post be deleted
 

pndwal

Senior Member
I have read this and keep going back but I'm no developer and my general understanding of Android is less than elementary
X2
This is where it's still confusing to me. Because according to that statement, it sounds like developers can choose what guarantee of security they want...
Well Hardware evaluationTypes are used if available by default even if just calling Device_Integrity. That's why @kdragon uses both fake keystone (causes exception which triggers fall back to basic attestation) and altered Model prop (mismatch causes enforcement of a Hardware based verdict to be bypassed, ie. the forced basic attestation becomes acceptable)...

The statement "JSON ... details was the CTS Profile checked on TEE or not (= STRONG integrity for the be PI API)" may be misleading; really, MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY only indicates a passing STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict using hardware TEE; of course, unlocked devices will fail to return MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY and there will be no indication whether hardware TEE was used or not in PI, unlike old S/N attestation... Conversely, CTS Profile will be checked in TEE (ie. we see S/N HARDWARE evaluationType) to attest to DEVICE_INTEGRITY if it's available by default (ie. on A8+ devices), but if it fails there is no indication from PI API that hardware TEE was used, and no indication if hardware was used if it succeeds either unless STRONG_INTEGRITY succeeds also...

Don't confuse evaluationType with the choice of verdict type; Devs can choose any of three levels for verdict but cannot choose evaluationType used; Hardware will be used if it's available for that type unless userspace tricks are used to spoof device and cause fallbacks...
but

This makes it sound like Play Integrity is not so much a framework as it is a service, meaning at some point app developers will have no choice?
It's an API, (Application Programming Interface) requiring server-end support by Google; I gave you the dates / link a couple of times now for 'Migration deadline' & 'Full turndown' of S/N API at which point there will be no choice but to use PI API...
Or am I right on both accounts, but app developers can either call the Play Integrity API, or they can call the device security fields alone?
Sorry, are you referring to Play Integrity response labels?... These are all part of Play Integrity, of course!?

Main signals (responses) are defined as:

- Application integrity
- Account details
- Device integrity

For Device integrity, device_recognition_verdict is called.

By default, this can have one of the following labels:

MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY
or
No labels (a blank value)

If you opt in to receive additional labels in Device integrity, device_recognition_verdict can have the following additional labels:

MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY
or
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY
and for emulators only
MEETS_VIRTUAL_INTEGRITY

These 'fields' are all called via the Device Integrity API.

https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity/verdict

😛 PW

PS. Just did this on 140 min flight from Broken Hill to Sydney... Just landed...
 
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ipdev

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I am not sure about the Google Pay Magisk Discussion Thread but, posts (including mine) related to Play Integrity in the Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.3.1 thread seem to start around Post # 1,796.

All the posts about Play Integrity (that are not related to the USNF module) would have to be moved and kept in order to this thread.
I am not sure how easy that would be to do, since a lot of the discussion included linked posts in the responses.

Maybe @mrjuniork has an idea of the best and easiest way to do it?

Cheers. :cowboy:

PS.
Sorry to ping you mrjuniork.
I might be wrong but, it looks like you will be the one who gets stuck moving the posts.
🙃
 

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  • 3
    @pndwal I've updated the OP yet again to reflect what we discussed about Android 8 devices.

    The basics as I understand them:
    • Pre 8.0 devices are not capable of hardware backed attestation; so Play Integrity defaults to basic; should pass both BASIC and DEVICE_INTEGRITY in most cases even with an unlocked bootloader although the latter may require other alterations such as MHPC
    • Android 8.0+ devices default to hardware backed attestation, meaning that all 3 verdicts will only pass on a locked bootloader and OEM firmware
    • USNF mod forces basic attestation method for rooted 8.0+ devices, so they're basically in the same camp as the pre 8.0 devices
    • No apps are currently known to require STRONG_INTEGRITY
    2
    @pndwal I've updated the OP yet again to reflect what we discussed about Android 8 devices.

