I followed the procedure you recommended. Thanks again!Glad you got it to flash! Just to be clear, did you get it to flash by issuing the exact commands I gave you or did you do something else?
I followed the procedure you recommended. Thanks again!Glad you got it to flash! Just to be clear, did you get it to flash by issuing the exact commands I gave you or did you do something else?
fastboot reboot bootloader
command, there was nothing to boot into so it bootlooped back to slot a.fastboot reboot bootloader
command, thus preventing what happened above from occurring.I had flashed the previous firmware to both slots successully. Or at least I thought I did. Why this latest firmware misbehaved I'm not certain, but I think your advice to the OP holds merit since it has proven to resolve my issue. Appreciate everyone's help.@roirraW "edor" ehT Regarding Posts #1535-41...
I believe these problems occurred because this person had never flashed the firmware to slot b (e.g. in cases where it's a new phone), thus when they set their active slot to b and issued thefastboot reboot bootloader
command, there was nothing to boot into so it bootlooped back to slot a.
I would like to suggest that in the OP, Post #2, Section 11, OPTIONAL: If you want to flash both slots, after this first time, then after do the following:, that it be noted that if the user has never flashed the firmware to their inactive slot (via OTA, flashing factory image, etc.) that they skip thefastboot reboot bootloader
command, thus preventing what happened above from occurring.
Thank you, I'll take a look just as soon as I can.@roirraW "edor" ehT Regarding Posts #1535-41...
I believe these problems occurred because this person had never flashed the firmware to slot b (e.g. in cases where it's a new phone), thus when they set their active slot to b and issued thefastboot reboot bootloader
command, there was nothing to boot into so it bootlooped back to slot a.
I would like to suggest that in the OP, Post #2, Section 11, OPTIONAL: If you want to flash both slots, after this first time, then after do the following:, that it be noted that if the user has never flashed the firmware to their inactive slot (via OTA, flashing factory image, etc.) that they skip thefastboot reboot bootloader
command, thus preventing what happened above from occurring.
EDIT: Apparently that person thinks they did successfully flash the firmware to both slots beforehand, so maybe this wasn't the case in this instance.
You could use either one. The main difference would be that the UK version would be optimized for your regions network/basebands. If you did flash the global version it would boot and work fine but you might sacrifice your network connectivityHi everyone i have P7P UK Global version i just want to know which Factory Image I should download i know i should download the UK one but what if i download the other one what's the difference between those...? And what will happen...
Thank youYou could use either one. The main difference would be that the UK version would be optimized for your regions network/basebands. If you did flash the global version it would boot and work fine but you might sacrifice your network connectivity
Thank you for this clarification! I was going to follow the instructions from badabing2003 on post #1341 because I haven't installed an OTA nor flashed to both slots before, but didn't understand the reason why I was to skip rebooting to bootloader and was going to omit that, so I am very grateful you clarified this for me and saved me a whole lot of headache!@roirraW "edor" ehT Regarding Posts #1535-41...
I believe these problems occurred because this person had never flashed the firmware to slot b (e.g. in cases where it's a new phone), thus when they set their active slot to b and issued thefastboot reboot bootloader
command, there was nothing to boot into so it bootlooped back to slot a.
I would like to suggest that in the OP, Post #2, Section 11, OPTIONAL: If you want to flash both slots, after this first time, then after do the following:, that it be noted that if the user has never flashed the firmware to their inactive slot (via OTA, flashing factory image, etc.) that they skip thefastboot reboot bootloader
command, thus preventing what happened above from occurring.
EDIT: Apparently that person thinks they did successfully flash the firmware to both slots beforehand, so maybe this wasn't the case in this instance.
Hi everyone i have P7P UK Global version i just want to know which Factory Image I should download i know i should download the UK one but what if i download the other one what's the difference between those...? And what will happen...
Thank you
This is the only difference I think. The modem and confseq files are indentical on the o2 and the main firmware versions. Use the o2 one if you're their client.
Have you tried "fastboot flash init_boot" and then click on the patched image and drag and drop it in to cmd?I updated my phone from Nov to Dec. However, when I try to root the Dec update i get the error below. Any ideas on how to fix this?
"FAILED (remote: partition (init_boot) not found)"
I did the play system update few minutes back which does not include this.It's a server side rollout not in the actual update itself. Not sure if it's attached to the play system update or play services but it will eventually change. Idk anyone who has it yet.
Yesterday the Security and Privacy settings were combined on my phone. I rebooted during the day and it showed up.Yeah I don't have it yet either. Guess we'll have to wait and see
Stable 25.2. Canary 25205 works as well.
I'm using stable.
Indeed. My MOD is a temporary solution until kdrag0n release accurate fix.I would expect that once 2.4.0 is released publicly, we should probably go back to using the official release, but conversely, as long as something works for you, there's also not necessarily a need to fix what isn't broken. Personally, I plan on switching once it's made completely public.
Note that @Displax wasn't trying to replace the official version - they always kept it the same version as the most recent official along with "Mod", "Mod 2", or "Mod 2.1", so that suggests to me they were merely making temporary workarounds until/if the official was updated.
He's released it to his Patreon members. Hopefully it will be released to the general public in a week or two.@kdrag0n has some interesting work going on for the official Universal SafetyNet Fix (USNF) v2.4.0, that's now in testing.
