MAGISK MODULE ❯ Universal SafetyNet Fix 2.4.0

[zgfg]

I did see the posts, I'm asking if Play Integrity and Play Protect certification are the same thing.

And @plepew is exactly right. Seniority and expertise does not give anyone license to be rude or condescending. If you find yourself unable to respond in a patient, helpful manner, you should avoid posting at all. Remember that disrespect is absolutely not tolerated on XDA. Compliance with the Forum Rules is mandatory, and no one gets a free pass.

From the post and the linked article it should be understandable (if reading carefully before asking) that Google is going to replace SafetyNet API with the new API, and in the foreseeable future - as they say, old API will be removed by June '24, but they ask banking apps to adapt to the incoming API till Jun '23. We are now in Jul '22

Somebody asked how come the SN still works - of course it does since it is still the old SN API, not full-proof (that's one of the main reasons Google will replace) where we can still use the old known holes to bypass

 

[V0latyle]

From the post and the linked article it should be understandable (if reading carefully before asking) that Google is going to replace SafetyNet API with the new API, and in the foreseeable future - as they say, old API will be removed by June '24, but they ask banking apps to adapt to the incoming API till Jun '23. We are now in Jul '22

Somebody asked how come the SN still works - of course it does since it is still the old SN API, not full-proof (that's one of the main reasons Google will replace) where we can still use the old known holes to bypass

Right, and I understand that SafetyNet and Play Protect are not the same thing. What I'm asking is if Play Integrity is an evolution or extension of Play Protect, or if it's going to replace both Play Protect and SafetyNet?

 

[ipdev]

Right, and I understand that SafetyNet and Play Protect are not the same thing. What I'm asking is if Play Integrity is an evolution or extension of Play Protect, or if it's going to replace both Play Protect and SafetyNet?

Play Integrity is a new (improved) way to check the same things.

It replaces Play Protect and SafetyNet.

There is a short video introduction on Google's website.
Play Integrity API - [developer.android] - Link

Along with a link to the documentation.

Quick links.

Introducing Play Integrity API - [YouTube] - Link
Overview of the Play Integrity API - [developer.android] - Link​

Hope it helps more than confuse.

Cheers.

 

[V0latyle]

Play Integrity is a new (improved) way to check the same things.

It replaces Play Protect and SafetyNet.

There is a short video introduction on Google's website.
Play Integrity API - [developer.android] - Link

Along with a link to the documentation.

Quick links.

Introducing Play Integrity API - [YouTube] - Link
Overview of the Play Integrity API - [developer.android] - Link​

Hope it helps more than confuse.

Cheers.

That's the answer I was looking for, thank you!

 

[73sydney]

That's the answer I was looking for, thank you!

@ipdev and @pndwal did a much better job than my earlier hit and run posting of an androidpolice article from just last month, which gives a roadmap of nearly 2 years...i guess it makes sense if theyve gone hard and early for their core apps...

Like most i only discovered this new paradigm shift by coming across the linked article when the smelly stuff hit the fan or from links from ipdev and pndwal

 

[TraderJack]

That's the answer I was looking for, thank you!

To be clear, the new "Play Integrity API" is a new check that is failing now on many systems.
I guess part of the issue is to figure out exactly why/how and determine if there is a fix. I don't think there is one that will last.

Previously we usually worried about two different checks to make sure all of our apps would download and function properly.

The first was "Play Protect certification" which is visible in the About section of the Play Store settings. I think there have been several methods that were used to determine certification here, but it isn't dependent just on the Play Store app, but more so the Play Services Framework.

It used to be that hiding these services using MagiskHide was sufficient, until Google enhanced and enforced the SafetyNet API, specifically the Hardware Attestation. That was the big rigmarole ~1-2 years ago and what Universal SafetyNet Fix (USNF) has allowed us to get by for the recent past. USNF basically spoofs a keystore which forces SafetyNet to fallback to using Basic instead of Hardware key Attestation (https://github.com/kdrag0n/safetynet-fix/blob/master/docs/details.md).

As mentioned there, we also still needed to pass Basic Attestation with CTS Profile/fingerprint which is where MagiskHide Props Config (MHPC) comes in to set a profile for a phone that will at least pass Basic Attestation.

Using all these things in conjunction (MagiskHide, USND, MHPC) is what has kept us in business for the past year or two.