    The basics as I understand them:
    • Pre 8.0 devices are not capable of hardware backed attestation; so Play Integrity defaults to basic; should pass both BASIC and DEVICE_INTEGRITY in most cases even with an unlocked bootloader although the latter may require other alterations such as MHPC
    Actually for unlocked/rooted devices both basicIntegrity and deviceIntegrity will require hiding root from droidguard (attestation) gms process as a minimum for passing verdicts and many will need changes to sensitive prop values also. Old MagiskHide did this. Or users can add droidguard (attestation) gms process in denylist (w/ or w/o Shamiko or other hiding) and use MHPC to adjust sensitive prop values (does this even with nothing configured by user). Or just run USNF (From v2.3.1: Restored support for Android 7... Actually I think he means A7 and older per commit: magisk: Allow limited installation on Android 7 and older … "In general, users on such old versions of Android don't need to bypass
    hardware-backed attestation... so allow them to install the module without the Zygisk part.") to fix sensitive props... Users may still need to hide root from droidguard (attestation) gms process manually in this case as Zygisk parts won't load... I'm not sure...
    • Android 8.0+ devices default to hardware backed attestation, meaning that all 3 verdicts will only pass on a locked bootloader and OEM firmware
    All 3 together, yes... 2 can pass /unlocked bootloader... (... The pedant in me is showing. 🤪)
    • USNF mod forces basic attestation method for rooted 8.0+ devices, so they're basically in the same camp as the pre 8.0 devices
    • No apps are currently known to require STRONG_INTEGRITY
    Yup...

    FWIW I'm working on a simplified explanation for Google's progressive employment of hardware-backed attestation, USNF's evolving bypass and fallback methods and clarification of common misunderstandings for USNF discussion thread... It's taking a while as I have limited time ATM with long days (also very flakey internet w/ vodafail and patchy WiFi in small-town Taree)... 🤠 PW
    2
    So, not much to do for the time being, at least from my side, as I don't have any knowledge to do that and I very much doubt Lineage will ever do it.
    Thanks for the clarification
    Official LOS will never do it... Many unofficial builds do however... But a number of users of ROMs w/ integrated SNF are reporting similar intermittent Play Integrity failures to what those using latest USNF are reporting ATM... PW
    1
    Play Integrity API

    What is Play Integrity?
    Play Integrity has replaced SafetyNet for the most part, with a deadline of June 2024, when Google's SafetyNet servers will go offline. Apps that continue to exclusively depend on SafetyNet will no longer work once this happens. Most developers have already migrated to Play Integrity.

    Is Play Integrity the same as Play Protect?
    No. Play Integrity provides users with the ability to verify device compatibility and security, much like SafetyNet did. Play Protect is a part of the Play Store that ensures that your device is certified, and helps to protect against malware. In this context, "certified" refers to whether or not your device has passed Android compatibility testing. This is also used for part of the Play Integrity checks. More information here


    My device passes SafetyNet but I can't use Google Pay/other apps.
    Don't rely on SafetyNet as a good assessment of your device's compatibility and security. It is possible to pass SafetyNet, but fail Play Integrity.

    Rooted Pixel 5 on stock firmware: USNF 2.3.1 shows SafetyNet Pass using YASNAC, but device fails Play Integrity DEVICE_INTEGRITY check.

    How do I know if my device is passing Play Integrity checks?
    To check Play Integrity status, you can use this app:
    Github

    If you're a nerd and you want to check key attestation, use this:
    Github

    What causes a device to fail Play Integrity checks?
    It depends on your Android version and device state. If you're on an old version of Android prior to 8.0, even an unmodified device will only pass BASIC_INTEGRITY and DEVICE_INTEGRITY, because they are not capable of hardware backed attestation methods. Android 8.0+ devices that are not modified or unlocked should pass all 3; Android 8.0+ devices with unlocked bootloaders will fail all 3, because the unlocked bootloader state means hardware backed attestation is not possible.

