Yes, if I recall the specs correctly, permissive mode is one of the checks for cts-profile attestationAlso I'm not sure but setting SElinux to permissive at least from my experience might make cts profile match or device integrity fail.
Yes, if I recall the specs correctly, permissive mode is one of the checks for cts-profile attestationAlso I'm not sure but setting SElinux to permissive at least from my experience might make cts profile match or device integrity fail.
I thought that lsposed can be detected because when I recently reflashed the stock firmware for some reason no matter what I did PI api always detected device modifications and failed so I thought that lsposed can also be always detected by some specific app.Ok, but I argue that the fact that I have Zygisk-LSposed installed, does not attribute to any of my Momo detections
Neither for Ruru, TB-Checker nor SCheck - all those three fully pass in green not finding anything
NB:
TB-Checker extensively looks for XPosed artefacts but it fully passes in green
And actually HMA module for LSPosed helps to pass things for TB-Checker, SCheck and Ruru
Yes, if I recall the specs correctly, permissive mode is one of the checks for cts-profile attestation
My SN and PI pass (of course, cannot pass Strong Integrity - cannot trick TEE) with no problem with LSPosed installedI thought that lsposed can be detected because when I recently reflashed the stock firmware for some reason no matter what I did PI api always detected device modifications and failed so I thought that lsposed can also be always detected by some specific app.
Now it works turned out I had to just leave it for a few days and it fixed itself.My SN and PI pass (of course, cannot pass Strong Integrity - cannot trick TEE) with no problem with LSPosed installed
Seems Ricedroid is based on lineage/crdroid... You'll see here that crdroid pulls SafetyNet Fix w/ Displax mod from here:Hi. I have a riddle that I can't solve. I have two devices: Pixel 6 Pro (raven) and Pixel 7 Pro (cheetah). Both with unlocked bootloader. On Pixel 6 Pro I installed the RiceDroid rom.
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[ROM][13][raven][oriole] riceDroid 8.0[AOSP][PIXEL][UNOFFICIAL]
riceDroid for the Google Pixel 6/6 Pro [raven][oriole] What is riceDroid? * Ricedroid is an operating system based on lineage/crdroid, that aims to provide necessary "ricing" for android while being fast and stable. Terminology * The rice in...forum.xda-developers.com
It is very functional, does not really require root to give satisfaction from daily use. It runs banking applications, gpay (wallet) and has the accepted status of MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY and MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY.
Pixel 7 Pro, on the other hand, is quite a challenge. I installed Paranoid Android Topaz beta 1 on it
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Paranoid Android Topaz Beta 1 - Google Pixel 7 Pro
We are very excited to announce the beta of Paranoid Android Topaz, based on Android 13. On the first launch, you’ll notice a clean setup with beautiful wallpapers from Hampus Olsson, who teamed up with us again to create several beautiful...forum.xda-developers.com
Nb. Displax mod 2.0 USNF is enough for this; USNF settings will often interfere with that fix and your other solutions may be confusing you/the issue...Due to limited usability, I rooted and installed Displax mod 2.0 USNF. I couldn't get MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY despite combos with other Magisk modules (Shamiko, Husky, old USNF etc.)
Device is not 'absolute stock' if bootloader is unlocked... AVB is reporting that so you don't have deviceIntegrity! - you need the @Displax modded USNF to spoof this by forcing the fallback (based on an exception error mod causes) to basic attestation as well as several prop mismatches needed to bypass hardware evaluation type enforcement... With old Basic attestation (as used in pre A8 devices) you can spoof deviceIntegrity as AVB signals are not backed by HKA.So I went back to absolute stock via the online android flash tool. Strangely, on absolute stock, without root, Pixel 7 Pro still shows only MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and no wallet or Netflix or anything "requiring" internal payments accually works. This is a really incomprehensible situation for me considering how the predecessor (Pixel 6 Pro) behaves. I kindly ask for advice and tips.
Welcome...
You may have missed the exchange here, but I recently analysed & made (educated) guesses w/ @shoey63's help. See here:@shoey63 and/or anyone else familiar with the Asus ROG situation, can you explain how the keystore is broken and how this allows Play Integrity to return STRONG verdict?
Hiding root is necessary for many users because otherwise they cannot use various banking apps, e-citizen apps, mobile device management, etcWhat's the deal with so many people jumping through hoops with Shamiko and lsposed to try to hide root? It would seem that the Play Integrity workaround should work for most people, the exception being apps that use specific root detection methods? In other words, hiding root shouldn't be necessary for most people; passing BASIC and DEVICE integrity should be the main concern, no?