Now the problems have come two-fold:

First, Magisk has changed and removed MagiskHide. The Deny list that comes with the new versions will disable Magisk from applying anything to those apps listed, but it doesn't hide the presence of Magisk to an app. The LSposed devs have created Shamiko which is a module which can hide Magisk, Zygisk and related modules. I'm not exactly sure how it works, I think it is probably similar to how the old MagiskHide did (don't quote me). But once you enable it as a Magisk Module it uses Magisk's "Configure Deny List" settings to enforce hide (NB: when using Shamiko you want to ensure that the "Configure Deny List" in Magisk settings is setup, but that you don't "Enforce DenyList" as Shamiko does its work instead).

Second, and the big issue at hand:
The introduction, and now partial enforcement of the new(er) Play Integrity API.

In the past, we could ensure that we were passing certification and SafetyNet checks by looking at the Play Store (device certified status), and running any one of the various SN checker apps available. However even passing those checks now is not enough to guarantee things will work anymore because of the new PI-API.

Others have linked above to some articles which explain the basics of how it works. @1nikolas has made the awesomely simple Play Integrity API Checker (which I'm sure there will be more of), which does a simple check to see if the device is passing the check. If you read the articles about how PI-API works and as @1nikolas cautions in another post, this app doesn't verify all the aspects that can be checked with this API. According to the doc overview 3 things can be verified:

• Genuine app binary
• Genuine Play install
• Genuine Android device

I'm pretty sure the first two require the App checking to actually be uploaded to the Play Store, and I believe he is working on an updated app that can do that. App developers will be able to check all these things, but most likely the one giving us the biggest issue now (and the one @1nikolas does check for) is that it is a Genuine Android device.

The question is (which I'm sure others can answer), how is this API checking for and determining if we are on a genuine (or unmodified) device and why are we failing this check when SafetyNet is doing the same thing and we have been able to fool it?

I *think* the answer has to do with Hardware Attestation. Somehow the new PI-API is looking at the device fingerprint and saying "Hey you have a Google Pixel 3 XL running Android 12. You should support Hardware Attestation, so let's use it".
At this point, either the PI-API is finding another way to check for HA that USNF can't get around, or more likely (I *think*) it is failing HA and saying "Well, you should support Hardware Attestation, but the best I can do is Basic. And that isn't good enough...so something must be wrong...and therefore FAIL".

IOW, Basic Attestation was good enough for SafetyNet, but not for the new PI-API.

My further assumption is that the current workaround, which is to use MHPC to set an older device is simply matching devices and profiles to a list that Google is maintaining as to which devices should support the new API fully. Google is pretty confident that a Pixel 3 XL running 12 should support HA and the new API, but maybe they are concerned about breaking older devices so a 3XL running 9 is still set as a "soft pass" as it were in their databases.

This is my guess (also based on some other conversations in the forum here) as to why we are currently able to still work around the enforcement of the new PI-API by setting our devices to an older OS version (and/or possibly an entirely different model depending on our device).

Personally I tried all of the original workarounds but was still failing according to @1nikolas API Checker and GPay was telling me I couldn't add a card because my device was modified. Even so, Play Certification was OK and SafetyNet passed no problem.

I first tried to change my fingerprint with MHPC to "One Plus 5 - Android 9", but even after clears and reboots that didn't work. I then changed it to "Pixel 3XL - Android 9" and I was able to pass. Ofc I should probably have tried my phone model first, but someone with a One Plus 5 responded that fingerprint worked for them. I find it interesting (because I'm not sure why), the other fingerprint didn't work on my phone when it did function successfully on another (after all one whole point of MHPC is to emulate another device through its props).

Hopefully with the ground set with the above, those more knowledgeable can chime in to offer corrections, clarifications, and theories on where we can go now....

 

[1nikolas]

I'm pretty sure the first two require the App checking to actually be uploaded to the Play Store, and I believe he is working on an updated app that can do that

That is true but I was talking about the 3 flags of the "Genuine Android device" thing. The "old" (aka current) app only checks for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY but there are 2 extra flags, MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY which are (as far as I know) one to one with the SafetyNet Basic and CTS profile (but of course more strict). The latter 2 are available only for apps through the Play Store that's why I made a new better app for and uploaded it on Play Store. The only problem is that Google tells me they need to "Verify my ID" and this takes 2 business days (so that is tomorrow). In the meantime you can check the source code which is available on Github (frontend and backend)

Note: I havent actually tested the functionallity of the 2 extra flags because, well, I can't until the app is published on Google Play

 

[pndwal]

Are you talking about Play Protect certification? My Pixel 5 passes both SafetyNet and Play Protect, yet somehow GPay still detects root.