    What do I do if my device is failing all 3 checks?
    You can use the Universal SafetyNet Fix Magisk module 2.4.0 or higher, which forces basic attestation similar to pre Android 8. If you're on rooted OEM firmware, this should be sufficient for most apps including Google Pay. Custom ROMs and Chinese OEMs may have to use fingerprint altering methods to pass. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked bootloader...unless it's"broken", like an
    ASUS ROG. Fortunately, this isn't a big deal, as no app developers are known to require that verdict.

    Now, details on what Play Integrity is and how it works...


    SafetyNet has been discontinued in favor of the new Play Integrity, which uses stronger methods to verify the security of a device. This is why many rooted users have been unable to use security sensitive apps, such as banking and DRM. There is a workaround for this.

    But first, details on the new API.
    The three elements in Play Integrity are:
    • MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet ctsProfileMatch. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. (Device profile matches that of a device that has passed Compatibility Test Suite) A device that fails this will appear as Uncertified in Play Store.
    • MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet basicIntegrity. The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer. Most devices should pass this, even if they're rooted.
    • MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet HARDWARE_BACKED attestation. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. An unlocked bootloader will ALWAYS fail this label because boot integrity cannot be verified, meaning that hardware backed attestation methods cannot be used.
    This table shows the relationship between SafetyNet and Play Integrity responses:
    View attachment 5732079

    The most fundamental change is that Play Integrity, by default, uses hardware methods to verify BASIC and DEVICE integrity, which is why simply having an unlocked bootloader will cause the device to fail all 3 results. However, Play Integrity also uses hardware methods (if available) to verify device security state in addition to the aforementioned checks. This is STRONG integrity, which relies on hardware-backed key attestation as well as Verified Boot to verify that a device has not been tampered with and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked and/or modified device, or a pre Android 8 device. (Notable exception being devices with broken keystores such as ASUS ROG)

    It is worth noting that SafetyNet always provided the means for developers to force hardware backed evaluation types; none did, including Google. The same seems to still be true; most app developers require DEVICE verdict, "secure" apps require BASIC and DEVICE, but none are known to require STRONG

    So this all sounds rather depressing. What do we do?
    Fortunately, we have the ability to force a basic attestation method that prevents the use of hardware checks, meaning it is possible to partially pass. Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.4.0 does this:
    (Response from Play Integrity Checker on my rooted Pixel 5 with Universal SafetyNet Fix MOD by Displax)
    View attachment 5751415
    You can find that module here:


    As far as how this is going to affect us in the future, it's up to the app developers to decide what results they want. In most cases, all they care about is BASIC and DEVICE. But if they really want to ensure that they're running on a trusted platform, they can require STRONG attestation, which cannot be spoofed or bypassed. BASIC and DEVICE can, because they use the same mechanisms that SafetyNet did. The million dollar question is whether they ever will.


    For those interested in the timeline:
    View attachment 5732061

    For more information, please read the discussion in this thread.
    Thank you SO much for not only giving solution(s), but for explaining each bullet point in such depth and detail. This is extremely helpful in giving not only the "what" but also the "how" and "why" - much appreciated.
    1
    Hi, guys!
    Apologize for errors in writing, English is not my first language. For me the Gpay was working until today. I've checked the API integrity and receive the UNEVALUATED results with all integrity red. I've attached the denylist and magisk modules. Right now my USNF mod is 2.3.1 v2.0 (i know there is newest one, i've tried it with same results). Can you, please, help me identify the culprit. MOMO detects only wrong partition, so i think it's just the bootloader unlock. My phone is Oneplus 7T Pro, running stock OOS11, unlocked BL.
  • 13
    Play Integrity API

    What is Play Integrity?
    Play Integrity has replaced SafetyNet for the most part, with a deadline of June 2024, when Google's SafetyNet servers will go offline. Apps that continue to exclusively depend on SafetyNet will no longer work once this happens. Most developers have already migrated to Play Integrity.