I would expect that once 2.4.0 is released publicly, we should probably go back to using the official release, but conversely, as long as something works for you, there's also not necessarily a need to fix what isn't broken. Personally, I plan on switching once it's made completely public.So for those who are more knowledgeable in such matters, do you experts think/predict that we would go back to using this standard official Universal SafetyNet Fix? Or need to continue to use Displax's mod branched off of kdrag0n's? Or is kdrag0n's incorporating Displax's modifications (from the small changelog Lughnasadh posted and I understand it, kdrag0n is attempting to spoof only when necessary whereas Displax's may spoof it continuously[?]) and using it is essentially the same as using the one with Displax's mod? Or am I just totally off the mark and kdrag0n's official USNF is slated for other devices outside of Pixels? -- When USNF and MagiskHide Props Config stopped working for getting Google Pay to work properly for a window of time there (about 6 weeks), for a small period of time I stepped away from updating my firmware and proper root hiding. When I came back, I found that, while USNF may have continued to work for other devices, Displax's mod was necessary to work for Pixels(?).
Sorry if I may be rather out of touch and/or misunderstanding of the situation; hence the request for some clarification in the pursuit of understanding things better...
13.0.0 (TQ1A.230105.002, Jan 2023) | Flash | Link | 34d676ff4d260f02d9ada1f16f24fd7995c9b9ca832410099950d9c510db8793 |
13.0.0 (TQ1A.230105.002.A1, Jan 2023, Telstra) | Flash | Link | 6632344c9647b04bfce622b0decf3733dfb3bc5c3b2c068ea118f8631c1b39b8 |
Android Security Bulletin—January 2023
bookmark_border
Published January 3, 2022
The Android Security Bulletin contains details of security vulnerabilities affecting Android devices. Security patch levels of 2023-01-05 or later address all of these issues. To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version.
Android partners are notified of all issues at least a month before publication. Source code patches for these issues will be released to the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) repository in the next 48 hours. We will revise this bulletin with the AOSP links when they are available.
The most severe of these issues is a high security vulnerability in the Framework component that could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. The severity assessment is based on the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would possibly have on an affected device, assuming the platform and service mitigations are turned off for development purposes or if successfully bypassed.
Refer to the Android and Google Play Protect mitigations section for details on the Android security platform protections and Google Play Protect, which improve the security of the Android platform.
Note: Information on the latest over-the-air update (OTA) and firmware images for Google devices is available in the January 2023 Pixel Update Bulletin.
Android and Google service mitigations
This is a summary of the mitigations provided by the Android security platform and service protections such as Google Play Protect. These capabilities reduce the likelihood that security vulnerabilities could be successfully exploited on Android.
- Exploitation for many issues on Android is made more difficult by enhancements in newer versions of the Android platform. We encourage all users to update to the latest version of Android where possible.
- The Android security team actively monitors for abuse through Google Play Protect and warns users about Potentially Harmful Applications. Google Play Protect is enabled by default on devices with Google Mobile Services, and is especially important for users who install apps from outside of Google Play.
2023-01-01 security patch level vulnerability details
In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2023-01-01 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID. Devices with Android 10 and later may receive security updates as well as Google Play system updates.
Framework
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2022-20456 A-242703780 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20489 A-242703460 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20490 A-242703505 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20492 A-242704043 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20493 A-242846316 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20912 A-246301995 EoP High 13 CVE-2023-20916 A-229256049 EoP High 12, 12L CVE-2023-20918 A-243794108 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20919 A-252663068 EoP High 13 CVE-2023-20920 A-204584366 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20921 A-243378132 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20494 A-243794204 DoS High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20908 A-239415861 DoS High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20922 A-237291548 DoS High 11, 12, 12L, 13 System
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege of BLE with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2022-20461 A-228602963 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20904 A-246300272 EoP High 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20905 A-241387741 EoP High 10 CVE-2023-20913 A-246933785 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20915 A-246930197 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 Google Play system updates
The following issues are included in Project Mainline components.
Subcomponent CVE MediaProvider CVE-2023-20912 2023-01-05 security patch level vulnerability details
In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2023-01-05 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID.
Kernel
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-42719 A-253642087
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical mac80211 CVE-2022-42720 A-253642015
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical WLAN CVE-2022-42721 A-253642088
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical Multiple Modules CVE-2022-2959 A-244395411
Upstream kernelEoP High Pipe Kernel components
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-41674 A-253641805
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical WLAN CVE-2023-20928 A-254837884
Upstream kernelEoP High Binder driver Kernel LTS
The following kernel versions have been updated. Kernel version updates are dependent on the version of Android OS at the time of device launch.
References Android Launch Version Kernel Launch Version Minimum Launch Version A-224575820 12 5.10 5.10.101 Imagination Technologies
This vulnerability affects Imagination Technologies components and further details are available directly from Imagination Technologies. The severity assessment of this issue is provided directly by Imagination Technologies.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-20235 A-259967780 * High PowerVR-GPU MediaTek components
These vulnerabilities affect MediaTek components and further details are available directly from MediaTek. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by MediaTek.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-32635 A-257714327
M-ALPS07573237 *High gps CVE-2022-32636 A-257846591
M-ALPS07510064 *High keyinstall CVE-2022-32637 A-257860658
M-ALPS07491374 *High hevc decoder Unisoc components
These vulnerabilities affect Unisoc components and further details are available directly from Unisoc. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Unisoc.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-44425 A-258731891
U-2028856 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44426 A-258728978
U-2028856 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44427 A-258736883
U-1888565 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44428 A-258741356
U-1888565 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44429 A-258743555
U-1981296 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44430 A-258749708
U-1888565 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44431 A-258741360
U-1981296 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44432 A-258743558
U-1981296 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44434 A-258760518
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44435 A-258759189
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44436 A-258760519
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44437 A-258759192
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44438 A-258760781
U-2064988 *High Android Qualcomm components
These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-22088 A-231156521
QC-CR#3052411Critical Bluetooth CVE-2022-33255 A-250627529
QC-CR#3212699High Bluetooth Qualcomm closed-source components
These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm closed-source components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2021-35097 A-209469821 * Critical Closed-source component CVE-2021-35113 A-209469998 * Critical Closed-source component CVE-2021-35134 A-213239776 * Critical Closed-source component CVE-2022-23960 A-238203772 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-25725 A-238101314 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-25746 A-238106983 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33252 A-250627159 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33253 A-250627591 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33266 A-250627569 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33274 A-250627236 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33276 A-250627271 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33283 A-250627602 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33284 A-250627218 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33285 A-250627435 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33286 A-250627240 * High Closed-source component Common questions and answers
This section answers common questions that may occur after reading this bulletin.