No... Play Protect status (at least currently) relies on SafetyNet API which was deprecated last month.

This concerns the SafetyNet replacement called Play Integrity. PW

 

[TraderJack]

That is true but I was talking about the 3 flags of the "Genuine Android device" thing. The "old" (aka current) app only checks for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY but there are 2 extra flags, MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY which are (as far as I know) one to one with the SafetyNet Basic and CTS profile (but of course more strict). The latter 2 are available only for apps through the Play Store that's why I made a new better app for and uploaded it on Play Store. The only problem is that Google tells me they need to "Verify my ID" and this takes 2 business days (so that is tomorrow). In the meantime you can check the source code which is available on Github (frontend and backend)

Note: I havent actually tested the functionallity of the 2 extra flags because, well, I can't until the app is published on Google Play

Would be good to know exactly what they mean how they are determined!
This is what is out there:

Work with integrity verdicts | Google Play | Android Developers

developer.android.com

By default, device_recognition_verdict can have one of the following labels:

MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements.

No labels (a blank value) The app is running on a device that has signs of attack (such as API hooking) or system compromise (such as being rooted), or the app is not running on a physical device (such as an emulator that does not pass Google Play integrity checks).

If you opt in to receive additional labels in the integrity verdict, device_recognition_verdict can have the following additional labels:

MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY The app is running on a device that passes basic system integrity checks. The device may not meet Android compatibility requirements and may not be approved to run Google Play services. For example, the device may be running an unrecognized version of Android, may have an unlocked bootloader, or may not have been certified by the manufacturer.

MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY The app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements.

Furthermore, if your app is being released to approved emulators, the device_recognition_verdict can also take on the following label:

MEETS_VIRTUAL_INTEGRITY The app is running on an Android emulator powered by Google Play services. The emulator passes system integrity checks and meets core Android compatibility requirements.

So what is interesting is my device (and I'm sure others) according to your app is simply showing MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY.

At this point, they must not be opting in for the "additional labels" as mentioned above. If they are they certainly would not be delivering the MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY label. If they were it would mean that hardware-backed attestation was either not really necessary, or still being fooled by USNF.

 

[1nikolas]

Would be good to know exactly what they mean how they are determined!

Also this is interesting:

If you are having problems with your testing device meeting device integrity, make sure the factory ROM is installed (for example, by resetting the device) and that the bootloader is locked.

It checks for bootloader too (unless SafetyNet did that too)

 

[TraderJack]

Also this is interesting:


It checks for bootloader too (unless SafetyNet did that too)

Yes I also read that and found it interesting, but assumed anyone who wanted would read the full page (as you did!).
I believe, SafetyNet would have certainly checked for bootloader for HA.
But with USNF, we only were ever reporting Basic (saying we couldn't perform HA), so they would not have known if it was locked or not.
Now, according to my theory above, we have to prove our Hardware Attestation status through the new API in order to be given a STRONG rating.

 

[Orphee]

Hi !

Samsung Galaxy S20 5G with Android 12.
as everybody there, new Google check killed Pay features.

My bootloader is unlocked
Magisk 25.2
Safetynet fix module

I used Props config to fake S20 ultra Android 10 from certified list.
Wiped Play services and GPay. rebooted.

It did the trick, for now.

GPay/Wallet is working again.

 

[desvariando]

To be clear, the new "Play Integrity API" is a new check that is failing now on many systems.
I guess part of the issue is to figure out exactly why/how and determine if there is a fix. I don't think there is one that will last.

Previously we usually worried about two different checks to make sure all of our apps would download and function properly.

The first was "Play Protect certification" which is visible in the About section of the Play Store settings. I think there have been several methods that were used to determine certification here, but it isn't dependent just on the Play Store app, but more so the Play Services Framework.