    Is Play Integrity the same as Play Protect?
    No. Play Integrity provides users with the ability to verify device compatibility and security, much like SafetyNet did. Play Protect is a part of the Play Store that ensures that your device is certified, and helps to protect against malware. In this context, "certified" refers to whether or not your device has passed Android compatibility testing. This is also used for part of the Play Integrity checks. More information here


    My device passes SafetyNet but I can't use Google Pay/other apps.
    Don't rely on SafetyNet as a good assessment of your device's compatibility and security. It is possible to pass SafetyNet, but fail Play Integrity.
    Rooted Pixel 5 on stock firmware: USNF 2.3.1 shows SafetyNet Pass using YASNAC, but device fails Play Integrity DEVICE_INTEGRITY check.

    How do I know if my device is passing Play Integrity checks?
    To check Play Integrity status, you can use this app:
    Github

    If you're a nerd and you want to check key attestation, use this:
    Github

    What causes a device to fail Play Integrity checks?
    It depends on your Android version and device state. If you're on an old version of Android prior to 8.0, even an unmodified device will only pass BASIC_INTEGRITY and DEVICE_INTEGRITY, because they are not capable of hardware backed attestation methods. Android 8.0+ devices that are not modified or unlocked should pass all 3; Android 8.0+ devices with unlocked bootloaders will fail all 3, because the unlocked bootloader state means hardware backed attestation is not possible.

    What do I do if my device is failing all 3 checks?
    You can use the Universal SafetyNet Fix Magisk module 2.4.0 or higher, which forces basic attestation similar to pre Android 8. If you're on rooted OEM firmware, this should be sufficient for most apps including Google Pay. Custom ROMs and Chinese OEMs may have to use fingerprint altering methods to pass. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked bootloader...unless it's"broken", like an ASUS ROG. Fortunately, this isn't a big deal, as no app developers are known to require that verdict.

    Now, details on what Play Integrity is and how it works...


    SafetyNet has been discontinued in favor of the new Play Integrity, which uses stronger methods to verify the security of a device. This is why many rooted users have been unable to use security sensitive apps, such as banking and DRM.

    The three elements in Play Integrity are:
    • MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet ctsProfileMatch. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. (Device profile matches that of a device that has passed Compatibility Test Suite) A device that fails this will appear as Uncertified in Play Store.
    • MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet basicIntegrity. The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer. Most devices should pass this, even if they're rooted.
    • MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY: Corresponds to SafetyNet HARDWARE_BACKED evaluationType. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. An unlocked bootloader will ALWAYS fail this label because boot integrity cannot be verified, meaning that hardware backed attestation methods cannot be used.
    This table shows the relationship between SafetyNet and Play Integrity responses:
    1665499433643.png


    The most fundamental change is this: Play Integrity, by default, uses hardware methods to verify BASIC and DEVICE integrity, but also uses the same hardware methods as proof of boot and system integrity. What this means is that Play Integrity uses stronger (and unbreakable!) methods as "proof" of the BASIC and DEVICE verdicts, and uses the availability of these hardware backed methods to determine the STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict.

    These hardware methods include hardware-backed key attestation as well as Verified Boot to verify that a device has not been tampered with. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked and/or modified device, or a pre Android 8 device. (Notable exception being devices with broken keystores such as ASUS ROG)

    It is worth noting that SafetyNet always provided the means for developers to force hardware backed evaluation types; none did, including Google. The same seems to still be true; most app developers require DEVICE verdict, "secure" apps require BASIC and DEVICE, but none are known to require STRONG.