1. How do I determine if my device is updated to address these issues?
To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version.
Device manufacturers that include these updates should set the patch string level to:
- Security patch levels of 2023-01-01 or later address all issues associated with the 2023-01-01 security patch level.
- Security patch levels of 2023-01-05 or later address all issues associated with the 2023-01-05 security patch level and all previous patch levels.
For some devices on Android 10 or later, the Google Play system update will have a date string that matches the 2023-01-01 security patch level. Please see this article for more details on how to install security updates.
- [ro.build.version.security_patch]:[2023-01-01]
- [ro.build.version.security_patch]:[2023-01-05]
2. Why does this bulletin have two security patch levels?
This bulletin has two security patch levels so that Android partners have the flexibility to fix a subset of vulnerabilities that are similar across all Android devices more quickly. Android partners are encouraged to fix all issues in this bulletin and use the latest security patch level.
Partners are encouraged to bundle the fixes for all issues they are addressing in a single update.
- Devices that use the 2023-01-01 security patch level must include all issues associated with that security patch level, as well as fixes for all issues reported in previous security bulletins.
- Devices that use the security patch level of 2023-01-05 or newer must include all applicable patches in this (and previous) security bulletins.
3. What do the entries in the Type column mean?
Entries in the Type column of the vulnerability details table reference the classification of the security vulnerability.
4. What do the entries in the References column mean?
Abbreviation Definition RCE Remote code execution EoP Elevation of privilege ID Information disclosure DoS Denial of service N/A Classification not available
Entries under the References column of the vulnerability details table may contain a prefix identifying the organization to which the reference value belongs.
5. What does an * next to the Android bug ID in the References column mean?
Prefix Reference A- Android bug ID QC- Qualcomm reference number M- MediaTek reference number N- NVIDIA reference number B- Broadcom reference number U- UNISOC reference number
Issues that are not publicly available have an * next to the corresponding reference ID. The update for that issue is generally contained in the latest binary drivers for Pixel devices available from the Google Developer site.
6. Why are security vulnerabilities split between this bulletin and device / partner security bulletins, such as the Pixel bulletin?
Security vulnerabilities that are documented in this security bulletin are required to declare the latest security patch level on Android devices. Additional security vulnerabilities that are documented in the device / partner security bulletins are not required for declaring a security patch level. Android device and chipset manufacturers may also publish security vulnerability details specific to their products, such as Google, Huawei, LGE, Motorola, Nokia, or Samsung.
Versions
Version Date Notes 1.0 January 3, 2022 Bulletin Published
13.0.0 (TQ1A.230105.002, Jan 2023) | Flash | Link | 34d676ff4d260f02d9ada1f16f24fd7995c9b9ca832410099950d9c510db8793 |
13.0.0 (TQ1A.230105.002.A1, Jan 2023, Telstra) | Flash | Link | 6632344c9647b04bfce622b0decf3733dfb3bc5c3b2c068ea118f8631c1b39b8 |
Android Security Bulletin—January 2023
bookmark_border
Published January 3, 2022
The Android Security Bulletin contains details of security vulnerabilities affecting Android devices. Security patch levels of 2023-01-05 or later address all of these issues. To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version.
Android partners are notified of all issues at least a month before publication. Source code patches for these issues will be released to the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) repository in the next 48 hours. We will revise this bulletin with the AOSP links when they are available.
The most severe of these issues is a high security vulnerability in the Framework component that could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. The severity assessment is based on the effect that exploiting the vulnerability would possibly have on an affected device, assuming the platform and service mitigations are turned off for development purposes or if successfully bypassed.
Refer to the Android and Google Play Protect mitigations section for details on the Android security platform protections and Google Play Protect, which improve the security of the Android platform.
Note: Information on the latest over-the-air update (OTA) and firmware images for Google devices is available in the January 2023 Pixel Update Bulletin.
Android and Google service mitigations
This is a summary of the mitigations provided by the Android security platform and service protections such as Google Play Protect. These capabilities reduce the likelihood that security vulnerabilities could be successfully exploited on Android.
- Exploitation for many issues on Android is made more difficult by enhancements in newer versions of the Android platform. We encourage all users to update to the latest version of Android where possible.
- The Android security team actively monitors for abuse through Google Play Protect and warns users about Potentially Harmful Applications. Google Play Protect is enabled by default on devices with Google Mobile Services, and is especially important for users who install apps from outside of Google Play.
2023-01-01 security patch level vulnerability details
In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2023-01-01 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID. Devices with Android 10 and later may receive security updates as well as Google Play system updates.