It used to be that hiding these services using MagiskHide was sufficient, until Google enhanced and enforced the SafetyNet API, specifically the Hardware Attestation. That was the big rigmarole ~1-2 years ago and what Universal SafetyNet Fix (USNF) has allowed us to get by for the recent past. USNF basically spoofs a keystore which forces SafetyNet to fallback to using Basic instead of Hardware key Attestation (https://github.com/kdrag0n/safetynet-fix/blob/master/docs/details.md).

As mentioned there, we also still needed to pass Basic Attestation with CTS Profile/fingerprint which is where MagiskHide Props Config (MHPC) comes in to set a profile for a phone that will at least pass Basic Attestation.

Using all these things in conjunction (MagiskHide, USND, MHPC) is what has kept us in business for the past year or two.

Now the problems have come two-fold:

First, Magisk has changed and removed MagiskHide. The Deny list that comes with the new versions will disable Magisk from applying anything to those apps listed, but it doesn't hide the presence of Magisk to an app. The LSposed devs have created Shamiko which is a module which can hide Magisk, Zygisk and related modules. I'm not exactly sure how it works, I think it is probably similar to how the old MagiskHide did (don't quote me). But once you enable it as a Magisk Module it uses Magisk's "Configure Deny List" settings to enforce hide (NB: when using Shamiko you want to ensure that the "Configure Deny List" in Magisk settings is setup, but that you don't "Enforce DenyList" as Shamiko does its work instead).

Second, and the big issue at hand:
The introduction, and now partial enforcement of the new(er) Play Integrity API.

In the past, we could ensure that we were passing certification and SafetyNet checks by looking at the Play Store (device certified status), and running any one of the various SN checker apps available. However even passing those checks now is not enough to guarantee things will work anymore because of the new PI-API.

Others have linked above to some articles which explain the basics of how it works. @1nikolas has made the awesomely simple Play Integrity API Checker (which I'm sure there will be more of), which does a simple check to see if the device is passing the check. If you read the articles about how PI-API works and as @1nikolas cautions in another post, this app doesn't verify all the aspects that can be checked with this API. According to the doc overview 3 things can be verified:

• Genuine app binary
• Genuine Play install
• Genuine Android device

I'm pretty sure the first two require the App checking to actually be uploaded to the Play Store, and I believe he is working on an updated app that can do that. App developers will be able to check all these things, but most likely the one giving us the biggest issue now (and the one @1nikolas does check for) is that it is a Genuine Android device.

The question is (which I'm sure others can answer), how is this API checking for and determining if we are on a genuine (or unmodified) device and why are we failing this check when SafetyNet is doing the same thing and we have been able to fool it?

I *think* the answer has to do with Hardware Attestation. Somehow the new PI-API is looking at the device fingerprint and saying "Hey you have a Google Pixel 3 XL running Android 12. You should support Hardware Attestation, so let's use it".
At this point, either the PI-API is finding another way to check for HA that USNF can't get around, or more likely (I *think*) it is failing HA and saying "Well, you should support Hardware Attestation, but the best I can do is Basic. And that isn't good enough...so something must be wrong...and therefore FAIL".

IOW, Basic Attestation was good enough for SafetyNet, but not for the new PI-API.

My further assumption is that the current workaround, which is to use MHPC to set an older device is simply matching devices and profiles to a list that Google is maintaining as to which devices should support the new API fully. Google is pretty confident that a Pixel 3 XL running 12 should support HA and the new API, but maybe they are concerned about breaking older devices so a 3XL running 9 is still set as a "soft pass" as it were in their databases.

This is my guess (also based on some other conversations in the forum here) as to why we are currently able to still work around the enforcement of the new PI-API by setting our devices to an older OS version (and/or possibly an entirely different model depending on our device).

Personally I tried all of the original workarounds but was still failing according to @1nikolas API Checker and GPay was telling me I couldn't add a card because my device was modified. Even so, Play Certification was OK and SafetyNet passed no problem.

I first tried to change my fingerprint with MHPC to "One Plus 5 - Android 9", but even after clears and reboots that didn't work. I then changed it to "Pixel 3XL - Android 9" and I was able to pass. Ofc I should probably have tried my phone model first, but someone with a One Plus 5 responded that fingerprint worked for them. I find it interesting (because I'm not sure why), the other fingerprint didn't work on my phone when it did function successfully on another (after all one whole point of MHPC is to emulate another device through its props).