    So if Play Integrity defaults to unbreakable hardware backed attestation, what can we do if this is broken or unavailable on our devices?
    Fortunately, we have the ability to force a basic attestation method that prevents the use of hardware checks, meaning it is possible to partially pass. Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.4.0 does this:
    (Response from Play Integrity Checker on my rooted Pixel 5 with Universal SafetyNet Fix MOD by Displax)
    1667488774837.png

    You can find that module here:


    As far as how this is going to affect us in the future, it's up to the app developers to decide what results they want. In most cases, all they care about is BASIC and DEVICE. But if they really want to ensure that they're running on a trusted platform, they can require STRONG attestation, which cannot be spoofed or bypassed. BASIC and DEVICE can, because they use the same mechanisms that SafetyNet did. The million dollar question is whether they ever will.


    For those interested in the timeline:
    1665497085076.png


    For more information, please read the discussion in this thread.
    8
    Some Insight on the New Cat and Mouse Game...

    Since many are asking:
    Is there a fix for this? ... Can't pass MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY.
    I'm posting this WOT. 🤪

    I predict some will like it, some won't... You've been warned! 😜

    FWIW, Play Integrity MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY is akin to SafetyNet Evaluation type HARDWARE with CTS Profile match...

    Banks could have used this before (w/ S/N API) but haven't as it would have excluded too many users/devices/customers... Nothing has actually changed with new PI API; MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY will exclude the same group, so it's doubtful they'll rush to require this verdict...

    Basically, the means to enforce Hardware key-backed Attestation has already been here w/ either of these attestations, but banks don't want to exclude all those w/Android 7 and below, or many w/ broken keymaster 3+ implementations in Android 8+ devices (CTS Profile match with HARDWARE Evaluation type / MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY won't pass with locked bootloader), eg most OnePlus devices (nb. Keymaster may have been fixed in OnePlus devices launched with Android 12+)...

    I'm guessing the banks may well leverage this at some point if the time arrives when they feel there is a sufficient critical mass of devices w/ working hardware-backed keymaster (ie w/ hardware keystore, A8+) to trade against the number of modded (bootloader unlocked) devices in use especially if they deem Google slow to close the fallback-to-basic-attestation loophole that has allowed modders to bypass hardware based attestation to CTS Profile match enforcement (by triggering fallback to BASIC Evaluation type as well as bypassing enforcement) and also to allow its counterpart, MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict. (Nb. This verdict should not properly be obtained on modded devices, and it requires the same attestations as S/N as well as the same tricks to trigger fallback to BASIC attestation and bypass enforcement) The incentive to use this foolproof means is also certainly being weighed constantly against the cost / need to use their own custom means of sophisticated 'root' detection...

    Google also, as other authorities have commented, appears to be waiting for some 'acceptable' percentile / critical mass of such devices in use to be reached also, before they swing the 'big hammer' that is Hardware-backed Key Attestation enforcement and that will definitely spell the endgame for modders' use of bank apps, and possibly for OnePlus users and others whose devices have broken keymaster*

    *Nb. There are exceptions, eg Asus ROG Phone 3, where broken keymaster actually results in PI MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY and S/N CTS Profile match with Evaluation type HARDWARE regardless of bootloader status instead of the converse...

    It seems likely to me that OnePlus and other devices with broken keymaster can be spared if Google do prevent on-device triggering of fallbacks to basic attestation use simply by using device info contained in the cryptographic attestation sent to Google servers instead of userspace model props etc now used, to bypass enforcement at the server end. If they do this it would be a concession as modded OnePlus etc may then still be able to pass CTS Profile match / DEVICE_INTEGRITY while other modern modded devices won't...

    This would, however, be a way to swing the hammer a bit sooner, and either way, as can be seen from the above, they may be forced to do this once banks do indicate a willingness to enforce
    MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY in order to stop a landslide that would prevent all stock locked Android 7 and lower devices using bank apps etc... Or maybe they'll just let the landslide go and force bank app users to upgrade devices...

    Hopefully this gives some insight regarding what pressures may finally force Google to properly deploy (ie. strictly enforce) Hardware-based Key Attestation on devices that support it...