Framework
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2022-20456 A-242703780 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20489 A-242703460 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20490 A-242703505 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20492 A-242704043 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20493 A-242846316 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20912 A-246301995 EoP High 13 CVE-2023-20916 A-229256049 EoP High 12, 12L CVE-2023-20918 A-243794108 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20919 A-252663068 EoP High 13 CVE-2023-20920 A-204584366 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20921 A-243378132 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2022-20494 A-243794204 DoS High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20908 A-239415861 DoS High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20922 A-237291548 DoS High 11, 12, 12L, 13 System
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to local escalation of privilege of BLE with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Updated AOSP versions CVE-2022-20461 A-228602963 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20904 A-246300272 EoP High 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20905 A-241387741 EoP High 10 CVE-2023-20913 A-246933785 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 CVE-2023-20915 A-246930197 EoP High 10, 11, 12, 12L, 13 Google Play system updates
The following issues are included in Project Mainline components.
Subcomponent CVE MediaProvider CVE-2023-20912 2023-01-05 security patch level vulnerability details
In the sections below, we provide details for each of the security vulnerabilities that apply to the 2023-01-05 patch level. Vulnerabilities are grouped under the component they affect. Issues are described in the tables below and include CVE ID, associated references, type of vulnerability, severity, and updated AOSP versions (where applicable). When available, we link the public change that addressed the issue to the bug ID, like the AOSP change list. When multiple changes relate to a single bug, additional references are linked to numbers following the bug ID.
Kernel
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-42719 A-253642087
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical mac80211 CVE-2022-42720 A-253642015
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical WLAN CVE-2022-42721 A-253642088
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical Multiple Modules CVE-2022-2959 A-244395411
Upstream kernelEoP High Pipe Kernel components
The most severe vulnerability in this section could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed.
CVE References Type Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-41674 A-253641805
Upstream kernel [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]RCE Critical WLAN CVE-2023-20928 A-254837884
Upstream kernelEoP High Binder driver Kernel LTS
The following kernel versions have been updated. Kernel version updates are dependent on the version of Android OS at the time of device launch.
References Android Launch Version Kernel Launch Version Minimum Launch Version A-224575820 12 5.10 5.10.101 Imagination Technologies
This vulnerability affects Imagination Technologies components and further details are available directly from Imagination Technologies. The severity assessment of this issue is provided directly by Imagination Technologies.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-20235 A-259967780 * High PowerVR-GPU MediaTek components
These vulnerabilities affect MediaTek components and further details are available directly from MediaTek. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by MediaTek.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-32635 A-257714327
M-ALPS07573237 *High gps CVE-2022-32636 A-257846591
M-ALPS07510064 *High keyinstall CVE-2022-32637 A-257860658
M-ALPS07491374 *High hevc decoder Unisoc components
These vulnerabilities affect Unisoc components and further details are available directly from Unisoc. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Unisoc.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-44425 A-258731891
U-2028856 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44426 A-258728978
U-2028856 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44427 A-258736883
U-1888565 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44428 A-258741356
U-1888565 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44429 A-258743555
U-1981296 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44430 A-258749708
U-1888565 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44431 A-258741360
U-1981296 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44432 A-258743558
U-1981296 *High Kernel CVE-2022-44434 A-258760518
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44435 A-258759189
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44436 A-258760519
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44437 A-258759192
U-2064988 *High Android CVE-2022-44438 A-258760781
U-2064988 *High Android Qualcomm components
These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2022-22088 A-231156521
QC-CR#3052411Critical Bluetooth CVE-2022-33255 A-250627529
QC-CR#3212699High Bluetooth Qualcomm closed-source components
These vulnerabilities affect Qualcomm closed-source components and are described in further detail in the appropriate Qualcomm security bulletin or security alert. The severity assessment of these issues is provided directly by Qualcomm.
CVE References Severity Subcomponent CVE-2021-35097 A-209469821 * Critical Closed-source component CVE-2021-35113 A-209469998 * Critical Closed-source component CVE-2021-35134 A-213239776 * Critical Closed-source component CVE-2022-23960 A-238203772 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-25725 A-238101314 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-25746 A-238106983 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33252 A-250627159 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33253 A-250627591 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33266 A-250627569 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33274 A-250627236 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33276 A-250627271 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33283 A-250627602 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33284 A-250627218 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33285 A-250627435 * High Closed-source component CVE-2022-33286 A-250627240 * High Closed-source component Common questions and answers
This section answers common questions that may occur after reading this bulletin.
1. How do I determine if my device is updated to address these issues?
To learn how to check a device's security patch level, see Check and update your Android version.
Device manufacturers that include these updates should set the patch string level to:
- Security patch levels of 2023-01-01 or later address all issues associated with the 2023-01-01 security patch level.
- Security patch levels of 2023-01-05 or later address all issues associated with the 2023-01-05 security patch level and all previous patch levels.
For some devices on Android 10 or later, the Google Play system update will have a date string that matches the 2023-01-01 security patch level. Please see this article for more details on how to install security updates.
- [ro.build.version.security_patch]:[2023-01-01]
- [ro.build.version.security_patch]:[2023-01-05]
2. Why does this bulletin have two security patch levels?
This bulletin has two security patch levels so that Android partners have the flexibility to fix a subset of vulnerabilities that are similar across all Android devices more quickly. Android partners are encouraged to fix all issues in this bulletin and use the latest security patch level.
Partners are encouraged to bundle the fixes for all issues they are addressing in a single update.