Makes senseHiding root is necessary for many users because otherwise they cannot use various banking apps, e-citizen apps, mobile device management, etc
Those apps use various other methods to detect root - eg, although you pass Play Integrity (SN), those apps still seek themselves (not through Google's PII/SN) for su, initrc, LSPosed module and/or even for the presence of Magisk app, etc
If they detect, they complain that device is unsecure and user cannot open them to eg configure his banking logging account, etc
More or less, that's all because stakeholders for those apps know that PI/SN attestation is not full-proof, ie, that many users successfully spoof CTS attestation although their Bootloaders are unlocked, custom ROMs installed, boot partition patched with Magisk and so.
Hence they look for other detection methods that are harder (specially for newbies) to spoof
That's again the lack of knowledge and understandingMakes sense
I guess what is bugging me is when someone recommends using Shamiko + lsposed as a fix for PI dependent apps not working. Google Wallet doesn't work? Here, install three modules and configure a bunch of confusing DenyList crap, instead of just installing one module and calling it a day
Occam's razor.
Google knows S/N / PI are easy to bypass, but don't seem to regard the 'white hat' modding community as high risk, and aren't in a big hurry to preempt enforced use of hardware based attestation verdicts either... In this sense they don't seem to be working against this community (contrary to what some Google haters keep asserting) at all, but they do need to be seen to be providing reliable means for developers of security dependant apps to determine if runtime environment has been tampered, so they've provided evaluationType and strongIntegrity attestations capable of doing this...Makes sense
I guess what is bugging me is when someone recommends using Shamiko + lsposed as a fix for PI dependent apps not working. Google Wallet doesn't work? Here, install three modules and configure a bunch of confusing DenyList crap, instead of just installing one module and calling it a day
Occam's razor.
[ ... etc. ... ] Banks, on the other hand, have no such qualms using as many extra means to detect device/execution environment tampering as are available, and will often spend money/resources to develop new ones...
[ ... etc. ... ]
Just realised I replied to the wrong member above... Corrected now...And yet, these same banks gladly issue debit cards to their customers, and these cards are just as easy to steal as mobile devices, and they have many fewer "security" measures associated with them than most of these banks try to implement within mobile devices.
Lots of these cards are set up with credit-card-like clearing mechanisms and can be used without PINs for purchases. Therefore, it is easier to commit fraud via stolen debit cards than via stolen or hacked Android devices.
Furthermore, these banks allow their customers full web-based access to their finances via desktop computers which can be hacked with keystroke-capturing malware that can then be used to determine the victims' login ID's and passwords that are utilized to access these banks' web sites.
And all these desktop computers are rooted, and the banks do nothing to cripple any software on these desktop computers, nor do they even try to force their users to install anti-virus software before allowing web access to their banking sites.
And there are many more desktop computers and debit cards in use in the world than there are rooted Android devices, and much more fraud is committed via compromised home computers and via stolen debit cards than could possibly ever be committed via hacked or stolen rooted Android devices.
I believe that the monetary value of all the fraud that has been prevented by Android-device-crippling "security" software is lower than the amount of money spent by banks to develop and maintain the anti-rooting and anti-modding facilities that they utilize.
I'm not talking about Google themselves here; rather, I'm referring to the stupidity of the management of these banks.
But there's no law against being stupid, and therefore, we mice will be increasingly at the mercy of these cretinous cats.
No, he's just being a little obstinate and ignoring the fact that it's much less "risky" to attempt to exploit vulnerabilities on devices and obtain financial information that way...carrying a stolen card can get you caught, and installing a card skimmer is risky, too. I think it's pretty pointless to rail against the big bad banks when they try to take (necessary) steps to protect their customers, simply because it means that using their apps may not be possible a few white hats. As pndwal said, we are collateral damage.Just realised I replied to the wrong member above... Corrected now...
Anyway, I was simply elaborating on why banks need more detection bypasses than Google's G Pay/Wallet (which goes to the issue of users confusing what bypasses are actually required)... Just stating how things are / developed / are developing...
Did I say anything wrong?...PW
Actually for unlocked/rooted devices both basicIntegrity and deviceIntegrity will require hiding root from droidguard (attestation) gms process as a minimum for passing verdicts and many will need changes to sensitive prop values also. Old MagiskHide did this. Or users can add droidguard (attestation) gms process in denylist (w/ or w/o Shamiko or other hiding) and use MHPC to adjust sensitive prop values (does this even with nothing configured by user). Or just run USNF (From v2.3.1: Restored support for Android 7... Actually I think he means A7 and older per commit: magisk: Allow limited installation on Android 7 and older … "In general, users on such old versions of Android don't need to bypass@pndwal I've updated the OP yet again to reflect what we discussed about Android 8 devices.