    Personally, I think Google has exercised great restraint, possibly out of some regard for the modding community since I can't see any other compelling reason not to have properly enforced CTS Profile match with HARDWARE Evaluation type where supported or Hardware attested MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY sooner, unless the matter of ensuring that the API properly sees hardware identifiers (ie. these cannot be spoofed, which I believe would again require cryptographic server-side attestation that the device doesn't indicate the presence of hardware keystore) for bypassing hardware attestation enforcement in devices launched with Android 7 and earlier is proving difficult (but I'm fairly sure this mechanism will be a simple matter for Google and probably already in place)... 😛

    It may well be that Google is benevolently holding off but is using/will use MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY uptake data as tha natural indicator of the banks propensity for reliable HKA... My bet is that if Google doesn't have immediate plans to move to srtict HKA enforcement for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, then they will when the banks themselves move to use the even stricter MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict...


    👀 🤠
    5
    RL does hold me tight lately.
    ...which is why I already moved a few posts @V0latyle requested. Got your back! (y)
    5

    Tech = Spy-Biz, HippoMan

    FWIW, I'm answering this here (might be the best place...):
    Its none of the banks business to stop their clients from using rooted devices. Theyre just adding another hindrance to smooth banking operations thereby possibly hampering their own business by wasting both their and their clients time. Thats Stupidity!
    Well, seems that's a popular option here, but it's also a highly subjective one...
    Bank Devs did you hear? Pls discuss this with your bosses. Its like going backwards instead of forward.
    And you're going to need to do better than that... Even if banks themselves didn't persue these initiatives (ostensibly to protect their interests / bottom line) they're being driven by many other powerful entities...

    The Open Mobile Terminal Platform (OMTP) first defined TEE in their "Advanced Trusted Environment:OMTP TR1" standard around 2007, and for some 15 years Hardware implementations for a hardware isolation mechanism with a secure operating system running on top of this along with an associated "hardware root of trust" have been progressively adopted and implemented not just in/by mobile devices / ARM SOCs (TrustZone, first iterations in 2008, but not much further development/excited customer till 1012, and more), but also by Apple (Secure Enclave is a hardware feature found in most versions of iPhone, iPad, Mac, Apple TV, Apple Watch and HomePod), AMD (Platform Security Processor, PSP, 2013, and more), IBM (IBM Secure Service Container, 2017, and more),
    Intel (Trusted Execution Technology / Management Engine, 2008 and more),
    RISC-V SOCs (MultiZone™ Security Trusted Execution Environment, 2018, and more)...

    The aim of tee on SOC is to to reduce the attack surface... Typical applications include DRM functionality for controlling the use of media (ie. media security) and preventing any unapproved use of a device (ie. device/data security)...

    And it's not just banks who are interested in this; Service providers, mobile network operators (MNO), operating system developers, application developers, device manufacturers, platform providers and silicon vendors are the main stakeholders contributing to the standardization efforts around the TEE in SOC and implementation...

    Banks are simply impatient as, at least in Android, secure TEE implementation for device security is un-developed, flawed, lagging, arguably broken even... unlike in iOS (iOS Secure Enclave) ... And that's a problem, not just for Google...

    So banks do their own security checks... Simply because Android Verified Boot doesn't work for them... I mean attestation to it in the usable deviceIntegrity verdict can't be trusted... I mean it's hardly 'verified', is it?... It's 'chain of trust' can't be trusted because components can be spoofed so Verified Boot can't be trusted, and all because of TEE not being usefully implemented (ie. to allow detection of tampering with a runtime environment along with either a hardware based attestation to the device model or to a working implementation of keymaster for enforcing hardware evaluation type)... And it's not useful presently because the simple implementations of both SafetyNet evaluationType and Play Integrity strongIntegrity will necessarily fail all devices using Android 7 and below as well many OnePlus and other devices with broken keystore implementations if adopted (because attestation doesn't include the information in parentheses above) making this option largely impractical...