- Devices that use the 2023-01-01 security patch level must include all issues associated with that security patch level, as well as fixes for all issues reported in previous security bulletins.
- Devices that use the security patch level of 2023-01-05 or newer must include all applicable patches in this (and previous) security bulletins.
3. What do the entries in the Type column mean?
Entries in the Type column of the vulnerability details table reference the classification of the security vulnerability.
4. What do the entries in the References column mean?
Abbreviation Definition RCE Remote code execution EoP Elevation of privilege ID Information disclosure DoS Denial of service N/A Classification not available
Entries under the References column of the vulnerability details table may contain a prefix identifying the organization to which the reference value belongs.
5. What does an * next to the Android bug ID in the References column mean?
Prefix Reference A- Android bug ID QC- Qualcomm reference number M- MediaTek reference number N- NVIDIA reference number B- Broadcom reference number U- UNISOC reference number
Issues that are not publicly available have an * next to the corresponding reference ID. The update for that issue is generally contained in the latest binary drivers for Pixel devices available from the Google Developer site.
6. Why are security vulnerabilities split between this bulletin and device / partner security bulletins, such as the Pixel bulletin?
Security vulnerabilities that are documented in this security bulletin are required to declare the latest security patch level on Android devices. Additional security vulnerabilities that are documented in the device / partner security bulletins are not required for declaring a security patch level. Android device and chipset manufacturers may also publish security vulnerability details specific to their products, such as Google, Huawei, LGE, Motorola, Nokia, or Samsung.
Versions
Version Date Notes 1.0 January 3, 2022 Bulletin Published
Kush M.
Community Manager•Original Poster
Google Pixel Update - January 2023
Announcement
Hello Pixel Community,
We have provided the monthly software update for January 2023. All supported Pixel devices running Android 13 will receive these software updates starting today. The rollout will continue over the next few weeks in phases depending on carrier and device. Users will receive a notification once the OTA becomes available for their device. We encourage you to check your Android version and update to receive the latest software.
Details of this month’s security fixes can be found on the Android Security Bulletin: https://source.android.com/security/bulletin
This update also includes support for static spatial audio, which will provide surround sound for any connected headset. Another update will roll out to Pixel Buds Pro in the coming weeks that will enable spatial audio with head tracking.
Thanks,
Google Pixel Support Team
Software versions
Global
- Pixel 4a: TQ1A.230105.001
- Pixel 4a (5G): TQ1A.230105.001
- Pixel 5: TQ1A.230105.001
- Pixel 5a (5G): TQ1A.230105.001
- Pixel 6: TQ1A.230105.002
- Pixel 6 Pro: TQ1A.230105.002
- Pixel 6a: TQ1A.230105.001.A2
- Pixel 7: TQ1A.230105.001.A2
- Pixel 7 Pro: TQ1A.230105.002
Canada
- Pixel 4a: TQ1A.230105.001.B1
Telstra (AU)
What’s included
- Pixel 7: TQ1A.230105.001.A3
- Pixel 7 Pro: TQ1A.230105.002.A1
The January 2023 update includes bug fixes and improvements for Pixel users – see below for details.
Audio
- Add support for Spatial Audio with certain devices and accessories *[1]
Biometrics
- Additional improvements for fingerprint recognition and response in certain conditions *[2]
Bluetooth
- Fix for issue occasionally preventing certain Bluetooth Low Energy devices or accessories from pairing or reconnecting
- Fix for issue preventing audio from playing over certain headphones or accessories while connected in certain conditions
Camera
- Fix for issue occasionally causing captured photos to appear corrupted or distorted while zoomed in *[3]
Display & Graphics
- Fix for issue occasionally preventing display from waking or appearing turned off while device is powered on *[3]
User Interface
---------------------------------------------------------------
- Fix for issue occasionally causing UI to display in landscape layout while device is held in portrait mode
Device Applicability
Fixes are available for all supported Pixel devices unless otherwise indicated below.
*[1] Included on Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro, Pixel 7, Pixel 7 Pro
*[2] Included on Pixel 6a, Pixel 7
*[3] Included on Pixel 7, Pixel 7 Pro
Details
Other
init_boot.img
, NOT boot.img AND we flash the patched init_boot to the init_boot partition - do not flash it to the boot partition.Unlocking or locking the bootloader will wipe the device every single time, so be sure to have your data backed up before doing so, or better yet, just unlock it as soon as you get the device.
Keep in mind that unlocking the bootloader or rooting might affect your phone's capability to use banking apps such as Google Pay, your local bank's app, or even the ability to install some apps like NetFlix. See Post #2 - Unlocking Bootloader / Rooting / Updating | SafetyNet | ADB/Fastboot & Windows USB Drivers.
If you're going to re-lock the bootloader, make sure the ROM you have on your phone is completely stock (by flashing the latest official firmware) BEFORE re-locking it.
There are no permanent negative consequences if you unlock or re-lock the bootloader other than it will wipe your phone, and while your bootloader is unlocked you get a brief screen when you boot the phone telling you (and anyone who sees your phone at the time) that it's unlocked. You will also continue to receive updates (if you've merely unlocked the bootloader, you can take updates as normal) unlike Samsung, Sony, et cetera, which have permanent major consequences with reduced functionality even if you un-root and re-lock your bootloader. If you're actually rooted (not just bootloader unlocked), you'll have to perform extra steps to manually update each month, and to keep root/re-root.
TD1A.220804.031
.