Hopefully with the ground set with the above, those more knowledgeable can chime in to offer corrections, clarifications, and theories on where we can go now....

I am on Magisk on a custom ROM on Android 12 which mimics a Pixel 5 with Android 12 fingerprint. It only passes Basic integrity.
Play Integrity fails.

However, when removing Magisk, despite being on Android 12 and with Basic Integrity, "Play Integrity" passes.

So, there is something else behond hardware attestation, as otherwise I wouldn't be able to run the "Stock ROM" passing Play Integrity.

 

[rodken]

success/mileage varies per device and users of regular bank apps / gamers etc on stock devices will all soon be forced to experiment with MHPC prints also.

+1

 

[TraderJack]

I am on Magisk on a custom ROM on Android 12 which mimics a Pixel 5 with Android 12 fingerprint. It only passes Basic integrity.
Play Integrity fails.

However, when removing Magisk, despite being on Android 12 and with Basic Integrity, "Play Integrity" passes.

So, there is something else behond hardware attestation, as otherwise I wouldn't be able to run the "Stock ROM" passing Play Integrity.

I don't think that is definitive.
Also. Define what you mean by "Basic integrity"? Are you speaking about SafetyNet?

 

[desvariando]

I don't think that is definitive.
Also. Define what you mean by "Basic integrity"? Are you speaking about SafetyNet?

Yes. Basic SafetyNet attestation.

 

[pndwal]

Would be good to know exactly what they mean how they are determined!
This is what is out there:

Work with integrity verdicts | Google Play | Android Developers

developer.android.com

So what is interesting is my device (and I'm sure others) according to your app is simply showing MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY.

At this point, they must not be opting in for the "additional labels" as mentioned above. If they are they certainly would not be delivering the MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY label. If they were it would mean that hardware-backed attestation was either not really necessary, or still being fooled by USNF.

But if MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY are one for one with original Basic Integrity and Compatibility Test Suite Profile match (I'm not sure they are 'one for one', but seems likely they are very similar at this point, and can still be made to fall back to a basic attestation/evaluation type), then these are likely opted for by the apps and passing (by using USNF)...

My conclusion is that GPay, Play Store etc are calling STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict in fact, but the basic DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict is using fingerprint prop in a way that's not yet clear to me... It seems likely that this is actually bypassing hardware attestation for this verdict (a fallback to basic?) per some Google server end white or black-list of fingerprints currently...

It is clear that USNF is working currently for PI API as for S/N once a passing fingerprint is selected (at least for A11+ devices generally; A10- seem to pass PI's DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict as is); this attestation will fail where the selected fingerprint fails old CTS Profile match or if USNF is simply disabled, indicating that a STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict is probably being effectively bypassed by USNF... PW

 

[TraderJack]

But if MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY are one for one with original Basic Integrity and Compatibility Test Suite Profile match (I'm not sure they are 'one for one', but seems likely they are very similar at this point, and can still be made to fall back to a basic attestation/evaluation type), then these are likely opted for by the apps and passing (by using USNF)...

My conclusion is that GPay, Play Store etc are calling STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict in fact, but the basic DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict is using fingerprint prop in a way that's not yet clear to me... It seems likely that this is actually bypassing hardware attestation for this verdict (a fallback to basic?) per some Google server end white or black-list of fingerprints currently...

It is clear that USNF is working currently for PI API as for S/N once a passing fingerprint is selected (at least for A11+ devices generally; A10- seem to pass PI's DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict as is); this attestation will fail where the selected fingerprint fails old CTS Profile match or if USNF is simply disabled, indicating that a STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict is probably being effectively bypassed by USNF... PW

I don't think I agree with much of that (FWIW).
To start. SafetyNet check is made up of several components, but the two most important are ctsProfileMatch and basicIntegrity. See here.

It would appear based on verbiage in the PI-API that MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY requires Hardware Attestation.

MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITYThe app is running on an Android device powered by Google Play services and has a strong guarantee of system integrity such as a hardware-backed proof of boot integrity. The device passes system integrity checks and meets Android compatibility requirements.

I'll concede that the documentation isn't 100% clear. It clearly says has a "strong guarantee" but it also say "SUCH AS harware-backed proof of boot integrity" (i.e. HA). I think it is not unreasonable to assume that MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY requires a successful HA, which USNF will not produce.