    Don't expect that banks won't adopt PI strongIntegrity verdict use sooner or later however... they're only waiting for a certain critical mass of compliant devices (which only they will determine)... or for a better solution (read: more useful hardware based attestation to a trusted, non-tampered runtime environment)...

    Moreover, the efforts banks are making in persuing their own detection of tampered runtime environments as an interim measure only highlights their own interest/ stake in TEE in SOC implementation of keystore/keymaster attestation for device security and standardization...

    I totally agree!

    And as I've mentioned here before, every desktop computer is a rooted device, and of course we don't see the banks trying to hinder us from accessing their services from our computers.

    And banks gladly issue us debit cards which we keep in our wallets that are just as easy to steal as mobile devices.

    Rooted Android devices are just low-hanging fruit. And the amount of fraud that's prevented by trying to fight against Android root is minuscule, given the extremely small percentage of mobile device users who want to use rooted Android devices. I wouldn't be surprised if the amount of money that banks spend for anti-Android-modding software development exceeds the maximum amount of money that could be lost via the hacking of modded Android devices.
    But as I've told you before, and as the above should make abundantly clear, TEE and other, especially hardware backed, means to detect tampered execution environments for an application developer's code are here to stay in mobile devices, and are arriving in PCs also... cos like banks, Google and iOS etc, Microsoft is doing the maths also...
    In 2021, protections built into Windows, Azure, Microsoft 365, and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 have blocked more than 9.6 billion malware threats, more than 35.7 billion phishing and other malicious emails, and 25.6 billion attempts to hijack our enterprise customers by brute-forcing stolen passwords—that’s more than 800 password attacks per second...
    https://www.microsoft.com/security/...for-windows-11-will-help-protect-hybrid-work/

    Hardware and software makers hope TEEs provide a long-term solution for using sensitive data in a more secure manner on smartphones, PCs, cloud systems, and virtualized workloads...
    https://www.hpe.com/us/en/insights/...with-trusted-execution-environments-2102.html

    And Microsoft are already spruiking Windows 11 as a "Zero Trust" solution for PC advanced security needs...

    Guards against sophisticated attacks​

    Protects down to the firmware level with hardware security features that shield user credentials and other critical data.

    Secured-core PCs and hardware-based security​

    Secured-core PCs deliver the highest level of Windows 11 protection including advanced protection of firmware and dynamic root of trust measurement.

    Windows 11 security innovations​

    Microsoft optimizes Windows 11 for Zero Trust protection. Read the Windows 11 Security Guide for a quick overview.
    https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/business/windows-11-secured-core-computers

    Anyway, as I see it, we are able to have a bit of fun beating the system, or really subverting mobile OS's security models only because these have been slow to implement proper / useful "zero trust" protections... The fun's sure to end sooner or later however cos we live in the real world!... And being real, you and I both know 'bank devs' will NEVER convince their bosses to abandon these advances either! (...ok, ok... advancement, regression, it's your call... or is it?... Who do we think we are???)...

    Eh guys?

    ... The only way you'll get your wish is by cobbling together enough funds to buy the banks, Google, the SOC makers and the OEMs you love ... Then you'll have a fighting chance. 🙂...

    Wish you luck... PW
    4
    I am not sure about the Google Pay Magisk Discussion Thread but, posts (including mine) related to Play Integrity in the Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.3.1 thread seem to start around Post # 1,796.

    All the posts about Play Integrity (that are not related to the USNF module) would have to be moved and kept in order to this thread.
    I am not sure how easy that would be to do, since a lot of the discussion included linked posts in the responses.

    Maybe @mrjuniork has an idea of the best and easiest way to do it?

    Cheers. :cowboy:

    PS.
    Sorry to ping you mrjuniork.
    I might be wrong but, it looks like you will be the one who gets stuck moving the posts.
    🙃