- @AndyYan
- @anirudhgupta109
- @Az Biker
- @bosox284
- @capntrips
- @Chainfire
- @DespairFactor
- @direwolf1
- @Displax
- @edcsxz
- @Eleo
- @flar2
- @foobar66
- @Freak07
- @j4velin
- @Jawomo
- @Jon8RFC
- @jorrik98
- @kdrag0n
- @[email protected]
- @LLStarks
- @Lughnasadh
- @mariusnoor
- @Namelesswonder
- @PurppleMonkey
- @Quinny899
- @rovo89
- @siavash79
- @Sib64
- @simplepinoi177
- @StrangerWeather
- @tbalden
- @topjohnwu
- @TotallyAnxious
- @Tulsadiver
- @Typhus_
- @V0latyle
- @VR25
- @xgerryx
- @xike456
- @xstefen
- And many others from all of the previous years who I thanked in my previous OPs.
Will never be able to have their bootloader unlocked. It's like winning the lottery, and just as rare and relatively random. There is nothing that anyone on XDA can do to help you unlock your Verizon variant.
Can be unlocked once you pay the phone off, then you contact the carrier and arrange to Carrier unlock the phone. Once the phone is Carrier unlocked, then you can unlock the bootloader with the usual caveats (will wipe the device and there's no way around it).
Can be bootloader unlocked at any time. I'd try it first before putting a SIM card in the phone. If OEM unlocking is grayed out, try connecting to Wi-Fi, and reboot if necessary. If it's still grayed out, try with your SIM card, and reboot again. Historically on Pixels, most of the time you can toggle OEM unlocking immediately, but occasionally some users have found it took a little while after being either connected to Wi-Fi or having your SIM card installed in it, and then eventually (hours? day? days?) you can toggle OEM unlocking.
No idea. Feel free to ask in the thread and hopefully, someone with specific knowledge will answer.
How to update each month (and also how to root) [requires an unlocked bootloader for updating via this factory image method]The one-time first steps are:
- Android Settings
- About phone
- Click on
Build number
repeatedly, about seven times- Go back to the main Android Settings
- System
- Developer options
- Toggle
OEM unlocking
on. See @Namelesswonder's tip below (this won't help with variants that are supposed to be bootloader locked):
Also a little tip for anyone trying to enable OEM unlocking on a device and it is grayed out, you can force the phone to check for eligibility by connecting to the internet in whatever way, going to the dialer, and dialing*#*#2432546#*#*
(CHECKIN).
You should receive a notification from Google Play services with "checkin succeeded" and OEM unlocking should be available immediately if the device is eligible.
Google account not needed, SIM not needed, no other setup required. Works on completely-skipped-setup-wizard. Just need to make sure to connect to the internet and select the connection as metered to avoid any updates.- Toggle
USB debugging
on.- [Optional] I highly suggest you also disable
Automatic system updates
. Note that in a situation such as the Android 12 serious bootloader security issue, this setting will not keep Google from forcing an update to come through anyway.- How to actually root follows the same steps below as how to update each month.
- Download the latest ADB/Fastboot (SDK Platform Tools) and Windows USB Drivers.
- Unzip the Platform Tools and Drivers.
NOTE: If you have USB drivers for other Android devices installed, like Samsung, they can alternately sometimes work and not work with Google Pixels. I recommend uninstalling those drivers, or at least updating that driver to Google's driver as instructed below (the Device Manager entry may be different with other OEMs).
- The Windows USB Drivers may have to be installed twice:
- The first time while your phone is running and unlocked as normal.
- In Windows, right-click on the Start Button and choose
Device Manager
.- Plug your phone into the computer and look for the new hardware entry in Device Manager. Near the top of Device Manager should be
Android Device
. Click the drop-down arrow to the left of it.- Below
Android Device
, it should now showAndroid Composite ADB Interface
- Right-click the
Android Composite ADB Interface
and chooseUpdate driver
- Choose
Browse my computer for drivers
- Click
Browse
and navigate to where you unzipped the Windows USB drivers to.- Follow the prompts to install the driver.
- Keep Device Manager itself open - you'll need it again in a minute, but you can close any other Device Manager windows after you have installed the driver.
- Open a Command Prompt and navigate to the
platform-tools
folder.- Run command:
Code:adb devices
- On your Android device, you'll get an ADB prompt. Check the box to always give ADB permission and click
OK
.- Confirm that the command results in a list of Android devices. When doing these producedures, you should only have the one device you want to work on connected, to keep things simple.
- The second time to install the driver is while the phone is in Bootloader (fastboot mode), notFastbootD (fastbootd) mode. I know it's confusing.
- Run command:
Code:adb reboot bootloader
- Repeat the instructions above starting with "Right-click the Android Composite ADB Interface".
- This second time installing the drivers while in Bootloader (fastboot mode), it will show up as "Android Bootloader Interface". Thanks @simplepinoi177 for the suggestion to add this detail.