The basics as I understand them:
- Pre 8.0 devices are not capable of hardware backed attestation; so Play Integrity defaults to basic; should pass both BASIC and DEVICE_INTEGRITY in most cases even with an unlocked bootloader although the latter may require other alterations such as MHPC
All 3 together, yes... 2 can pass /unlocked bootloader... (... The pedant in me is showing.
- Android 8.0+ devices default to hardware backed attestation, meaning that all 3 verdicts will only pass on a locked bootloader and OEM firmware
Yup...
- USNF mod forces basic attestation method for rooted 8.0+ devices, so they're basically in the same camp as the pre 8.0 devices
- No apps are currently known to require STRONG_INTEGRITY
Official LOS will never do it... Many unofficial builds do however... But a number of users of ROMs w/ integrated SNF are reporting similar intermittent Play Integrity failures to what those using latest USNF are reporting ATM... PWSo, not much to do for the time being, at least from my side, as I don't have any knowledge to do that and I very much doubt Lineage will ever do it.
Thanks for the clarification
Thank you SO much for not only giving solution(s), but for explaining each bullet point in such depth and detail. This is extremely helpful in giving not only the "what" but also the "how" and "why" - much appreciated.Play Integrity API
What is Play Integrity?
Play Integrity has replaced SafetyNet for the most part, with a deadline of June 2024, when Google's SafetyNet servers will go offline. Apps that continue to exclusively depend on SafetyNet will no longer work once this happens. Most developers have already migrated to Play Integrity.
Is Play Integrity the same as Play Protect?
No. Play Integrity provides users with the ability to verify device compatibility and security, much like SafetyNet did. Play Protect is a part of the Play Store that ensures that your device is certified, and helps to protect against malware. In this context, "certified" refers to whether or not your device has passed Android compatibility testing. This is also used for part of the Play Integrity checks. More information here
My device passes SafetyNet but I can't use Google Pay/other apps.
Don't rely on SafetyNet as a good assessment of your device's compatibility and security. It is possible to pass SafetyNet, but fail Play Integrity.
Rooted Pixel 5 on stock firmware: USNF 2.3.1 shows SafetyNet Pass using YASNAC, but device fails Play Integrity DEVICE_INTEGRITY check.
How do I know if my device is passing Play Integrity checks?
To check Play Integrity status, you can use this app:
GithubPlay Integrity API Checker - Apps on Google Play
Get info about your Device Integrity through...play.google.com
If you're a nerd and you want to check key attestation, use this:
GithubKey Attestation Demo - Apps on Google Play
Demo for Key Attestation feature of the...play.google.com
What causes a device to fail Play Integrity checks?
It depends on your Android version and device state. If you're on an old version of Android prior to 8.0, even an unmodified device will only pass BASIC_INTEGRITY and DEVICE_INTEGRITY, because they are not capable of hardware backed attestation methods. Android 8.0+ devices that are not modified or unlocked should pass all 3; Android 8.0+ devices with unlocked bootloaders will fail all 3, because the unlocked bootloader state means hardware backed attestation is not possible.
What do I do if my device is failing all 3 checks?
You can use the Universal SafetyNet Fix Magisk module 2.4.0 or higher, which forces basic attestation similar to pre Android 8. If you're on rooted OEM firmware, this should be sufficient for most apps including Google Pay. Custom ROMs and Chinese OEMs may have to use fingerprint altering methods to pass. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked bootloader...unless it's"broken", like an ASUS ROG. Fortunately, this isn't a big deal, as no app developers are known to require that verdict.
Now, details on what Play Integrity is and how it works...
SafetyNet has been discontinued in favor of the new Play Integrity, which uses stronger methods to verify the security of a device. This is why many rooted users have been unable to use security sensitive apps, such as banking and DRM. There is a workaround for this.
But first, details on the new API.
The three elements in Play Integrity are:
This table shows the relationship between SafetyNet and Play Integrity responses:
MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY
: Corresponds to SafetyNetctsProfileMatch
. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. (Device profile matches that of a device that has passed Compatibility Test Suite) A device that fails this will appear as Uncertified in Play Store.MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY
: Corresponds to SafetyNetbasicIntegrity
. The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer. Most devices should pass this, even if they're rooted.MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY
: Corresponds to SafetyNetHARDWARE_BACKED
attestation. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. An unlocked bootloader will ALWAYS fail this label because boot integrity cannot be verified, meaning that hardware backed attestation methods cannot be used.