I think MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY is on par with SafetyNet passing with basicIntegrity=True, whereas MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY would be SafetyNet passing with Hardware Attestation.

I'm also curious to how you believe that USNF is definitively working for PI API? We can assume that USNF is functioning as it did before. Meaning that when HA is requested, USNF causes it to failback to basic. This would therefore make the device pass SN with a qualification of basic which would therefore allow the device to meet the PI API requirement of MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY assuming that the CTS Profile is being matched to a device which currently does not require HA to meet it.

Again, these are my thoughts just looking at the available documentation and data we have so far. I'm interested in further discussion.

EDIT: AHA - I found I think part of what we are looking for:

Migrating from the SafetyNet Attestation API | Google Play | Android Developers

developer.android.com

I believe it is backing up my statements. It shows that the original SN checks of basicIntegrity and CTSProfileMatch only contribute to the decisions and are not a one-to-one match.

What is very interesting about this chart (and although it does reinforce what I was saying, it also muddles it with misinformation from other posts). Previously the documentation stated that MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY is the standard response to device_recognition_verdict. It also says the additional data labels of BASIC_OR_STRONG can be delivered if requested.

However this chart seems to indicate that MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY can be returned independently of MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, which to me would be completely contradictory to what was being stated in the previously linked section.

Regardless, it shows that:
MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY is equivalent to a SafetyNet pass of ctsProfileMatch = True and basicIntegrity/Basic Evaluation. This is what USNF provides.
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY is equivalent to a SafetyNet pass of ctsProfileMatch = True and basicIntegrity/HA Evaluation. This is not going to be achievable on almost any rooted/unlocked device.

 

[zgfg]

But if MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY are one for one with original Basic Integrity and Compatibility Test Suite Profile match (I'm not sure they are 'one for one', but seems likely they are very similar at this point, and can still be made to fall back to a basic attestation/evaluation type), then these are likely opted for by the apps and passing (by using USNF)...

My conclusion is that GPay, Play Store etc are calling STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict in fact, but the basic DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict is using fingerprint prop in a way that's not yet clear to me... It seems likely that this is actually bypassing hardware attestation for this verdict (a fallback to basic?) per some Google server end white or black-list of fingerprints currently...

It is clear that USNF is working currently for PI API as for S/N once a passing fingerprint is selected (at least for A11+ devices generally; A10- seem to pass PI's DEVICE_INTEGRITY verdict as is); this attestation will fail where the selected fingerprint fails old CTS Profile match or if USNF is simply disabled, indicating that a STRONG_INTEGRITY verdict is probably being effectively bypassed by USNF... PW

More exactly, per Play Integrity API documentation, Device Integrity Verdict mapping table:

Migrating from the SafetyNet Attestation API | Google Play | Android Developers

developer.android.com

SafetyNet basicIntegrety = Play Integrity MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY

SafetyNet basicIntegrety + ctsProfileMatch with Basic attestation = Play Integrity MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY

SafetyNet basicIntegrety + ctsProfileMatch with Hardware_backed attestation = Play Integrity MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY

Screenshot from the API doc attached

Edit: I see now that @TraderJack has already quoted that mapping table

 

[Displax]

So, here is my modification of USNF with Play Integrity API bypass.

It changes fingerprint to old 7.1.2 6.0 (LOL) and apply it only for GMS SafetyNet process (by Zygisk injection), so your original prints/security path level does not change. This avoids many side effects/problems with global props changing.

Updated 3.0:
No words needed, you understand everything yourself

Updated 2.1:
Hide "Enable OEM Unlock" setting

Updated 2.0:
Bypassing DEVICE_INTEGRITY for devices that shipped with Android 13+ (Pixel`s 7 )

Updated:
Drop fingerprint to lowest possible (6.0) to ensure that no one use same Android version

Usage:
1. Delete/disable/reset MagiskHidePropsConfig (if installed).
2. Just install it over old Universal SafetyNet Fix and reboot device.
3. You may be needed to wipe GMS data (not cache) if there is no result immediately.

Many thanks to @1nikolas for integrity checker.

Source code: https://github.com/Displax/safetynet-fix/tree/integrity