- Run command:
Code:fastboot flashing unlock
- On the phone, press either the up or down volume button once until you see
Unlock the bootloader |>|
beside the power button.- Press the power button. The phone will go black for a second and then show near the bottom
Device state: unlocked
.- After these first-time steps to unlock the bootloader, if you want to root, continue below at the step:
- Download the latest Pixel 7 Pro Factory Image (at the bottom of the "Cheetah" section).
platform-tools
folder, i.e. so that flash-all.bat and all other files are in the same folder as ADB and Fastboot from the platform-tools.flash-all.bat
(on Windows) or flash-all.sh
(on Linux) and remove the -w
from the fastboot update image-cheetah-etcetera.zip
line. This will keep the script from wiping your phone when you run it.init_boot.img
file from the image-cheetah-etcetera.zip
to the same platform-tools
folder.adb reboot bootloader
flash-all.bat (on Windows)
or
flash-all.sh (on Linux)
(Note: At least two Apple Macintosh users had trouble using the flash-all.sh - at least one of those users, everything went smooth once they used a Windows PC for this part of the process)
adb reboot bootloader
fastboot --set-active=other
flash-all.bat
magisk_patched-25200_1a2B3c.img
)back over to the computer.platform-tools
folder.adb reboot bootloader
fastboot flash init_boot magisk_patched-25200_1a2B3c.img
fastboot reboot
For the future, you don't need to go into safe mode unless that's your preference. I forgot what all it resets, but it's many settings and it's bothersome. I'd rather just reinstall my modules and not have to figure out those Android settings/changes which I come across days or weeks later when I infrequently do something. Have your phone reboot and run this:
I like to just do this first:Code:adb wait-for-device shell magisk --remove-modules
So the server is running, then I have the long one pasted and ready to go once the phone turns off.Code:adb devices
- Launch the Magisk app.
- Go to Magisk's Settings (Gear in top right).
- Click
Hide the Magisk app
.- When you hide it, you'll have the optional opportunity to change the Magisk app's name to whatever you wish. It doesn't have to be complex to fool apps that check for Magisk.
- Important: When you have the Magisk app hidden or renamed, you can accidentally install a new copy of Magisk. This situation won't work at all - neither copy of Magisk will work with two installed. This is one reason why I don't completely hide Magisk, so I can tell it's installed because I have it renamed as something easily recognizable.
- Back to the Magisk app's Settings...
- Click
Systemless hosts
. This adds a Magisk Module to Magisk, which you can verify in a later step.- Toggle
Zygisk
on.- Toggle
Enforce DenyList
on.- Click
Configure DenyList
.
- Add every app that you want to explicitly deny root and the existence of root.
- You can click the 3-dot menu and choose the options to display system and/or OS apps, if necessary.
- Note that for many apps, it is not enough to click the single checkmark to the right of the app name in this list. For many but not all apps, you should click on the app name and you'll see it expand to two or more entries, each with its own toggles. In this expanded state, you can now check the single top checkbox beside the main app name and it'll toggle all individual sub-entries.
- Some apps add new entries to this list from time to time, so if you find that an app used to work for you when rooted and doesn't now, check this list again and look for the entries that aren't fully checked. There will be an incomplete horizontal line above the apps that don't have all of their sub-entries toggled.
- You can use the Search button at the top of this list to find specific apps quickly.
- The most common apps you should definitely fully check in this list are:
IMPORTANT - There are some things, such as
Google Play Services
which it's fine to add to the DenyList, but it's perfectly normal when used in combination with the Universal SafetyNet Fix (USNF) that it is back to being unchecked the next time you visit the DenyList. Since USNF takes care of Google Play Services, you don't even have to add it to the DenyList in the first place.- Google Play Store
- Google Services Framework
- Google Play Protect Service
- Wallet
- GPay
- Any banking apps.
- Any streaming apps that use DRM.
- Any 2FA apps, especially those for work.
- Some of those Google apps might not need denying, but it doesn't hurt to deny them.
- Any time you toggle more entries in this list, it may be necessary to reboot the phone for it to take effect.
- From the main screen in the Magisk app, go to
Modules
at the bottom.- Confirm that the
Systemless hosts
Magisk Module is added to this list, and enabled.- Install the Magisk Module: Universal SafetyNet Fix. New Official Universal SafetyNet Fix released by @kdrag0n v2.4.0 available at XDA.
- Reboot.
- Install from the Play Store:
- YASNAC - SafetyNet Checker
- Launch it.
- Click
Run SafetyNet Attestation
.- It should say:
- Basic integrity: Pass
- CTS profile match: Pass
- Evaluation type: BASIC
- Play Integrity API Checker
- Launch it.
- Click
Check
.- It should have the following with a green checkmark:
- MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY
- MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY
- It's normal for
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY
to have a red X.- You don't have to keep these installed, although I keep them handy.
- Sometimes, clearing app cache and/or data for apps like the Google Play Store, GPay, Wallet and others (and then rebooting) after these steps may help pass SafetyNet as well.
- See @V0latyle's explanation (and further linked post) for why we can't achieve
STRONG_INTEGRITY
with an unlocked bootloader.- See @V0latyle's [DISCUSSION] Play Integrity API regarding why SafetyNet, per se, is actually defunct and replaced with Play Integrity - and New Official Universal SafetyNet Fix released by @kdrag0n v2.4.0 referenced in the steps above takes care of the latter.
- Download the custom kernel of choice on the phone.
Be sure to read the particular installation instructions in the kernel threads' OP - any instructions in their OPs takes priority over anything I say here, which is generalized.
For now even the AK3 Zip versions of custom kernels requires Verity and Verification to be disabled.
How to determine if you already have Verity and Verification disabled - see section in Post #3 - Other, most important resources- The two schools of thought on disabling Verity and Verification:
- My post here. If you want to discuss it any, please do so in my thread, or at least not in that custom kernel thread, so as to keep the thread on-topic.
- Extract the
vbmeta.img
file from the inner Zip of the factory image zip and put it in the same folder with the latest extracted platform-tools.- Hook the phone up to your computer and run the following commands:
[wait for the phone to reboot to bootloader (fastboot mode)]Code:adb reboot bootloader
Code:fastboot flash vbmeta vbmeta.img --disable-verity fastboot reboot
- Unlock the phone once it's booted up.