View attachment 5732079
The most fundamental change is that Play Integrity, by default, uses hardware methods to verify BASIC and DEVICE integrity, which is why simply having an unlocked bootloader will cause the device to fail all 3 results. However, Play Integrity also uses hardware methods (if available) to verify device security state in addition to the aforementioned checks. This is STRONG integrity, which relies on hardware-backed key attestation as well as Verified Boot to verify that a device has not been tampered with andMEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY
. It is not possible to pass STRONG integrity on an unlocked and/or modified device, or a pre Android 8 device. (Notable exception being devices with broken keystores such as ASUS ROG)
It is worth noting that SafetyNet always provided the means for developers to force hardware backed evaluation types; none did, including Google. The same seems to still be true; most app developers require DEVICE verdict, "secure" apps require BASIC and DEVICE, but none are known to require STRONG
So this all sounds rather depressing. What do we do?
Fortunately, we have the ability to force a basic attestation method that prevents the use of hardware checks, meaning it is possible to partially pass. Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.4.0 does this:
(Response from Play Integrity Checker on my rooted Pixel 5 with Universal SafetyNet Fix MOD by Displax)
View attachment 5751415
You can find that module here:
As far as how this is going to affect us in the future, it's up to the app developers to decide what results they want. In most cases, all they care about isBASIC
andDEVICE
. But if they really want to ensure that they're running on a trusted platform, they can requireSTRONG
attestation, which cannot be spoofed or bypassed. BASIC and DEVICE can, because they use the same mechanisms that SafetyNet did. The million dollar question is whether they ever will.
For those interested in the timeline:
View attachment 5732061
For more information, please read the discussion in this thread.
MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY
: Corresponds to SafetyNet ctsProfileMatch
. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. (Device profile matches that of a device that has passed Compatibility Test Suite) A device that fails this will appear as Uncertified in Play Store.MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY
: Corresponds to SafetyNet basicIntegrity
. The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer. Most devices should pass this, even if they're rooted.MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY
: Corresponds to SafetyNet HARDWARE_BACKED
evaluationType. The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements. An unlocked bootloader will ALWAYS fail this label because boot integrity cannot be verified, meaning that hardware backed attestation methods cannot be used.BASIC
and DEVICE
. But if they really want to ensure that they're running on a trusted platform, they can require STRONG
attestation, which cannot be spoofed or bypassed. BASIC and DEVICE can, because they use the same mechanisms that SafetyNet did. The million dollar question is whether they ever will.I'm posting this WOT.Is there a fix for this? ... Can't pass MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY.
Well, seems that's a popular option here, but it's also a highly subjective one...Its none of the banks business to stop their clients from using rooted devices. Theyre just adding another hindrance to smooth banking operations thereby possibly hampering their own business by wasting both their and their clients time. Thats Stupidity!
And you're going to need to do better than that... Even if banks themselves didn't persue these initiatives (ostensibly to protect their interests / bottom line) they're being driven by many other powerful entities...Bank Devs did you hear? Pls discuss this with your bosses. Its like going backwards instead of forward.
But as I've told you before, and as the above should make abundantly clear, TEE and other, especially hardware backed, means to detect tampered execution environments for an application developer's code are here to stay in mobile devices, and are arriving in PCs also... cos like banks, Google and iOS etc, Microsoft is doing the maths also...I totally agree!
And as I've mentioned here before, every desktop computer is a rooted device, and of course we don't see the banks trying to hinder us from accessing their services from our computers.
And banks gladly issue us debit cards which we keep in our wallets that are just as easy to steal as mobile devices.
Rooted Android devices are just low-hanging fruit. And the amount of fraud that's prevented by trying to fight against Android root is minuscule, given the extremely small percentage of mobile device users who want to use rooted Android devices. I wouldn't be surprised if the amount of money that banks spend for anti-Android-modding software development exceeds the maximum amount of money that could be lost via the hacking of modded Android devices.
https://www.microsoft.com/security/...for-windows-11-will-help-protect-hybrid-work/In 2021, protections built into Windows, Azure, Microsoft 365, and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 have blocked more than 9.6 billion malware threats, more than 35.7 billion phishing and other malicious emails, and 25.6 billion attempts to hijack our enterprise customers by brute-forcing stolen passwords—that’s more than 800 password attacks per second...
https://www.hpe.com/us/en/insights/...with-trusted-execution-environments-2102.htmlHardware and software makers hope TEEs provide a long-term solution for using sensitive data in a more secure manner on smartphones, PCs, cloud systems, and virtualized workloads...
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/business/windows-11-secured-core-computersGuards against sophisticated attacks
Protects down to the firmware level with hardware security features that shield user credentials and other critical data.
Secured-core PCs and hardware-based security
Secured-core PCs deliver the highest level of Windows 11 protection including advanced protection of firmware and dynamic root of trust measurement.
Windows 11 security innovations
Microsoft optimizes Windows 11 for Zero Trust protection. Read the Windows 11 Security Guide for a quick overview.