- Make sure the Kernel Flasher app is up to date. XDA thread for the Kernel Flasher app is here.
- Launch Kernel Flasher.
- Select the slot that's mounted.
- Choose Flash AK3 Zip.
- Select the custom kernel zip just downloaded.
- When it's done flashing, head to Android Settings and perform a Factory Reset, as is currently needed for Despair kernel.
- If you failed to disable Verity and Verification ahead of time, if you have to, just force the phone off using these instructions: Turn your Pixel phone on & off, then press the Volume Down and Power buttons for a couple of seconds to get into the bootloader (fastboot mode). You'll still have to factory reset after disabling Verity in combination with this kernel, for now.
- Whenever you use the flash-all to flash your phone, as long as you want to continue to disable Verity and Verification, you'll have to further modify the flash-all script as such:
Code:fastboot update image-cheetah-buildnumber.zip --disable-verity --disable-verification
Windows: https://dl.google.com/android/repository/platform-tools-latest-windows.zip
Mac: https://dl.google.com/android/repository/platform-tools-latest-darwin.zip
Linux: https://dl.google.com/android/repository/platform-tools-latest-linux.zip
Release Notes https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/platform-tools:
33.0.3 (Aug 2022)
- adb
- Don't retry adb root if first attempt failed.
- Fix track-devices duplicate entry.
- Add receive windowing (increase throughput on high-latency connections).
- More specific error messages in the "more than one device" failure cases.
- Reject unexpected reverse forward requests.
- Fix install-multi-package on Windows.
- fastboot
- Remove e2fsdroid as part of SDK platform-tools.
- Print OemCmdHandler return message on success.
You'll need this if you're going to unlock the bootloader on your Pixel 7 Pro: SDK Platform Tools (download links for Windows, Mac, and Linux). Note that you can find links to download the tools elsewhere, but I wouldn't trust them - you never know if they've been modified. Even if the person providing the link didn't do anything intentionally, the tools could be modified without them being aware. Why take a chance of putting your phone security further at risk?
You can alternately use the tools from the SDK Manager, but most of us will want to stick to the basic tools-only without the complications of the full development manager.
For Windows, get Google's drivers here Get the Google USB Driver (ADB will likely work while the phone is fully booted, but if you're like me, you'll need these drivers for after youadb reboot-bootloader
, to be able to use ADB and Fastboot.
Indeed. My MOD is a temporary solution until kdrag0n release accurate fix.I would expect that once 2.4.0 is released publicly, we should probably go back to using the official release, but conversely, as long as something works for you, there's also not necessarily a need to fix what isn't broken. Personally, I plan on switching once it's made completely public.
Note that @Displax wasn't trying to replace the official version - they always kept it the same version as the most recent official along with "Mod", "Mod 2", or "Mod 2.1", so that suggests to me they were merely making temporary workarounds until/if the official was updated.
adb reboot bootloader
fastboot flash init_boot init_boot.img
I would guess that this should be the appropriate URL for official TWRP custom recovery for the Pixel 7 Pro, but who knows when/if that will actually be made available, and it may become available unofficially in these forum sections before being made official. I'll adjust this URL as needed. https://twrp.me/google/googlepixel7pro.html.
It's also handy to have to the full official firmware available, whether it's to recover from accidents or for actual development. Note the official link to the general Factory Images for Nexus and Pixel Devices page. The following link goes directly to the Pixel 7 Pro (Cheetah) section: Pixel 7 Pro Factory Images. I prefer to actually bookmark a link to the device listed immediately below the device I want the firmware for, because Google dumbly (in my opinion) puts the latest firmware at the bottom of the list for each particular device, and that ends up making you scroll a lot after a year or two of monthly updates.
Worked for me yesterday when I accidentally tried some old version of a Magisk Module. You have to reinstall your Magisk Modules, but if you're using a third-party widget, it won't disable them like Safe mode does.For the future, you don't need to go into safe mode unless that's your preference. I forgot what all it resets, but it's many settings and it's bothersome. I'd rather just reinstall my modules and not have to figure out those Android settings/changes which I come across days or weeks later when I infrequently do something. Have your phone reboot and run this:
I like to just do this first:Code:adb wait-for-device shell magisk --remove-modules
So the server is running, then I have the long one pasted and ready to go once the phone turns off.Code:adb devices
In the future try this
adb wait-for-device shell su -c "touch /data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/disable"
adb reboot
OEM unlocking in developer options needs to be toggled on. I don't "believe" you have to actually do the "fastboot flashing unlock" command.
Alternative two more manual ways of checking:I keep seeing this asked, so I added a Magisk module for it to the linked Github release. With the module installed, you can just run:
Code:su avbctl get-verity avbctl get-verification
I spent way more time debugging that I downloaded Github's HTML of theupdate-binary
script rather than the raw file than I care to admit.Off to bed.
Since you´re probably already rooted anyway if you plan to flash this kernel, simply reboot your device. After you enter the device immediately take a kernel log with for example EXKM or any other app that allows to do that, terminal, etc.
Look for that line
[ 1.273480] init: [libfs_avb]AVB HASHTREE disabled on: /vendor_dlkm
If you see this line, verity/verification should be disabled.
I've seen several cases where having the ability to check would have been handy, so I pushed anavbctl
binary built against the latest aosp sources here.
The simplest way to use it would be the following:
Code:adb push avbctl /data/local/tmp adb shell su cd /data/local/tmp chmod +x avbctl ./avbctl get-verity ./avbctl get-verification